• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제31권1호
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• pp.68-79
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• 1999

The YGN Units 3&4 plant conditions during shutdown operation were reviewed to identify the possible event scenarios following the loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) event. For the five cases of typical reactor coolant system (RCS) configurations under the worst event sequence, such as unavailable secondary cooling and no RCS inventory makeup, the thermal hydraulic analyses were performed using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code to investigate the plant behavior following the event. The thermal hydraulic analyses include the estimation of time to boil, time to core uncovery, and time to core heat up to determine the containment closure time to prevent the uncontrolled release of fission products to atmosphere. The result indicates that the containment closure is recommended to be achieved within 42 minutes after the loss of SDC for the steam generator (SG) inlet plenum manway open case or the large cold leg open case under the worst event sequence. The containment closure time is significantly dependent on the elevation and size of the opening and the SG secondary water level condition. It is also found that the containment closure needs to be initiated before the boiling time to ensure the survivability of the workers in the containment. These results will provide useful information to operators to cope with the loss of SDC event.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제31권5호
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• pp.476-485
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• 1999

In order to evaluate the gravity-injection capability to maintain core cooling after a loss-of-shutdown-cooling event during shutdown operation, the plant conditions of the Yong Gwang Units 3&4 were reviewed. The six cases of possible gravity-injection paths from the refueling water tank (RWT) were identified and the thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code. The core cooling capability was significantly dependent on the gravity-injection path, the RCS opening, and the injection rate. In the cases with the pressurizer manway opening higher than the RWT water level, the coolant was held up in the pressurizer and the system pressure continued increasing after gravity-injection. The gravity injection eventually stopped due to the high system pressure and the core was uncovered. In the cases with the injection path and opening on the same leg side, the core cooling was dependent on whether the water injected from the RWT passed the core region or not. However, in the cases with the injection path and opening on the different leg side, the system was well depressurized after gravity-injection and the core boiling was successfully prevented for a long-term transient. In addition, from the sensitivity study on the gravity-injection flow rate, it was found that about 54 kg/s of injection rate was required to maintain the core cooling and the core cooling could be provided for about 10.6 hours after event with that injection rate from the RWT. Those analysis results would provide useful information to operators coping with the event.

• 한국원자력학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국원자력학회 1998년도 춘계학술발표회논문집(1)
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• pp.647-652
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• 1998

The YGN Units 3&4 plant conditions during shutdown operation were reviewed to identified the possible even scenarios following the loss of shutdown cooling. The Thermal hydraulic analyses were performed for the five cases of RCS configurations under the worst event scenario, unavailable secondary cooling and no RCS inventory makeup, using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code to investigate the plant behavior, From the analyses results, times to boil, times to core uncovery and times to core heat up were estimated to determined the containment closure time to prevent the uncontrolled released of fission products to atmosphere, These data provide useful information to the abnormal procedure to cope with event.

• 한국원자력학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국원자력학회 2001년도 춘계학술발표회요약집
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• pp.258.2-258
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• 2001

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제21권1호
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• pp.1-11
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• 1989

원자로 정지동안에도, 잔열제거계통은 그 기능이 계속 유지되어야 하나, 실제로 가압 경수로에서 냉각상실고가 많이 발생되어 있다. 본 논문은 원자로 정지중의 냉각기능상실을 예방하고, 또한 냉각기능상실로 인한 노심손상의 중대성을 완화시키기 위한 대책을 강구하기 위한 시도로서, 전형적인 가압경수로에 대한 사고/고장 수목과 운전원실수 확률을 위한 HCR 모델, 초기 사상의 빈도를 위한 2단계 bayesian 방법 및 고장난 계통의 회복 활률을 위한 계단함수 모델 등을 이용한 원자로 정지 위해도 모델을 개발하여, 잔열제거계통의 신뢰도를 분석하였다. 그 결과는 원자로가 정지 중일 때의 위해도가 운전중일 때 이것에 비해 별로 낮지 않은 것으로 나타났으며, 몇 가지의 설계개선을 통하여 냉각기능상실로 인한 노심 손상확률을 상당히 낮출 수 있는 것으로 나타났다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제30권6호
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• pp.531-540
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• 1998

The DYLAM-3 code which overcomes the limitation of event tree/fault tree was applied to LOOP (Loss of Off-site Power) in the mid-loop operation employing HEPs (Human Error Probabilities) supplied by the ASEP (Accident Sequence Evaluation Program) and the SEPLOT (Systematic Evaluation Procedure for Low power/shutdown Operation Task) procedure in this study. Thus the time history of core uncovery frequency during the mid-loop operation was obtained. The sensitivity calculations in the operator's actions to prevent core uncovery under LOOP in the mid-loop operation were carried out. The analysis using the time dependent HEP was performed on the primary feed & bleed which has the most significant effect on core uncovery frequency. As the result, the increment of frequency is shown after 200 minutes duration of simulation conditions. This signifies the possibility of increment in risk after 200 minutes. The primary feed & bleed showed the greatest impact on core uncovery frequency and the recovery of the SCS (Shutdown Cooling System) showed the least impact. Therefore the efforts should be taken on the primary feed & bleed to reduce the core uncovery frequency in the mid-loop operation. And the capability of DYLAM-3 in applying to the time dependent concerns could be demonstrated.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제28권3호
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• pp.257-264
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• 1996

The conventional Equipment Environment Qualification (EEQ) envelope is developed based on the containment responses during the design basis events. The Safety Depressurization System (SDS) design without In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) adopted in the Ulchin 3&4 challenges the conventional EEQ envelope during long term Feed and Bleed (F&B) operation due to the direct discharge of high mass and energy into the containment. Therefore, it is necessary to confirm that the containment pressure and temperature history during the long term F&B operation does not violate the conventional EEQ envelope. However, this subject has never been quantitatively assessed before. To investigate the success path of long term F&B operation this paper analyzes the thermal hydraulic response of the containment and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) until the completion of depressurization and cooldown of RCS into Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) entry condition. It is found that the SCS entry condition can be reached within 6 hours without violating the EEQ curve by proper operation of SDS valves, High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps and active Containment Heat Removal System (CHRS). The suggested strategy not only demonstrates the feasibility of long term F&B operation but also can be utilized in the preparation of Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs)