• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.77-105
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• 2023

This paper investigates the management stability of KOSPI-listed energy public enterprises from the perspective of median voter theory. We analyze the profitability and stability of five energy public enterprises during the period 2011~2022, and conduct an empirical analysis to determine whether they are related to the preferences of median voters who can represent the general public. Our analysis of the profitability and stability of the energy public enterprises shows that the stability of their has been deteriorating in recent years. The results of the empirical analysis also show that the management stability of the energy public enterprises is related to the preference of median voter. Specifically, they indicate that when the median voter's income is smaller than the average income, the profitability of the utility decreases and the debt ratio increases. This paper suggests that from the median voter's point of view, excessive utility and energy bills may strengthen the incentives for governments and politicians to suppress rate increases, leading to lower profitability and higher debt for public enterprises.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Automotive Engineers
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.34-42
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• 2006

As many systems depend on electronics, concern for fault tolerance is growing rapidly. For example, a car with its steering controlled by electronics and no mechanical linkage from steering wheel to front tires(steer-by-wire) should be fault tolerant because a failure can come without any warning and its effect is devastating. In order to make system fault tolerant, there has been a body of research mainly from aerospace field. This paper presents the structure of predictive smoothing voter that can filter out most erroneous values and noise. In addition, several numerical simulation results are given where the predictive smoothing voter outperforms well-known average and median voters.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.107-131
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• 2018

This paper presents a model for the Minimum Wage Commission's decision process and analyzes the strategic actions of the participants in the process. The Minimum Wage Commission has used two ways of setting the minimum wage. The commission has voted either on the labor's against the management' final proposals or has voted on the public interest commissioners' proposal. According to the model, the minimum wage is determined at a level that is very close to or at a level preferred by the median voter among the public interest commissioners. But the probability of adopting labor or management proposal is ex-ante the same. Empirical evidence from the minimum wage decision process is consistent with the predictions of the model. The probability of adopting the labor's proposal in the minimum wage commission voting is not statistically significantly different from 50%. The model also suggests that the preference of the median voter among public interest commissioners determines the minimum wage level. Since the government appoints public interest commissioners and thus, in fact, the median voters, the government can decide the minimum wage level. This proposition is also consistent with data. The annual growth rate of the minimum wage under the progressive governments is higher than under conservative governments.

• American Studies
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.169-198
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• 2009

Unlike the Democratic nomination, Republican nomination struggle has ended with an easy victory of Senator John McCain. This paper claims that the easy victory of McCain should not be interpreted as Republican's return to the median voter, because it masks religious schism and ideological discord among the Republicans. Christian rights were still reluctant to support McCain mostly due to his liberal position on social issues. In addition, the conservatives who request stricter immigration policy presented the mixed feeling toward the Republican candidate. Even though McCain chose the harmony inside the Republican party, rather than sticked to his liberal attitude toward social issues during the campaign for 2008 general election, McCain's defeat is unlikely to result in a rapid change in the Republican party.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.61 no.4
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• pp.35-59
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• 2009

This paper presents a formal model of social policy development. The model shows that the development of social policy depends both on the social policy preferences of voters and on the political institution which mediates the preferences of voters. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pairwise vote. But in the representative democracy, political parties design social policy to win the support of a majority of voters. Hence, the political institution like electoral rule may affect social policy outcome. The model presented in this paper contrasts 3 alternative constitutional features and investigates how they affect social policy outcome. In result, this papers emphasizes that policy preferences of voters and political institution may be key variables to explain social policy development and divergence among welfare regimes.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.62 no.3
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• pp.141-162
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• 2010

This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development which has been presented in a former paper of this study. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pair-wise pure majority voting. But, in the more general setting, we should think of various political institutions as a collective choice device. For this reason, I draw a formal model which formulates three contrasting types of political institutions which are distinguished by the developments of political democracy and the differences of electoral rules. Comparative patterns of key variables which measure political institutions, social policy developments, and social policy preference provide support for my arguments. My empirical results suggest that three political institutions are associated with very different policy outcomes. Compared to other institutions, committee system entails more targeted subsidy, less universal benefit. On the contrary, proportional elections produce more universal benefit, less targeted subsidy.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.59 no.4
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• pp.297-317
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• 2007

In this article, I want to demonstrate wage equality increases support for welfare expenditures while the wage equality depends on how labour market institutions are organized. In other words, this study tries to show that there can be institutional complementarity between inequality-reducing labour market institutions and generous social policy. In the first section, I develop a theoretical models which deal(1) how the inequality of income affects the political support for welfare expenditure(2) how the configurations of labour market institutions affect income inequality in the labour market. In the following section, this study tests the models with data on welfare spending, configurations of labour market institutions, and the inequality of wage and salaries in 14 welfare states from 1980 to 1995. Empirical analysis also provides support for key implications of the models. These models and empirical findings may show that the institutional complementarity stems from the interdependence of institutional influences on actors' decision-making. Moreover, this study suggests welfare policy are always considered with labour market institutions.