• Analyses & Alternatives
• /
• v.1 no.2
• /
• pp.2-12
• /
• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.

• Korean journal of communication and information
• /
• v.18
• /
• pp.269-303
• /
• 2002

This article presents a historical account of media role in the transition and consolidation period of democracy. Despite the assumption that media plays a important role in the construction of democracy, it is less clear how the media can affect the process of political change itself. This article seeks to answer some of these question, based on the Mill's macro-social comparative 'method of difference' of Korea and Spain. It is widely agreed that both states achieve democracy through transaction from above(pacts). Media role, however, differs significantly in accordance with authoritarian legacies and civic representativeness of the pacts. Whereas Korean dailies is deepening given market oligopoly and prior practices after democratization, Spain dailies market entirely changed in both structural and spiritual respects. As a result, Korean dailies substantially lacks in civic representativeness as before, contrary to Spain. Spain television settled a sort of the external pluralism. Korean television is pursuing the BBC type of internal pluralism. In Korea, television is more commercial than Spain. Consequently, Spain media serve the consolidation of democracy more than Korea on the whole.