• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.2-12
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• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.16
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• pp.168-206
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• 2001

This study attempts to examine the relationships between the major market-based media and the government after closing military regime era, 1961-1987. After the military regime was collapsed, while the mass media in Korea obtained independence and autonomy from government, they have been confronted with the terrible competition not so much comparatively as before. The watchdog role in the traditional liberalism, which is regarded as normative relationship between the media and the government would be transformed in accordance with the market condition and the maturity of democracy. Thus, the watchdog metaphor has been variously deviated in rower-centered society; lap dog, guard dog, attack dog. liberalists argue that the primary democratic role of the media is to art as a public watchdog overseeing the state. Social democrats, however, criticize them as simplistic conception which could be only applied to the government. They argue that the media should be seen as a source of redress against the abuse of all forms of power over others; the home, the economy, and the civil society. The lap dog view is that the media is overwhelmingly dependent on the established power structure contrary to the watchdog. While the guard dog perspective is a means to preserve the power structure alarming with playing 'conflict role', the attack do8 aims to the private interest of the media in intruding into the politics. The attack dog perspective by T. Patterson could be composed of the interpretive style of report, the game schema report over the policy schema in the election, and the negativism against politics and government. The market-dominant press has been likely to transform from lap-guard dog into attack-guard dog. In Roh Tae Woo government(1988-1992), while the press was a lessened lap-guard dog before three parties merger in 1990, after merger the press had been transformed as the reinforced lap-guard dog because this merger entailed joint, party-to-party negotiations, and the formation of the new party preceded by dissolution of the ruling blot. In the early stage of Kim Young Sam government(1993-1997), the press has kept in pace with the reform movement drive-forced by the government. However, the press withdrew the support of Kim's reform in reaching the level of threat to ruling bloc. The press coalesced only circumstantially with government and was interested in preserving some margin of independence. The failure of Kim's reform proved the political muscle of the press in post-autho-ritarianism. In the middle stage of Kim Dae Jung government (1998-) that resulted in the shift of power structure as once-opposition party leader, the stress has been a manifested attack-guard dog owing to the anti-cold war policy, the realignment policy of power, and the minority-base of Kim's government. The press has endeavored to hold political communication within limits relatively less threatening to the established order.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.43
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• pp.75-97
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• 2009

Article 35 of the CISG defines standards for determining whether goods delivered by the seller conform to the contract in terms of type, quantity, quality, and packaging. When we apply these article 35(1), (2) of the CISG to the business connection, we will face several issues in the business connection. Fist, we will face the interpretation of contracts. When we interpret the contract, we must remember the article 8 of the CISG. Statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the intent of parties. Therefore parties of contract must describe their intent correctly. Second, we must make out a contract in written about the promised contents. And it is needed to insert a merger clause in order to prevent part of contract from disagreeing with each other. Third, there are several interpretation of fitness for the purpose for which the goods would ordinarily be used. So it is important to describe the quality standard to be applied. If it does not describe the standard, it is helpful to apply the reasonable quality test. Fourth, there may be some doubt regarding the question of whose standard-that of the seller's or that of the buyer's state-is relevant in order to determine which characteristics the goods must have in order to be fit for their ordinary purpose. Ultimately, the question of the relevant standard is a matter of the interpretation of the contract.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.