• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.1-9
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• 2015

This paper proposes CAC method that is more efficient for RRM using game theory combined with Multiple Attribute Decision Making(MADM). Because users request services with different Quality of Service(QoS), the network preference values to alternative networks for each service are calculated by MADM methods such as Grey Relational Analysis(GRA), Simple Additive Weighting(SAW) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution(TOPSIS). According to a utility function representing preference value, non-cooperative game is played, and then network provider select the requested service that provide maximum payoff. The appropriate service is selected through Nash Equilibrium that is the solution of game and the game is played repeated. We analyze two overlaid networks among four Wireless LAN(WLAN) systems with different properties. Simulation results show that proposed MADM techniques have same outcomes for every game round.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.29-40
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• 1995

Since the coastal countries, such as Unite States and other Latin America countries, proclaimed their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, these countries have attention to the need to develop effective coastal management and resource conservation But these countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable for the expansion of the vested EEZ. In such a situation, Exclusive Economic Zone expansion can appear as attractive policy tools in a coastal fishing firms in a noncooperative rivalries with pelagic countries, enable them to expand their fishing share and earn more profits. In reality, the coastal countries strategic Exclusive Economic Zone expansion change the initial condition of the game that both countries' fishing firms play. In this case, the coastal countries' fishing, such as South Korea, Japan and others, act as a followers. As result, the coastal countries' welfare is improved because of pelagic countries profit share shifts to the coastal countries profit share. In this paper, we find that coastal countries strategic EEZ expansion policy may not improve the coastal contries welfare if the shifting profits are dominated by the direct lobbying costs and related resource depletion.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.71-82
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• 2009

As a solution to spectrum under-utilization problem, Cognitive radio (CR) introduces a dynamic spectrum access technology. In the area, one of the most important problems is how secondary users (SUs) should choose between the available channels, which means how to achieve load balancing between channels. We consider spectrum load balancing problem for CR system in frequency domain and especially in time domain. Our objective is to balance the load among the channels and balance the occupied time length of slots for a fixed channel dynamically in order to obtain a user-optimal solution. In frequency domain, we refer to Dynamic Noncooperative Scheme with Communication (DNCOOPC) used in distributed system and a distributed Dynamic Spectrum Load Balancing algorithm (DSLB) is formed based on DNCOOPC. In time domain, Spectrum Load Balancing method with QoS support is proposed based on Dynamic Feed Back theory and Hash Table (SLBDH). The performance of DSLB and SLBDH are evaluated. In frequency domain, DSLB is more efficient compared with existing Compare_And_Balance (CAB) algorithm and gets more throughput compared with Spectrum Load Balancing (SLB) algorithm. Also, DSLB is a fair scheme for all devices. In time domain, SLBDH is an efficient and precise solution compared with Spectrum Load Smoothing (SLS) method.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.135-159
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• 2020

This paper analyzes and compares the effects of various government subsidies to improve labor productivity. Laborers are differentiated in learning ability, and duopsonists in the labor market sequentially determine the quality levels and wages of employed laborers in a two-stage noncooperative game under perfect information. If a subsidy is given to the advanced firm in quality and productivity of labor, that firm will prefer to intensify wage competition due to strengthening its competitiveness in the labor market, and attempt to lower its quality in order to reduce the degree of differentiation in quality. At that time, the other firm wants to avoid competition because of its weakened competitiveness, and may have an incentive to lower the quality level to expand the differentiation. If the government subsidizes low-quality and low-productivity firm, it is motivated to increase its quality level to reduce differentiation due to the strengthening of competitiveness, and its competitor has an incentive to improve the quality to expand the differentiation. And there is no significant difference in whether payments are made to laborers or firms.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.313-333
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• 2020

This paper shows that when the exchange rate changes, there are conflicting effects on improving the quality and increasing market share of eco-friendly vehicles. In a vertically differentiated duopoly model consisting of high quality clean cars and low quality internal combustion engine cars, I set up a two-stage noncooperative game under perfect information that the quality levels and the prices of the cars are competitively determined. The vehicles are assumed to be produced in countries that use distinct currencies. When the exchange rate of the country that produces low quality cars rises, the producer prefers to intensify competition due to the relatively lowed cost, and the incentive for quality improvement arises from the intension of attempting to reduce the degree of differentiation of quality level. At this time, the clean car manufacturing firm tries to avoid competition due to weakened competitiveness, and increases the quality level to expand quality differentiation. However, in this case, the market share of eco-friendly vehicles shrinks. On the other hand, if the exchange rate changes in the opposite direction, the market share of eco-friendly vehicles is expected to increase, but the quality of both cars are deteriorated, causing a conflict effect.