• Journal of the Korea institute for structural maintenance and inspection
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.48-54
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• 2024

NPP (Nuclear power plant) structures have been constructed near to the sea shore line for cooling water and exposed to steel corrosion due to chloride attack. Regarding NPP structures built in the UAE, chloride transport may be more rapid than those in the other regions since the temperature near to the coast is high. In this study, concrete samples with 5,000psi (35MPa) design strength grade were manufactured with the materials and mix proportions, which were the same as used in the UAE NPP structures, then chloride diffusion coefficients were evaluated considering temperature and curing age. The compressive strength and the diffusion coefficient were evaluated and analyzed for the samples with 28 and 91 curing days. In addition, chloride diffusion tests for 91-day-cured condition were carried out in the range of 20℃ to 50℃. The activation energy was obtained through converting the temperature slope to a logarithmic function and it was compared with the previous studies. The proposed activation energy can be useful for a reasonable durability design by using actual temperature-dependent chloride diffusion coefficient.

• Applied Chemistry for Engineering
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.311-318
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• 2015

This work investigated the plasma treatment of aqueous bisphenol A (BPA) solution and mineralization pathways. For the effective contact between plasmatic gas and aqueous BPA solution, the plasma was created inside a porous ceramic tube, which was uniformly dispersed into the aqueous solution through micro-pores of the ceramic tube. Effects of the gas flow rate, applied voltage and treatment time on the decomposition of BPA were examined, and analyses using ultraviolet (UV) spectroscopy, ion chromatography and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry were also performed to elucidate mineralization mechanisms. The appropriate gas flow rate was around $1.0L\;min^{-1}$; when the gas flow rate was too high or too low, the BPA decomposition performance at a given electric power decreased. The increase in the voltage improves the BPA decomposition due to the increased electric power, but the energy required to remove BPA was similar, regardless of the voltage. Under the condition of $1.0L\;min^{-1}$ and 20.8 kV, BPA at an initial concentration of $10L\;min^{-1}$ (volume : 1 L) was successfully treated within 30 min. The intermediates produced by the attack of ozone and hydroxyl radicals on BPA were further oxidized to stable compounds such as acetate, formate and oxalate.

• Spatial Information Research
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.341-350
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• 2009

As the power and scale of typhoons are growing due to global warming and socioeconomic damages induced by super-typhoons are increasing, it is important to estimate inundation damages and to prepare proper adaptation plans against an attack of the super-typhoon. In this paper, we estimated the inundation damages of urban area around Haeundae beach induced by super-typhoons which follow the route of Typhoon Maemi with the conditions of Typhoon Vera (Ise Bay in Japan, 1959), Typhoon Durian (Philippine, 2006) and Hurricane Katrina (New Oleans in U.S.A, 2005). The coastal area around the Haeundae beach (Busan and Gyeongnam province) is expectedly damaged by severe storm surges. In this study we calculated the rise of sea level height after harmonizing the different datum levels of land and ocean and estimated the inundation depth, inundation area and the amount of building damages by using airborne LiDAR data and GIS spatial analysis techniques more accurately and quantitatively. As many researchers are predicting that super-typhoon of overwhelming power will occur around the Korean peninsula in the near future, the results of this study are expected to contribute to producing coastal inundation map and evacuation planning.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Next Generation Computing
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.44-56
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• 2018

Researches on military weapons are actively studied to improve national defense power of each country. The military weapon system is being used not only as a weapon but also as a reconnaissance and surveillance device for places where it is difficult for people to access. If such a weapon system becomes an object of attack, military data that is important to national security can be leaked. Furthermore, if a device is taken, it can be used as a terrorist tool to threaten its own country. So, security of military devices is necessarily required. In order to enhance the security of a weapon system such as drone, it is necessary to form a chain of trust(CoT) that gives trustworthiness to the overall process of the system from the power on until application is executed. In this paper, by analyzing the trusted computing-based boot technology, we derive trusted boot technology components and classify them based on hardware dependence/independence. We expect our classification of hardware dependence/independence to be applied to the trusted boot technology of our self-development ultraprecision weapon system to improve the defense capability in our military.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.5
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• pp.93-101
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• 2008

Side channel attacks are well known as one of the most powerful physical attacks against low-power cryptographic devices and do not take into account of the target's theoretical security. As an important succeeding factor in side channel attacks (specifically in DPAs), exact time-axis alignment methods are used to overcome misalignments caused by trigger jittering, noise and even some countermeasures intentionally applied to defend against side channel attacks such as random clock generation. However, the currently existing alignment methods consider only on the position of signals on time-axis, which is ineffective for certain countermeasures based on time-axis misalignments. This paper proposes a new signal alignment method based on interpolation and decimation techniques. Our proposal can align the size as well as the signals' position on time-axis. The validity of our proposed method is then evaluated experimentally with a smart card chip, and the results demonstrated that the proposed method is more efficient than the existing alignment methods.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.241-271
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• 2020

The military technology currently receiving the most attention is the hypersonic missile. hypersonic is faster than the speed of sound or Mach 5+. The vast majority of the ballistic missiles that it inspired achieved hypersonic speeds as they fell from the sky. Rather than speed, today's renewed attention to hypersonic weapons owes to developments that enable controlled flight. These new systems have two sub-varieties: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability, and low altitude of flight. The fundamental question of this study is: 'What effect will the hypersonic missile have on the maritime strategy?' It is quite prudent to analyze and predict the impact of technology in the development stage on strategy in advance. However, strategy is essential because it affect future force construction. hypersonic missiles act as a limiting factor in securing sea control. The high speed and powerful destructive power of the hypersonic missile are not only difficult to intercept, but it also causes massive ship damage at a single shot. As a result, it is analyzed that the Securing sea control will be as difficult as the capacity of sea denial will be improved geographically and qualitatively. In addition, the concept of Fortress Fleet, which was criticized for its passive strategy in the past, could be reborn in a modern era. There are maritime power projection/defence, SLOC attack/defence in exploiting sea control. The effects of hypersonic missiles on exploiting sea control could be seen as both limiting and opportunity factors.

• Maritime Security
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.1-35
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• 2023

The purpose of this study is to present the direction of development of our navy's response strategy through analysis at the ends, ways, and means level of the Chinese navy's offensive strategy for the West Sea. As a result of the analysis, at the ends level, the Chinese Navy's offensive strategy for the West Sea strategy is being linked to a grand strategy to protect maritime rights and achieve maritime power between the U.S. and China competition, at the ways level, the Chinese Navy is expected to create a foundation for the international community to recognize the West Sea as China's inland sea through "routine entry" and "exercise authority", and in case of emergency, it will try to secure sea control in the West Sea in a short period of time by blocking Korea's maritime transportation route based on the overwhelming preemptive attack capability of aircraft carriers. At the means level, it is accelerating the construction of aircraft carrier warfare units and improving its ability to engage long-range missiles. As a direction of development of the Korean Navy's response strategy in response to this, first, Establishment and Development of National Maritime Security Strategy in conjunction with the Korean Indo-Pacific Strategy. Second, it proposes the development of the concept of effective security operations for the east sea area of the West Sea intermediate line, and third, the development of the concept of combat performance and capacity building to strengthen survival and lethality.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.41
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• pp.37-66
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• 2014

In recent years, with the development of computers and electronics, electronics and communication technology in a growing and each part is dependent on the cross-referencing makes all electronic equipment is obsolete due to direct or indirect damage EMP. Korea and the impending standoff North Korea has a considerable level of technologies related to the EMP, EMP weapons you already have or in a few years, the development of EMP weapons will complete. North Korea launched a long-range missile and conducted a nuclear test on several occasions immediately after, when I saw the high-altitude nuclear blackmail has been strengthening the outright offensive nuclear EMP attacks at any time and practical significance for the EMP will need offensive skills would improve. At this point you can predict the damage situation of Korea's security reality that satisfy the need, more than anything else to build a protective system of the EMP. The scale of the damage that unforeseen but significant military damage and socio-economic damage and fatalities when I looked into the situation which started out as a satellite communications systems and equipment to attack military and security systems and transportation, finance, national emergency system, such as the damage elsewhere. In General, there is no direct casualties reported, but EMP medical devices that rely on lethal damage to people who can show up. In addition, the State power system failure due to a power supply interruption would not have thought the damage would bring State highly dependent on domestic power generation of nuclear plants is a serious nuclear power plant accident in the event of a blackout phenomenon can lead to the plant's internal problems should see a forecast. First of all, a special expert Committee of the EMP, the demand for protective facilities and equipment and conduct an investigation, he takes fits into your budget is under strict criteria by configuring the contractors should be sifting through. He then created the Agency for verification of performance EMP protection after you have verified the performance of maintenance, maintenance, safety and security management, design and construction company organized and systematic process Guard facilities or secret communications equipment and perfect for the EMP, such as protective equipment maneuver system should take.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.