• Title/Summary/Keyword: moral philosophy

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Elementary Learning : A Book for a Child's Moral Education (소학 (小學): 아동의 도덕 교육을 위한 책)

  • An, Kwang Gug
    • Korean Journal of Child Studies
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    • v.37 no.6
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    • pp.213-217
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    • 2016
  • Sohak is a book compiled by Zhu Xi, who was a Confucian philosopher, and his disciple, Liu Qingzhi, to promote the morality and personality in children. This book reflects Zhu Xi's philosophy of human nature and education and provides a way to observe proprieties and courtesy. The content and principle of this book is not likely to be easily understood or applied to people in the modern Korean society. Nevertheless, Sohak inspires us to have an insight on how the human relationship should be and what is the desirable moral education method for children to solve moral conflicts in real settings of complicated social interactions.

Humanity and Culture: Based on the Conception of Husserl's Philosophical Cultural Community (인간성과 문화: 후설의 철학적 문화공동체 개념을 중심으로)

  • Park, In-Cheol
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • no.113
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    • pp.61-92
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    • 2016
  • In the Western civilization, the concept of culture has traditionally the meaning of education or forming the moral humanity. However, this meaning of culture has recently changed since the advent of cultural relativism which lays stress on the cultural diversity. The current meaning of culture lies in the ways of life, whatever they are. It indicates that culture has nothing to do with universal human nature and morality, as the new concept of culture is only based on the historical and contingent life-situations of people in the each special area. Against this current view of culture, this paper contends that culture and humanity(human nature) are closely connected with each other and that every culture is rooted in the universal human nature. So culture could have a great influence on humanity and forming of moral community. This thesis might be justified by Husserl's view on the philosophical culture of the ancient Greece. According to Husserl, the philosophy in the ancient Greece intended to realize the idea of true humanity and to build the moral community. Husserl's interpretation of the philosophical culture is based on his belief that philosophy as an ideal culture transcends the cultural diversity and historical contingency and strives for a universal human community, in which all mankind are harmonized and live well. The philosophical culture would -so Husserl- result in the moral community. Against this conception of the moral cultural community, could man argue that the idea of the moral community be an ideal dream which could not be realized considering the irrational and immoral character of community. However, this argument should be refuted, because it has overlooked the moral and open-minded character of culture with the feeling of solidarity.

복성(復性)서원 교학 과정을 통해 본 마일부의 교육관

  • Lee, Yeon-Jeong
    • 중국학논총
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    • no.64
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    • pp.205-221
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    • 2019
  • 馬一是浮中國現代哲學中與梁漱溟,熊十力並稱三大聖賢之一,對中國現代思想哲學有著重大影響的人物. 他樹立傳統儒家哲學,面對時代形勢,值得一提. 我知道現代哲學家們共同將儒學精神融入到他的思想體系中去,但打下這個基礎的正是馬一浮,所以,只要討論他的思想哲學,我覺得是一件非常有意義的事情. 他在"複性"的方針下,致力於重新定位國學,提高中國的精神價值. 在這些方向性實施的各種領域中,最值得注意的是教育,其中心就是"複性書院". 建立複星書院,把教育內容作爲留學的核心"育藝",這是其特點,爲了診斷當時學風的危害,恢複對思想學術研究的純真,書院獨立運作的嘗試,是實際實踐. 本論稿探討了福星書院的設立,建立方向,運行方針和規章制度,以考察他作爲民族思想家,教育實踐家的面貌,考察他的思想特點.

A Study on Zhou Dunyi and Yangming Xin-Xue (周敦颐与阳明心学)

  • Sun, yeongsam
    • (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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    • no.67
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    • pp.327-344
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    • 2017
  • Zhou Dunyi is regarded as a precursor of Li-Xue, which is called Neo-Confucianism. So, it could be say that Zhou Dunyi is a precursor of Song-Ming-Li-Xue. As is well known, Zhu xi is a synthesizer of Li-Xue in Song Dynasty, which is called Dao-Xue; Wang Yangming is a synthesizer of Li-Xue in Ming Dynasty, which is called Xin-Xue. Dao-Xue and Xin-Xue were engaged in an unyielding confrontation for many centuries in Asian areas. It is certain that Dao-Xue and Xin-Xue both succeed to the resources of Zhou Dunyi together, but it is not easy to confirm that the resources of Zhou Dunyi are common to both sides taking an unyielding confrontation into consideration. Usually, Zhou Dunyi is recognized as a Master of Dao-Xue rather than Xin-Xue. But in this paper, I try to give a question to this prevalent view, like this: Yang-Ming-Xin-Xue much absorbed and developed the Thought of Zhou Dunyi than Zhu-Xi-Dao-Xue did. In order to prove this assertion, I take two steps. The first is about Daotong, the second is about sincerity. In conclusion, while Wang Yangming build his own thought of moral philosophy, he fully absorbed Zhou Dunyi's thought of sincerity, and concreted his typical moral philosophy, which is Liangzhi-Xue. I could say that besides the viewpoint of Zhu xi, there is another viewpoint of Wang Yangming to understand the thought of Zhou Dunyi properly.

Building Bridges: Eurocentric to Intercultural Information Ethics

  • Gautam, Ayesha;Singh, Deepa
    • Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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    • v.20 no.1
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    • pp.151-168
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    • 2021
  • Misguided use, manipulation, misappropriation, disruption and mismanagement of Information deeply affects the infosphere as well as the social and moral fabric of a society. Information ethics is an attempt to bring the creation, organization, dissemination, and use of information within the ambit of ethical standards and moral codes. The diverse and inherently pluralistic nature of societies however puts forth an additional demand on us - to come up with an intercultural information ethics. An intercultural ethics which is other-centric, context sensitive and workable without being homogenizing, patronizing and colonizing. An endeavor in that direction has already been made by proponents of intercultural information ethics like: Charles M. Ess, Fay Sudweeks, Rafael Capurro, Pak-Hang Wong, Soraj Hongladarom et al. In our paper, we propose that the kind of ethical pluralism being sought in the domain of information ethics can be attained by having a reappraisal of the current methodological strategies, by casting a critical relook at the Eurocentric ethical model. This paper analyses the current framework of Intercultural Information Ethics. And in an endeavour to move towards an all-encompassing, other-centric, workable, intercultural, harmonious and compassionate model of 'Pluralistic Information Ethics', it proposes the Indian / Asian philosophical method of 'Samvāda' to the current inventory which includes methods like: 'parrhesia/free speech' and 'interpretive phronēsis.

Jeong Yak-Yong's Zhong-yong: The Habit of Moral Behavior Through Grasp (정약용의 중용: 장악을 통한 도덕적 행위의 습관화)

  • Gao, Ming-Wen;Mo, A-Yeong
    • Asia-pacific Journal of Multimedia Services Convergent with Art, Humanities, and Sociology
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    • v.8 no.8
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    • pp.793-803
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    • 2018
  • Since Confucius presentied 'zhong-yong' and Zi Si wrote Zhong-Yong (The Doctring of the Mean), specially since Zhu Xi edited Zhong-Yong as one of Si-Shu (The Four Books) and interpreted it, zhong-yong was not only recognized as the extreme of morality but also as a significant category of Confucianism. The purpose of this paper is to clarify how Jeong Yak-Yong criticized Zhu Xi's interpretation of zhong-yong, and furthermore, to search how Jung Yak-yong explain the zhong-yong by tree concepts of 'grasp', 'moral behavior', and 'habit'. Zhu Xi interpreted zong as a measured absolute middle of two-side and a non-launched original nature. Interpreted yong as a common truth. Therefore he interpreted zhong-yong as a common truth of neither excessive nor enough. Accordingly, Zhu Xi's zhong-yong can be understood as absolute zhong-yong without human's reflection and moral behavior. But Jeong Yak-Yong interpreted zhong as the state of a man's very hard-concentrate and grasp of situation, and interpreted yong as the state of a man's very hard-effort moral behavior and it's habit. Therefore he explained zhong-yong as a habit of moral behavior through grasp.

Restructuring Axel Honnet's Conception of Morality based on the Theory of Recognition from a Deontological Perspective (악셀 호네트의 인정이론적 도덕 구상의 의무론적 재구조화를 위한 시도)

  • Kang, Byoungho
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • no.116
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    • pp.1-28
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    • 2017
  • Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical conception of morality is most often characterized as a teleological or ethical foundation of morality and understood in simple consequentialist sense. Besides teleological or consequentialist components, however, there are obviously Kantian deontological ones too in his moral conception of Recognition. This study is intended to provide a consistent and coherent interpreta-tion of it, which is largely adopting main features of the moral philosophy of Kant. This interpretation makes a deontological restructuring of Honneth's moral conception of recognition necessary. It is in this way that the moral aspect of recognition will be able to satisfy the intention and whole project of Honneth's theory of recognition.

Schiller's 'Beautiful Soul' and Kant and Shaftesbury ("실러의 칸트 수용과 '아름다운 영혼' 그리고 샤프츠베리")

  • Kim, Joo-whee
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.148
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    • pp.101-128
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    • 2018
  • While there are various opinions about the relationship of Schiller's thought and Kant's, it is undeniable that Schiller owes much to Kant. What distinguished Schiller from other Weimar thinkers at his time, such as Goethe, Herder and Wieland, was that unlike them Schiller accepted Kant's project of critical philosophy. In fact, Schiller did not just accept it, but tried to interpret and formulate anew the relation of beauty and morality and some other aesthetical-ethical ideals on the basis of the new philosophy. Schiller's famous project of 'aesthetic education of mankind' itself is the product of such an endeavor. In this work we follow the history of Schiller's acceptance of Kant's critical philosophy and ruminate over its implications. And then, we'll show that Schiller's 'beautiful soul' in Grace and Dignity (1793), which is often suggested to be a proof of Schiller's conflict with Kant, was understood on the basis of Kant's moral theory. In this part of the work, we compare Schiller's ideal of the 'beautiful soul' and Shaftesbury's ethical thought, which is often presumed to be its background. From this comparison we'll be able to see that there is a considerable disparity, despite apparent similarities, between Schiller's and Shaftesbury's ethical ideals, which is due to their respective philosophical sources, that is neo-platonic metaphysics and Kant's critical philosophy.

Hegel's Philosophy of Law and Communitarianism - Focusing on Morality and Ethics - (헤겔의 법철학과 공동체주의 - 도덕성과 인륜성을 중심으로 -)

  • Yang, Hae-rim
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.117
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    • pp.161-189
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    • 2011
  • This thesis aims to examine the discussions on communitarianism and liberalism, which was actively debated post-1990's in the West. The paper will focus on the concepts of morality and ethics of Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" in order to connect the discussions on communitarianism and liberalism to our society's political reality. Specifically, through the introduction of Hegel's point of view, this paper will shed new light co the concept of communitarianism, which was viewed from the perspective of political philosophy within the West post-1990's. Through "Philosophy of Law," Hegel imbues a critical and fundamental meaning to modern ethical-political order. For Hegel, Kant's acceptance of morality has a foundational and compositional meaning for the concepts of law and nation. This paper will discuss this topic within the boundaries of Hegel's morality and ethics and regard this as a chance to look back on our political situation with a regretful introspection. International and national reviewers tend to regard the various perspectives of Hegel's philosophy of law as inspirational. However, it seems that the fundamental introspection of why our reality must adhere to his philosophy is lacking. Based on this concern, the paper aims to examine Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" to apply his perspectives to our political reality for a fundamental self-evaluation.

An Investigation on the human nature in philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism from a Kantian point of view (칸트의 관점에서 본 왕양명과 불교의 인간관)

  • Park, Jong-sik
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.131
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    • pp.165-197
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    • 2014
  • In this paper, I investigate on the human nature in philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism from a Kantian point of view. The core argument of the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, Buddhism and Kant is that all human beings have the pure abilities a priori to overcome themselves, to realize their own potentialities. This is called immanent transcendence. At this time human beings can be free. Kant, Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism claim that all human beings themselves will overcome their desires from their mind and body through the immanent transcendence, reflection and contemplation on their own. When we give up the external knowledges, throw away obsessions with the selfish desires and go back to our inside, we can see our original nature. To have an insight into this inner nature, to respect the moral law a priori, this is to overcome the ourselves, and to be a Grate Man(聖人) and a Buddha. This way is the only way to be a Grate Man and a Buddha. The main proposition of Wang Yang-Ming's philosophy is expressed 'There are no things without mind.'(心外無物) The core of Kant's transcendental philosophy is called the Copernican Revolution by himself. Copernican Revolution means the transition from the object-centered epistemology to the subject-centered epistemology. 'Innate Knowing'(良知) and 'Perform Innate Knowing'(致良知), 'All human beings have the mind of Buddha'(一切衆生悉有佛性) contain the apriority, immanence of Moral Law. In this respect, the theory of Innate Knowing in Wang Yang-Ming and mind of Buddha in Buddhism, pure Moral Law in Kant has the same structure grounded in subjectivity. Even if we have the mind of Buddha, innate Knowing, moral law a priori, the reason why we don't know our original nature is that we fall into the obsessions with selfish desires, and that we have inclination to external interests. So the moment you see our original nature, ordinary people themselves turn into a Buddha. These changes and transitions are immanent transcendence. All human beings have the ability to do this changes and transitions. Buddha does not exist outside of us, but it exists with our reflections on our human nature. Buddha can not existed without our insight into the our innate Ego. Where there is our original nature, there is a Buddha. So Buddha is called the another name of the original figure of human beings.