• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.51-57
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• 2016

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.749-759
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• 2021

We investigate the relationship between ownership control disparity and future firm value in high-technology industries, and whether the effect of ownership control disparity on future firm value is differentiated when high-tech industry firms belong to chaebol groups. Using 11,848 firm-year observations of Korean firms listed on the stock market from 2006 to 2019, we employ univariate analysis and Heckman 2 stage analysis to test our hypotheses. We define high-technology industries as ICT industries based on the Korean Standard Industrial Classification. We measure future firm value using average Tobin's q for the next three years and ownership control disparity using the shareholding ratio of affiliated companies. Our univariate test results show that mean of Tobin's q is higher in ICT firms than non-ICT firms and firms largely owned by affiliates. In multivariate test, we find that the ICT firms with higher ownership control disparity are positively associated with future firm value. However, this association is lessened when firms belong to a chaebol group. Based on our findings, we suggest ownership control disparity has an additional positive effect on future firm in high-technology industries. The negative impact of chaebol groups on the association suggests the possibility of diversification discount in business group.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.5-13
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• 2017

Purpose - This research analyzes the effects of Korean family ownership characteristics on firm value. The positive and negative effects of family ownership on Korean firm value were analyzed. If negative effects are evident, this research explores the factors that cause a decrease in firm value. Research design, data, and methodology - The study examined a total of 5,743 companies listed on the Korea Exchange from the period 2002 to 2012 using a panel data regression analysis. Result - An empirical analysis suggests that Korean family ownership diminishes firm value. Korean family firm value has been reduced when controlling shareholders are participated in management and pursue excessive wages, or make the management entrenchment effects associated with ownership-control disparity. When the controlling shareholders of family firms have increasing control rights over the shareholders' general meeting and the directors' board, the agency costs associated with seeking increasing executive wages or private benefits reduce firm value. Conclusions - This study has significance because it reveals the negative effect of family ownership in Korea on firm value. These negative effects can be the result of agency problems from controlling family shareholders seeking excessive wages or ownership-control disparity.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.10
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• pp.675-685
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• 2020

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the potential effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between board composition and bank performance. The study employs a sample of Saudi banks listed on Saudi stock exchange (TADAUWL) over the period from 2011 to 2018. To test the study hypotheses and control for endogeneity issues, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) techniques are used. The empirical results reveal a significant negative moderating effect of ownership concentration on the association between board composition and bank performance, which confirms the study argument and supports hypotheses. The results indicate that board composition in terms of independent board members, executive board members, and non-executive board members in banks with higher ownership concentration have a weaker positive influence on bank performance. For control variables, the results are almost consistent with theoretical perspectives and previous empirical evidence. The results of this study have important implications for regulatory authorities, companies, and market participants in Saudi Arabia and countries with high concentrated ownership to understand how ownership concentration could affect corporate governance and firm performance and to identify appropriate actions to protect board composition from the influence of ownership concentration.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.5434-5441
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• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.1101-1111
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• 2021

The current study aims to investigate the influence of different categories of ownership held by different types of board members on bank performance. The study uses a sample of Saudi listed banks for the period from 2011 to 2018. The results of the panel data analysis using firm fixed-effects regression model indicate that bank performance is significantly and positively affected by the chairman ownership and the CEO ownership. However, board independent members' ownership has a negative influence on bank performance. While non-executive board members' ownership and family board members have an insignificant impact on bank performance. Control variables, including board size, non-executive board members, government ownership, leverage, and bank size are significantly associated with bank performance. Overall, the results indicate that Saudi bank performance is higher in smaller banks that have smaller boards with lower non-executive members, lower portion of shares held by independent board members, higher portion of shares held by the chairman, CEO, and government, and higher leverage. The results of this study provide important implications for regulatory authorities and market participants in Saudi Arabia and countries with ownership concentration to understand the actual role of different categories of board ownership on firm performance in addition to optimize board ownership.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.5558-5563
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• 2011

Using longitudinal data of 108 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2009, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on R&D investment. The study finds that control-ownership disparity is negatively related to R&D intensity. This empirical result suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights incent controlling shareholders' expropriation for their private interests, leading to decreased R&D investment which enhances firm value in the long term.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.9 no.7
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• pp.53-59
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• 2018

Purpose - This study examines the effect of control-ownership wedge on stock crash risk. In Korea, controlling shareholders have exclusive control rights compared to their cash flow rights. With increasing disparity, controlling shareholders abuse their power and extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Managers who are controlling shareholders of the companies tend not to disclose critical information that would prevent them from pursuing private interests. They accumulate negative information in the firm. When the accumulated bad news crosses a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock prices. We predict that stock price crash likelihood due to information opaqueness increases as the wedge increases. Research design, data, and methodology - 831 KOSPI-listed firm-year observations are from KisValue database from 2005 to 2011. Control-ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO -UCF)/UCO where UCF(UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Dependent variable CRASH is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least 1 crash week during a year, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between control-ownership wedge and stock price crash risk. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in KisValue database for the period 2005-2011, we find that stock price crash risk increases as the disparity increases. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of WEDGE is significantly positive, supporting our prediction. The result implies that as controlling shareholders' ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to withhold bad news. Conclusions - Our results show that agency problems arising from the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights increase the opaqueness of accounting information. Eventually, the accumulated bad news is released all at once, leading to stock price crashes. It could be seen that companies with high control-ownership wedge are likely to experience future stock price crashes. Our study is related to a broader literature that examined the effect of the control-ownership wedge on stock markets. Our findings suggest that the disparity is a meaningful predictor for future stock price crash risk. The results are expected to provide useful implications for firms, regulators, and investors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.183-189
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• 2021

Transfer pricing is a matter of concern for countries. It affects the interests of the parties involved in the commercial transaction. Through manipulation of prices in transactions, businesses take advantage of tax rates in a country to adjust profits for economic gain. This affects the fairness and rationality of economic transactions between related parties. The article uses a two-year time series from 2018 to 2019 of 50 foreign direct investment enterprises in Vietnam. The article uses ordinary least squares to test the hypotheses of the research model. The article uses four independent variables related to ownership structure affecting transfer pricing decisions including total ownership, organization ownership, concentration ownership, and area ownership. Research results show that two variables have a positive influence on transfer pricing decisions including total ownership and organization ownership. Organization ownership has a higher degree of influence than total ownership. To be able to control transaction activities related to transfer pricing, Vietnam's state management agencies need to pay attention to perfecting the legal framework based on supplementing and amending regulations related to transfer pricing. Legal regulations need to be regulated based on international common practices to ensure uniformity on a global scale.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.35-43
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• 2017

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives' compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm's ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives' compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.