• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.263-268
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• 1970

시간과 에너지에 종속된 중성자 전도 방정식에 나타나는 연속 에너지 전도 연산자의 스펙트럼(Spectrum)을 분석했다. 스펙트럼에 관한 4가지 정리를 증명하고 일반화된 Mellin 에너지변화의 Convolution 정리를 얻었다. 또한 최종해에 필요한 완전성정리를 증명하고 점근적으로 가장 우세한 시간붕괴상수 1 - c를 발견하였다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.255-262
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• 1970

원자로 내에서 핵 분열이 관계될 때, 일반적인 비 등방성 중성자 수송 방정식의 세부적이고 확장된 계산이 다루어지고 있다. 우리가 일반 비 등방성인 경우의 해의 완전성을 증명할 때 산란과 분열의 복합 연산자가 각각 산란 연산자와 분열 연산자로 분리 될 수 있다는 것을 보여 주고 있다. 이러한 연산자가 실제 계산에 응용될 때, 해의 완전성에 필요한 측정되지 않은 새로운 항을 끌어낼 수 있고, 이로 말미암아 완전히 방정식을 풀 수 있다. 아울러, 2차 비등방성의 근의 수가 B$_1$와 B$_2$를 기지수로, Cs 미지수로 하여 자세히 분류되고 있다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제37권2호
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• pp.151-158
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• 2005

Advanced nuclear power plants are generally large complex systems automated by computers. Whenever a rare plant emergency occurs the plant operators must cope with the emergency under severe mental stress without committing any fatal errors. Furthermore, The operators must train to improve and maintain their ability to cope with every conceivable situation, though it is almost impossible to be fully prepared for an infinite variety of situations. In view of the limited capability of operators in emergency situations, there has been a new approach to preventing the human error caused by improper human-machine interaction. The new approach has been triggered by the introduction of advanced information systems that help operators recognize and counteract plant emergencies. In this paper, the adverse effect of automation in human-machine systems is explained. The discussion then focuses on how to configure a joint human-machine system for ideal human-machine interaction. Finally, there is a new proposal on how to organize technologies that recognize the different states of such a joint human-machine system.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제36권2호
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• pp.184-195
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• 2004

The multi-tasking feature of digital I&C equipment could increase risk concentration because the I&C equipment affects the actuation of the safety functions in several ways. Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS) is a typical case of safety function failure in nuclear power plants. In a conventional analysis, mechanical failures are treated as the main contributors of the ATWS. This paper quantitatively presents the probability of the ATWS based on a fault tree analysis of a Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant is also presented. An analysis of the digital equipment in the digital plant protection system. The results show that the digital system severely affects the ATWS frequency. We also present the results of a sensitivity study, which show the effects of the important factors, and discuss the dependency between human operator failure and digital equipment failure.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.155-164
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• 1995

증기발생기 수위조절계통의 무작위추출 비선형 제어계통의 경우로 연구되었다. 무작위 변수로는 시간불연속 계통의 추출시간간격 이 고려되었다. Lyapunov 함수를 구하지 않는 확률론적 Lyapunov 방법이 용되었다. 유도된 안정성 요건은 CANDU 형 원자로인 월성 1호기의 자료를 이용하여 시간 존속 모사로 검증하였다.

• 시스템엔지니어링학술지
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.82-90
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• 2021

The spent fuel pool (SFP) of a nuclear power plant functions to store the spent fuel. The spent fuel pool is designed to properly remove the decay heat generated from the spent fuel. If the cooling function is lost and proper operator action is not taken, the spent fuel in the storage pool can be damaged. Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is a safety evaluation method that can evaluate the risk of a large and complex system. So far, the probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants has been mainly performed on the reactor. This study defined the requirements and the functional architecture for the probabilistic safety assessment of the spent fuel pool (SFP-PSA) by applying the systems engineering process. And, a systematic and efficient methodology was defined according to the architecture.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제32권3호
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• pp.261-273
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• 2000

During an extensive review made as part of the Integrated Diagnosis System project of the Maiden Reactor Project, MOAS (Maryland Operator Advisory System) was identified as one of the most thorough systems developed thus far. MOAS is an integrated on-line diagnosis system that encompasses diverse functional aspects that are required for an effective process disturbance management: (1) intelligent process monitoring and alarming, (2) on-line sensor data validation and sensor failure diagnosis, (3) on-line hardware (besides sensors) failure diagnosis, and (4) real-time corrective measure synthesis. The MOAS methodology was used at the Maiden Man-Machine Laboratory HAMMLAB of the OECD Maiden Reactor Project. The performance of MOAS, developed in G2 real-time expert system shell for the high-pressure preheaters of the NORS process in the HAMMLAB, was tested against a variety of transient scenarios, including failures of the control valves and sensors, and tube leakage of the preheaters. These tests showed that MOAS successfully carried out its intended functions, i.e., quickly recognizing an occurring disturbance, correctly diagnosing its cause, and presenting advice on its control to the operator. The lessons learned and insights gained during the implementation and performance tests also are discussed.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제30권5호
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• pp.403-415
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• 1998

The CANDU 6 reactor assembly consists of an array of 380 pressure tubes, which are installed horizontally in a large cylindrical vessel, the Calandria, containing the low pressure heavy water moderator. The pressure tube is located inside the calandria tube and the annulus between these tubes, which forms a closed loop with $CO_2$ gas recirculating, is called the Annulus Gas System(AGS). It is designed to give an alarm to the operator even for a small pressure tube leak by a very sensitive dew point meter so that he can take a preventive action for the pressure tube rupture incident. To judge whether the operator action time is enough or not in the design of Wolsong 2,3 & 4, the Leak Before Break(LBB) assessment is required for the analysis of the pressure tube failure accident. In order to provide the required data for the LBB assessment of Wolsong Units 2, 3, 4, a series of leak detection capability tests was performed by injecting controlled rates of heavy water vapour. The data of increased dew point and rates of rise were measured to determine the alarm set point for the dew point rate of rise of Wolsong Unit 2. It was found that the response of the dew point depends on the moisture injection rate, $CO_2$ gas flow rate and the leak location. The test showed that CANDU 6 AGS can detect the very small leaks less than few g/hr and dew point rate of rise alarm can be the most reliable alarm signal to warn the operator. Considering the present results, the first response time of dew point to the AGS $CO_2$ flow rate is approximated.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.11-17
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• 1984

매우 작은 규모의 냉각재 상실 사고후($\leq$0.05ft$^2$) 어떤 일이 일어나는 가를 더 잘 이해하기 위해 고리 1호기에 대한 샘플 계산을 수행하였다 깨진 크기가 0.006 ft$^2$ 보다 큰 사고에 대해서는 냉각재 상실이 보충되는 양을 초과한다. 0.008 ft$^2$ 보다 큰 깨진 크기에 대해서는 잔열은 깨진 곳을 통해 완전히 제거된다. 이와 같은 결과에 비추어 고리 1호기는 매우 작은 규모의 냉각재 상실 사고의 전 영역에 걸쳐 비교적 안전하다고 결론지었다. 하지만, 900MWe 나 1200MWe 를 가진 원자로에 있어서, 어떤 깨진 크기에 대해서는 이 사고가 주의깊게 고려되어야 한다. 자연 순환에서 pool boiling 으로 또는 pool boiling에서 자연 순환으로 천이할때, 특별히 운전자와 안전 분석에 문제점을 남긴다. Primary pump shutoff, HPI pump shutoff, break isolation, opening relief valve의 운전자 간섭에 대해서도 논의 되었다. Shutoff 후 HPI pump의 연속적인 운전은 primary system의 건전성을 위협하지 않는다는 것이 증명되었다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제49권2호
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• pp.426-433
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• 2017

This paper describes the development process, the innovative techniques used and insights gained from the latest integrated, full scope, multistate Level 2 PSA analysis conducted at the Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant (KKL), Switzerland. KKL is a modern single-unit General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/6) with Mark III Containment, and a power output of $3600MW_{th}/1200MW_e$, the highest among the five operating reactors in Switzerland. A Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) analyses accident phenomena in nuclear power plants, identifies ways in which radioactive releases from plants can occur and estimates release pathways, magnitude and frequency. This paper attempts to give an overview of the advanced modeling techniques that have been developed and implemented for the recent KKL Level 2 PSA update, with the aim of systematizing the analysis and modeling processes, as well as complying with the relatively prescriptive Swiss requirements for PSA. The analysis provides significant insights into the absolute and relative importances of risk contributors and accident prevention and mitigation measures. Thanks to several newly developed techniques and an integrated approach, the KKL Level 2 PSA report exhibits a high degree of reviewability and maintainability, and transparently highlights the most important risk contributors to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) with respect to initiating events, components, operator actions or seismic component failure probabilities (fragilities).