• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국경영과학회 2004년도 추계학술대회 및 정기총회
• /
• pp.289-303
• /
• 2004

As needs for telecommunications services diversify, an increasingly wide range of telecommunications services is becoming available in the market. Any subscriber can find a service to satisfy his/her telecommunication requirements and competition between providers to retain heavy users is increasing. Service price reductions are one retention strategy, although price reductions for one service can affect the individual-level usage for other services. Price reductions can also be imposed on a service provider by regulation. For these reasons, understanding how price reductions affect service usage is of growing importance to the telecommunications industry for purposes of pricing and tariff development. In this paper, we develop an individual-level usage model for telecommunications services and analyze the effects on usage of a price reduction. We apply the model to age-stratified aggregate traffic data for a Korean mobile telecommunication service provider. Finally, we develop a model to support a market segmentation and price reduction strategy.

• 스마트미디어저널
• /
• 제12권1호
• /
• pp.54-61
• /
• 2023

Pricing, as one of the most important aspects of a business, should be taken seriously. Whatever affects a company's pricing system tends to affect its profits and losses as well. Currently, many manufacturing companies fix product prices manually by members of an organization's management team. However, due to the imperfect nature of humans, an extremely low or high price may be fixed, which is detrimental to the company in either case. This paper proposes the development of a fuzzy-based price expert system (Expert Fuzzy Price (EFP)) for manufacturing companies. This system will be able to recommend appropriate prices for products in manufacturing companies based on four major pricing strategic goals, namely: Product Demand, Price Skimming, Competition Price, and Target population.

• 국제학술발표논문집
• /
• The 2th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
• /
• pp.289-298
• /
• 2007

The development of construction industry has led to the increase in the number of criteria imposed by project clients for selecting contractors. For example, clients often request tenderers to satisfy various conditions such as tight programme, financial strength, managerial ability, relevant work experiences, technical strength, high workmanship standard, safety requirement, quality specification, and yet others. This trend has attracted research interests of devising various methods for helping project clients to assess contractors' bids. For example, in recent development, the Works Bureau of the Hong Kong Government has introduced two mechanisms in tender evaluation for various public work contracts, namely, the Marking Scheme effective from June 2002 and the Formula Approach effective from November 2002 [1], [2]. These approaches evaluate a contractor's tender by considering collectively its tender price and performance attributes, the latter including contractor experience, past performance, technical resources and technical content of his proposal. The tender with the highest combined price and performance score (CPPS) will be normally recommended for acceptance. It appears, however, that there is little existing research in helping contractors to identify a competition strategy that enables the contractor to offer his most competitive bid collectively taking into account his resource capacities and project client's multiple performance criteria. This paper examines the factors affecting contractor's competition strategy to compete for works in Hong Kong. The understanding about the factors will contribute to identifying effective competition strategy. The data used for the analysis were collected from Hong Kong construction industry. The research findings may provide valuable references for investigating effective competition strategies in other construction industries outside the region.

• Asia Marketing Journal
• /
• 제16권1호
• /
• pp.35-69
• /
• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 한국IT서비스학회지
• /
• 제15권1호
• /
• pp.81-96
• /
• 2016

This study analyzes how breach fee under long-term contract and/or cap regulation on the breach fee can affect the impacts of "Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act" on handset bundle price, average revenue per unit (ARPU), and social welfare. We conduct comparative analysis with an economic model of duopoly competition in price when users are under long-term contract and the breach fee can be regulated. The results show that the Act lowers the equilibrium prices, lower than incumbent price without the Act. Price of non-dominant Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can be lower than poaching price without the Act if significant portion of switching cost is breach fee or the market is significantly asymmetric. Under the significant circumstances, the Act can raise ARPU even though it improves social welfare. By contrast, the Act increases consumer surplus without affecting social welfare if breach fee is the only source of user's switching cost and is capped by the regulation, and more symmetric market and the stronger cap leads to higher consumer surplus.

• 패션비즈니스
• /
• 제8권4호
• /
• pp.117-130
• /
• 2004

The purposes of this study were to find out highly market sharing young casual brands, to compare their trends of concept and competition, and to propose orientation of brand concept repositioning and marketing strategies on Department stores. Reference searching method and field searching method were used for this study. The results were as follows: 1. The brands which covered more than 50% market share included <96NY> . 2. Price range of these brands was from 130,000 to 220,000 won. The brands of upper-moderate price zone included <96NY> and they were very competitive each other. The brands of moderate price zone included and they were also very competitive between them. However, the brands of lower-moderate price zone had lower competition. This price zone might be a good point to launch new brands. 3. The main target-age of young casual zone was from 17 to 30 years. The most of brands focused on 21-25 years old, which were higher age targeted before. 4. The main concepts of these brands were 'luxury, girlish, sexy' and 'Sportism, lifestyle' were sub-concepts.

• 토지주택연구
• /
• 제10권4호
• /
• pp.13-30
• /
• 2019

Parking lot within housing site contains public interest of relieving parking space shortage problem and subject to public restriction. If auctioned off at higher price by excessive competition in general competitive bid for land bidders, the development of parking lot will be made against its original purpose supply. The core issue is that a bid price is quite often to be blown out of proportion by 150%~ 250% due to extreme competition and, could face serious problem if a winning bidder runs sale business. If it is rental business, although about 30% of the total floor space of the whole building to be used as neighborhood facilities, too high winning bid price cause to lose transparency. In case of sale at aggregate buildings, most business operators would sell 30% of the neighborhood facilities, spare the parking lot and manages thereof separately. According to Aggregate Buildings Act, neighborhood facilities are allowed for individual registration and ownership of parking lot by business operator or designated person by business operator. In this case, the parking lot becomes 70% of the total floor space of the whole building and 70% of the land share which makes the mortgage very valuable and easier for business operator to get financial loan. There used to be many cases such as owners of neighborhood facilities (aggregate buildings partial owners) who run parking lot to repay their loan running parking lot to repay loan, but found that very tough and reached auction and relatively disadvantaged. For parking lot within housing site, it is recommend to exclude the public factors that land has and take into account of public restriction in area (housing site). Business opportunity for operators and protection of property rights for buyers in aggregate buildings, land supply method is recommended to replace from highest bid method into draw or private contract. In terms of price, supply at estimated price (construction price) and restriction on usage (Co-ownership of parking lot) proposals are submitted.

• 대한산업공학회지
• /
• 제31권4호
• /
• pp.277-288
• /
• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• 한국유기농업학회지
• /
• 제15권2호
• /
• pp.151-169
• /
• 2007

By the environment-friendly(hereafter EF) agricultural policy and toward the safety food of consumers, there is much glowing supply and demand fur EF agricultural products, in Korea. But, in general, EF agricultural products are blown as unique, unreasonable and high price system. This study aims to make clare the main bodies and competition structure in EF agricultural products and the different from the agricultural products. The mail results of this study are summarized as follows. Firstly, farmers and consumers directly participate in the distribution, and the major distributors participate in the market of EF agricultural products after the certification system is got ready. Because EF agricultural products is not dealt and the price system is not built up in agricultural wholesale market. Secondly, the distribution route of EF agricultural products is organized the unified organization by the main bodies such as farmers, consumers co-op, and special distributors. In any step of distribution, the main body of distribution surely deals with the contracted farmers, consumers co-op, and special distributors. Accordingly, it is said that EF agricultural products has the competition structure between the distribution route organized the unified organization rather than between main bodies in the each steps of distribution.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
• /
• 제24권66호
• /
• pp.37-45
• /
• 2001

Because the structure of the economy is being changed from product-oriented and company-centered economy to service-oriented and customer-centered economy, and the market competition is varying with the competition of non-price factors, the importance for customer service of logistics system is being increased. Thus, the level of customer service should be represented as an element of the logistics decision and the facility location decision. The level of customer service provided by logistics system has an effect on customers\` purchase decisions, hence on the market demand. That is, the market demand is elastic for customer service as it is influenced by product price. Considering the effect of customer service on demand, this study develops the market area which each facility will serve. That area is circular, and distance norm is considered Euclidean and Rectilinear (or Manhattan) distance norm. The market demand for product at a particular area is affected by the level of customer service that facility provides, and the relationship between the market demand and the level of customer service is represented with a mathematical function.