This paper examined the history and development of Gyeongbokgung Palace's back garden based on historical materials and drawings such as Joseon Ilgi(Diaries of Joseon Dynasty), Joseon Wangjo Sillok(the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty), Doseongdaejido(the Great Map of Seoul), Bukgwoldohyeong(Drawing Plan of the Northern Palace), the Bukgung Palace Restoration Plan, Restoration Planning of Gyeongbokgung Palace and the following results were derived. First, it was confirmed that the Back Garden of Gyeongbokgung Palace was famous for its great location since the Goryeo Dynasty, and that it was named Namkyeong at that time and was a place where a shrine was built, and that castles and palaces were already built during the Goryeo Dynasty under the influence of Fengshui-Docham(風水圖讖) and Zhouli·Kaogongji(周禮考工記). Although the back garden of Gyeongbokgung Palace in the early Joseon Dynasty stayed out of the limelight as a back garden for the palace, it has a place value as a living space for the head of the state from King Gojong to the present. Second, in order to clearly identify the boundaries of back garden, through literature such as map of Doseongdo (Map of the Capital), La Coree, Gyeongmudae Area, Japanese Geography Custom Compendium, Korean Photo Album, JoseonGeonchukdoJip(The Illustration Book of Joseon Construction), Urban Planning Survey of Gyeongseong, it was confirmed that the current Blue House area outside Sinmumun Gate was built outside the precincts of Gyeongbokgung Palace. It was found that the area devastated through the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, was used as a space where public corporations were combined through the process of reconstruction during the King Gojong period. In Japanese colonial era, the place value as a back garden of the primary palace was damaged, as the palace buildings of the back garden was relocated or destroyed, but after liberation, it was used as the presidential residence and restored the place value of the ruler. Third, in the back garden of Gyeongbokgung Palace, spatial changes proceeded through the Japanese Invasion and Japanese colonial era. The place with the greatest geographical change was Gyeongnongjae area, where the residence of the Japanese Government-General of Korea was built, and there were frequent changes in the use of the land. On the other hand, the current Gyeongmudae area, the forests next to the small garden, and the forests of Baekak were preserved in the form of traditional forests. To clarify this, 1:1200 floor plan of inner Gyeongmudae residence and satellite images were overlapped based on Sinmumun Gate, and as a result, it was confirmed that the water path originating from Baekak still exists today and the forest area did not change. Fourth, in the areas where the traditional forest landscape was inherited, the functional changes in the topography were little, and major old-age colonies are maintained. The old trees identified in this area were indicator tree species with historical value. Representatively, Pinus densiflora for. multicaulis Uyeki, located in Nokjiwon Garden, is presumed to have been preserved as one of Pinus densiflora for. multicaulis Uyeki planted next to Yongmundang, and has a historicality that has been used as a photo zone at dinners for heads of state and important guests. Lastly, in order to continuously preserve and manage the value of Gyeongbokgung Palace in Blue House, it is urgent to clarify the space value through excavation of historical materials in Japanese colonial era and establish a hierarchy of garden archaeology by era. In addition, the basis for preserving the historical landscape from the Joseon Dynasty to the modern era from Gyeongbokgung Palace should not damage the area of the old giant trees, which has been perpetuated since the past, and a follow-up study is needed to investigate all the forests in Blue House.
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limit pricing and predatory pricing. While there have been extensive studies which have dealt with predation and limit pricing separately, no study so far has analyzed these closely related practices in a unified framework. Treating each practice as if it were an independent phenomenon is, of course, an analytical necessity to abstract from complex realities. However, welfare analysis based on such a model may give misleading policy implications. By analyzing limit and predatory pricing within a single framework, this paper attempts to shed some light on the effects of interactions between these two frequently cited tactics of entry deterrence. Another distinctive feature of the paper is that limit and predatory pricing emerge, in equilibrium, as rational, profit maximizing strategies in the model. Until recently, the only conclusion from formal analyses of predatory pricing was that predation is unlikely to take place if every economic agent is assumed to be rational. This conclusion rests upon the argument that predation is costly; that is, it inflicts more losses upon the predator than upon the rival producer, and, therefore, is unlikely to succeed in driving out the rival, who understands that the price cutting, if it ever takes place, must be temporary. Recently several attempts have been made to overcome this modelling difficulty by Kreps and Wilson, Milgram and Roberts, Benoit, Fudenberg and Tirole, and Roberts. With the exception of Roberts, however, these studies, though successful in preserving the rationality of players, still share one serious weakness in that they resort to ad hoc, external constraints in order to generate profit maximizing predation. The present paper uses a highly stylized model of Cournot duopoly and derives the equilibrium predatory strategy without invoking external constraints except the assumption of asymmetrically distributed information. The underlying intuition behind the model can be summarized as follows. Imagine a firm that is considering entry into a monopolist's market but is uncertain about the incumbent firm's cost structure. If the monopolist has low cost, the rival would rather not enter because it would be difficult to compete with an efficient, low-cost firm. If the monopolist has high costs, however, the rival will definitely enter the market because it can make positive profits. In this situation, if the incumbent firm unwittingly produces its monopoly output, the entrant can infer the nature of the monopolist's cost by observing the monopolist's price. Knowing this, the high cost monopolist increases its output level up to what would have been produced by a low cost firm in an effort to conceal its cost condition. This constitutes limit pricing. The same logic applies when there is a rival competitor in the market. Producing a high cost duopoly output is self-revealing and thus to be avoided. Therefore, the firm chooses to produce the low cost duopoly output, consequently inflicting losses to the entrant or rival producer, thus acting in a predatory manner. The policy implications of the analysis are rather mixed. Contrary to the widely accepted hypothesis that predation is, at best, a negative sum game, and thus, a strategy that is unlikely to be played from the outset, this paper concludes that predation can be real occurence by showing that it can arise as an effective profit maximizing strategy. This conclusion alone may imply that the government can play a role in increasing the consumer welfare, say, by banning predation or limit pricing. However, the problem is that it is rather difficult to ascribe any welfare losses to these kinds of entry deterring practices. This difficulty arises from the fact that if the same practices have been adopted by a low cost firm, they could not be called entry-deterring. Moreover, the high cost incumbent in the model is doing exactly what the low cost firm would have done to keep the market to itself. All in all, this paper suggests that a government injunction of limit and predatory pricing should be applied with great care, evaluating each case on its own basis. Hasty generalization may work to the detriment, rather than the enhancement of consumer welfare.
As we considered in the main subjects, investigations on the theory of 'Doctrine on five elements' motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣學說)' through 'Wang Bing's Commentary(王氷 注本)' of 'The seven great chapters in The Yellow Emperor's Internal Classic Su Wen' ("黃帝內經素問 七篇大論") are as follows. (1) In The seven great chapters("七篇大論")' Wang Bing supplement theory and in the academic aspects as a interpreter, judging from 'forget(亡)' character. expressed in the 'The missing chapters("素問遺篇")', 'Bonbyung-ron("本病論")' and 'Jabeob-ron(刺法論)', 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")' must be supplementary work by Wang Bing. Besides, he quoted such forty books as medical books, taoist books, confucianist books, miscellaneous books, etc in the commentary and the contents quoted in the 'Su Wen(素問)' and 'Ling Shu("靈樞")' scripture nearly occupy in the book. As a method of interpreting scripiure as scripture, he edited the order of 'Internal Classic("內經")' ascended from the ancient time and when he compensated for commentary, with exhaustive scholarly mind and by observing the natural phenomena practically and writing the pathology and the methods of treatment. We knew that the book is combined with the study of 'Doctrine on five elements motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣學說)' (2) When we compare, analyze the similar phrase of 'The seven great chapters in The Yellow Emperor's Internal Classic Su Wen'("黃帝內經素問ㆍ七篇大論") through 'Wang Bing's Commentary(王氷 注本)', he tells abouts organized 'five elements(五行)' and 'heaven's regularly movement(天道運行)' rather than 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")' in 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")'. Also the 'Ohanunhangdae-ron("五運行大論")' because the repeated sentences with 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")' is long they are omitted. And in the 'Youkmijidae-ron("六微旨大論")', 'Cheonjin ideology(天眞四象)' based on the 'Sanggocheonjin- ron("上古天眞論")', 'Sagijosindae-ron("四氣調神大論")' is written and in the 'Gigoupyondae-ron("氣交變大論")', the syndrome and symptom are explained in detail rather than 'Janggibeobsi-ron("藏氣法時論")', 'Okgijinjang-ron ("玉機眞藏論")' and in the 'Osangieongdae-ron("五常政大論")', the concept of 'five element(五行)' of the 'Gemgwejineon-ron("金櫃眞言論")' is expanded to 'the five elements' motion concept(五運槪念)' and in the 'Youkwonjeonggidae-ron("六元正紀大論")', explanations of 'The five elements' motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣)' function are mentioned mainly and instead systematic pathology is not revealed rather than 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")'. And in the 'Jijinyodae-ron("至眞要大論")', explanations of the change of atmosphere which correspond to treatment principle by 'The three Yin and Yang(三陰三陽)' as a progressed concepts are revealed. Therefore there are much similarity between the phrase of 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")' and 'chapters of addition(補缺之篇)'. Generally, the doctrine which 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")' are added by Wang Bing(王氷) is supported because there are more profound concepts rather than the other chapter in 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")'. (3) When we study Wang Bing's(王氷) 'Pattern on five elements motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣格局)' in 'The seven great chapter("七篇大論")', in the 'Cheonwongi-dae-ron("天元紀大論")', With 'Cheonjin ideology(天眞思想)' and the concepts of 'Owang(旺)'
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.