• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.138-156
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• 2021

The aim of this article is to describe direction of Sino-Russian relations toward a new epoch - as the decision-making centers of both countries define them - indicating the commitment to building the future international order. It includes the synthesis of evolution of relations, descriptions of cooperation building of mutual confidence by both sides in variety of institutions; analyses of geo-economic relations emphasizing their geostrategic dimension and finally dynamics showing how two great powers want to achieve new areas of cooperation focused on building multipolar world order which is the essence of "new epoch". The argument goes towards recognizing the relationship as a "hhybrid alliance". This hybridity is a structural factor that can constrain the use of new dimensions of asymmetric interdependence as political leverage especially by United States against the two non-western powers but also facilitate to use it against West.

• Acta Via Serica
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.91-118
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• 2021

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China's contribution to the need for the world to collectively address deficits of peace, development, governance, and problems relating to climate, the environment and human health. The rise of China and the BRI do challenge the current 'rules-based global order' and the economic dominance and moral, political, economic, and cultural leadership of the United States and its allies. However, China's goal is not hegemony but a multipolar world in which common values coexist with principles of peaceful coexistence (including non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states). The evolution of the BRI is outlined, and the ways in which it reflects Chinese interests are summarized, including its roles in addressing natural resource dependence and excess capacity, a transition from investment promotion and factor-intensive growth to going out and industrial upgrading, going West, and the effective deployment of China's foreign exchange assets. Although China does therefore potentially gain, the BRI is designed so that partners also gain in a quest for win-win co-operation and mutual benefit. The values that underlie this approach and the call for a community with a shared future are compared with competing western values, whose roots lie in Enlightenment thought and are associated with a record of colonialism and imperialism. In this light, the article concludes with a consideration of the global implications of the BRI, the challenges it confronts and the likelihood that the unipolar moment will give way to a multipolar global development path.

• Anayses & Alternatives
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.37-78
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• 2022

The U.S.-led international order, sustained by overwhelming national power since the end of the Cold War, is gradually being restructured from a unipolar international system to a bipolar international system or a multipolar international system, coupled with the weakening of U.S. global leadership and the rise of regional powers. Geopolitically, discussions have been constantly raised about the security instability that the reshaping of the international order will bring about, given that East Asia is a region where the national interests of the United States and regional powers sharply overlap and conflict. This study aims to critically analyze whether security discussions in Korea are based on appropriate crisis assessment and evaluation. This paper points out that the security crisis theory emerging in Korea tends to arise due to threat exaggeration and emphasizes the need for objective evaluation and conceptualization of the nature and the level of threats that the restructured international order can pose to regional security. Based on the analysis of changes in conflict patterns (frequency and intensity), occurring in East Asia during the periods divided into a bipolar system (1950-1990), a unipolar system (1991-2008), and a multipolar system (2009-current), this study shows that East Asia has not been as vulnerable to power politics as other regions. This investigation emphasizes that the complexity of Korea's diplomatic and security burden, which are aggravated by the reorganization of the international order, do not necessarily have to be interpreted as a grave security threat. This is because escalating unnecessary security issues could reduce the diplomatic strategic space of the Republic of Korea.

• Anayses & Alternatives
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.5-36
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• 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War was a "three-layer compounded war" between the US and Russia, Russia and Ukraine, and Ukrainian government forces and rebels. First, the war is a phenomenon that occurred when the western sphere of influence seeking to maintain and strengthen the liberal international order and the Sino-Russian sphere of influence seeking a new alternative order collided in Ukraine, a geopolitical fault zone. Second, this war is the result of a typical 'security dilemma' phenomenon caused by the 'chain reaction' game of NATO's continuous expansion and Russia's response. Third, the Russia-Ukraine war was caused by the Russian military projection to prevent the military restoration of Donbas region by Ukraine. Until now, the Western world, led by the US, showed unexpected solidarity after the war despite subtle differences in positions. However, the non-Western world, including China, is not participating in the condemnation and sanctions against Russia. This war will be an important turning point in the existence and change of the current international order that has been formed and is operating since the end of the Cold War. The direction of maintenance/restoration, revision/change, and end/transformation of the current international order is highly likely to be determined depending on the development pattern and method of ending the war.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.157-173
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• 2021

In the transition to a multipolar international system, the literature has focused on great power competition while little attention has been given to the strategic possibilities of smaller states. However, as a result of globalization, states are so closely interconnected that the primary strategies of even major powers are not to achieve zero-sum solutions but to create asymmetric dependency through which they can influence the behavior of other states and non-state actors. States are assisted in this effort by a variety of tools, including setting up institutions, direct economic influence and through building different forms of infrastructure connectivity networks. By discussing asymmetric dependency situations from the perspective of the great powers, the literature presents smaller states primarily as passive actors, paralyzed by their dependence on great powers. Our paper argues that interdependence allows smaller states to effectively influence larger actors and examines strategies from which smaller states can choose in order to influence the behavior of larger states. Despite an extremely asymmetric relationship between Myanmar and China, actors in Myanmar have sought to influence China's Myanmar policy. We examine a case study of the Myitsone Dam, including Myanmar's strategic aims, chosen strategy and limitations in maneuvering space. Semi-structured interviews with local decision-makers and stakeholders are conducted in order to portray the full picture. Our study concludes that further research on the influencing strategies of small states in response to asymmetric dependence can contribute to a better understanding of the interdependence of states.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.82-108
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• 2023

As tension escalates between the US and China, scenarios for maintaining peace in Northeast Asia imply that secondary powers will perceive increasing incentives to reappraise their respective international roles. This analysis proposes that an analysis of France's Cold War role in Europe and the world under President Charles de Gaulle provides insights into conflict management in an increasingly multipolar international political environment. Their respective interests in preventing a so-called new Cold War emerging between the US and China include avoiding its excessive economic costs, if only because China is a massive trade partner. This study engages in theoretical framework-informed process tracing of de Gaulle's role. It explicates the assumptions that functionally underpinned de Gaulle's policy of soft balancing between the US and China. The analysis explores de Gaulle's contribution to the decay of the Cold War. It illuminates de Gaulle's contribution to a regional international environment that made West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik strategy more feasible politically. This study applies these findings in the formulation of strategy recommendations focusing on Japan. Valid inferences regarding the predominant motivations driving American and Chinese international interaction are necessary for this task. To the extent to which the US and China have entered into a conflict spiral, Japan's hedging towards Washington is further incentivized. Tokyo would necessarily need to convince the Chinese that Japan is no longer Washington's unsinkable aircraft carrier off its coast. Tokyo, like de Gaulle's France, would maintain close relations with Washington, but it would need to project to its interlocutors its commitment to its own strategic autonomy. Tokyo's emphasis on closer relations with liberal democratic Indo-Pacific actors would potentially fit well with a commitment to strategic autonomy to defend the global liberal order.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.31-60
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• 2011

Medvedev administration has adopted new foreign policy line because of Obama administration's 'Reset' policy and Global economic crisis. The objectives of Medvedev's new foreign policy are the creation of a favorable external environment and the efficient use of external resources for Russia's economic modernization. To achieve these goals, Medvedev's government fleshed out such specific action plans as the avoidance of conflicts with other powers, the prevention of conflicts around Russia's borders, the activation of capital investment, and the introduction of advanced technology from the outside. This foreign policy line takes shape in the building of a foundation for strategic cooperation with the United States, the preparation for 'Modernization Alliance' with Europe, the management of cooperation and conflict with China and Japan, and the introduction of a dual strategy of strategic stability and economic integration in relations with post-soviet states. In Russia's new foreign policy line the strengthening of relations with the United States and Europe acquires highest priority. However, this does not mean a return to a 'pro-Western liberal line' in the early 1990s. The ultimate goal of Russia's 'modernization' program still lies in the rebuilding of a powerful Russia in accordance with the multipolar world order that was Putin administration's foreign policy line. In this context, foreign policy change under Medvedev administration could be defined as a 'program change at international level' that signifies a change in the means to achieve goals without changing them.