• 제목/요약/키워드: mechanism of strength development

검색결과 162건 처리시간 0.02초

오염퇴적물의 주요 영향인자에 따른 메탄발생 생성률 평가 (Assessment of Methane Production Rate Based on Factors of Contaminated Sediments)

  • 김동현;박형준;방영준;이승오
    • 한국방재안전학회논문집
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    • 제16권4호
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    • pp.45-59
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    • 2023
  • 세계적으로 온실가스 감축을 위해 주로 이산화탄소 발생에 초점을 맞춰왔지만, 최근에는 메탄 발생에 대한 관심이 커지고 있다. 습지, 저수지, 호소 등 수중 환경을 포함한 자연은 온실 가스 중요한 발원지이다. 호수와 저수지 바닥에 쌓인 퇴적된 유기 오염물질은 산소가 부족한 상태에서 미생물 분해를 통해 메탄과 같은 온실 가스를 생성할 수 있다. 메탄 배출은 비점오염원의 증가와 하천에 설치되는 횡단 구조물에 의한 흐름변화에 의해 증가하고 있는 실정이다. 또한, 기후 변화로 인한 수온의 상승 등은 메탄 배출을 가속화하는 원인이다. 메탄은 다양한 경로를 통해 대기로 배출될 수 있다. 따라서, 본 연구에서는 메탄발생의 주요인자가 미치는 영향을 정량화하기 위하여 BMP test을 수행하였다. 실험조건에 따라 메탄발생량을 직접 계측하였으며, 실험조건은 온도, 기질의 종류, 전단응력 및 퇴적물 특성으로 구분하였다. 또한, 바닥의 전단 응력은 실험적으로 측정하기가 어려워 수치모의를 수행하였다. 실험결과, 생화학적 요소는 메탄 생성에 영향을 미치지만, 전단 속도는 메탄 분리에 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났으며, 퇴적물 특성은 메탄 생성 및 분리에 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 메탄 생성과 주요인자들 간의 관계를 경험식으로 제시하였으며, 향후 전단응력 및 유기물에 대한 실험조건을 구체화하고 실험규모를 확대한다면 메탄발생과 생지화학 및 수환경인자간의 관계를 도출할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

APPLICATION OF FUZZY SET THEORY IN SAFEGUARDS

  • Fattah, A.;Nishiwaki, Y.
    • 한국지능시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국퍼지및지능시스템학회 1993년도 Fifth International Fuzzy Systems Association World Congress 93
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    • pp.1051-1054
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    • 1993
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

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