• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
• /
• v.17 no.3
• /
• pp.340-360
• /
• 2005

Fishery resource rents(i.e. windfall gains or excess profit), which tend to lead a variety of important economic, social, political problems, have been a fundamental cause of unbalance between fishery resource use and management. Thus, there may exist several sorts of optimal level of resource utilization such as economic maximum sustainable yield, biological maximum sustainable yield, social optimum production, socio-political optimum yield, etc. The fishery resource use level seems to a large extent to be determined by the characteristics of fishermen's rent seeking structure. As well known, fishery resources as common properties have a characteristic of being difficult to establish private property rights. Therefore, their use rights are controlled by the permit and/or the license system. As a result, absolute or differential rents are formed by the changes in institutional arrangements. Rent problems are often transformed into serious socio-political issues when the rent in a given industry is much higher to a socially unacceptable extent than the average of other industries. However, individual fishermen or fishermen's groups tend to behave aggressively to change the existing fishery institutions towards maximizing fishery rents. These rent-seeking behaviors often tend to nullify fishery management schemes. The larger is the relative rent difference between fisheries and other industries, the more aggressive tend to be the rent-seeking behaviors in fisheries.

• The Journal of Korea Institute of Information, Electronics, and Communication Technology
• /
• v.12 no.6
• /
• pp.643-656
• /
• 2019

The development of hot social networking services, including the Internet, has transformed rental car services into IT-based car-sharing services. The car-sharing service is a service that allows people to rent cars online without having to face-to-face. It has become the preffered service among young people who are accustomed to drinking and eating alone. Users can use their smartphones to book their types of cars and hours of rent, and then go to a nearby designated parking lot to use their reserved cars. You can open a designated car door with a smart phone and drive. It is a very convenient service to pay for the distance you drive. However, the car-sharing service already in use in business has the following problems: underage who do not have a driver's license may drive a car borrowed by an acquaintance, the status of a license registered at the time of join membership with a car-sharing company may change to a suspension or cancellation of a license while renting and driving, or even a drunk person may rent a car and drive. In this paper, the method to solve these problems has been studied and proposed. The proposed method is to reduce the cost of investment by a car-sharing service provider and to minimize user inconvenience. And, it was compared and analyzed with the existing method. For the method to be used efficiently, the active operation of the car-sharing company and the government's policies will have to be supported.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.191-210
• /
• 2017

The old sources of competitive edge and value added were land, labor, and capital. In today's knowledge-based economy in the 21st century, technology is attracting attention as a new engine of growth. That paradigm shift of world economy has resulted in the global spread of technology transfer and the gradual increase of trade of intangible goods including patents and know-how as well as tangible goods in international trade. An international license agreement is a representative form of technology transfer. In license agreements, the providers of technology keep their ownership of technology, allow the implementation of technology to the users of technology only for a certain period of time, and receive loyalty as a reward. Economic profit through such technology trade can be realized with the smooth implementation and termination of agreement. International license agreements are different from sales contracts, which represent international business transaction based on mutual obligation, in many aspects in that they target intangible goods of technology and aim for rent for a certain period of time. This study thus set out to examine issues that could be controversial in the main and individual obligation of the parties in international license agreements and provide implications helpful for the prevention of disputes in advance.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
• /
• v.33 no.2
• /
• pp.49-74
• /
• 2002

This study examines, from an economic perspective, the reasons for introducing a resource taxe system into the Korean off-shore fisheries and the type of charges that can be introduced. Following a review of the charging systems in other advanced fisheries, we consider the types of charging scheme and some implications for the Korean off-shore fishing industry. Charges could be used for recovering part of fisheries management cost from the industry(i.e. administration, enforcement, research, etc). This can be justified on the grounds that the fishing industry is the main beneficiary of management and that it should therefore bear at least part of the cost involved. It is arguable that publicly-funded management is in effect a subsidy to the industry. Using charges to raise revenue in excess of the cost of management would represent the extraction of a public rent from the fishery resource, but the short-run financial consqquences for the industry would be significant. Results from a qualtitative analysis suggest that while any new charge will have a significant financial impact on the industry in the short run, a landings tax would have a lesser impact on fleet structure in the long run. The study also considers the possibility of a capital gains tax on license sales in order to recover some rent from the industry. Despite any short run-financial consequences, making the fishing industry pay for at least some of the cost of management could benefit the industry as a whole if there were more cooperation between industry and managers as a result. It is acknowledged, however, that there could be disputes over the relative management costs of different sectors of the industry. Even though this study makes few specific recommendations about charging the Korean off-shore fishing industry, it does advise that the issue be reviewed on the basis of the entire Korea fisheries. Finally, the study notes that insufficient data are available on the economic performance of the Korean off-shore fishing vessels and it recommands that a comprehensive system for the collection of costs and earnings data be put in place. It also suggests that MOMAF pay much attention to the permit right market and its transactions.

• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.14 no.10
• /
• pp.47-57
• /
• 2016

Purpose - This study's purpose is to investigate the market structure of the Korean duty free shop industry that has received recent attention from researchers and practitioners. By raising the question of whether or not the Korean duty free shop industry is unequivocally monopolistic, a wider viewpoint is provided. The study seeks to offer insights and managerial implications for marketers and policy makers who are in charge of regulating major Korean duty free shops. Research design, data, and methodology - The authors use secondary data from various sources, including Korea Customs Service and the Moodie Report, to investigate the structure of the duty free shop industry of Korea. Based on several theories, they present various criteria and statistical evidence such as K-firm concentration ratio, HHI, consumer substitutability, excess profit, and marketing costs. Results - In terms of consumer substitutability, it is difficult to confirm whether or not the Korean duty free shop industry is monopolistic. Notwithstanding monopoly characteristics in terms of market share, neither the company Lotte nor Shilla appear to have market dominating power. It is not easy for either of them to control prices or to achieve a much lower operational profit ratio due to a dominant bargaining power. Moreover, the license is not an economic rent. In this situation, it is not easy for these companies to obtain an excessive profit. Conclusions - Considering that most global duty free shops are trying to go upscale to improve bargaining power, it does not seem likely that rigid regulations are needed in the industry. Even though the Korean duty free industry ostensibly has a monopolistic structure, government and policy-makers should look beyond the surface. They should take global and other reasonable criteria into consideration when they establish or change regulation policies. Thorough understanding and appropriate support are needed for the Korean duty free shop industry. Additionally, duty free shops should position themselves as global companies struggling against unlimited international competition, rather than Korean domestic companies. At the same time, they need to give customers appropriate information about the benefits they provide.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
• /
• v.34 no.2
• /
• pp.1-25
• /
• 2003

During the past 100 years, Korean fisheries management policies have enforced the license system, it is the most typical regulation system in Korean fisheries. Even now, it has caused resource management failure, it has also invited economic inefficiency and inequity. Accordingly, the Korean government has recently introduced the self-regulatory management system for fishermen with the TAC system. These systems are one of the most market-oriented regulation systems in fisheries management systems. It is defined as regulatory policy tools other than regulations with command and control approach. It is also called “alternatives” which is composed of regulatory alternatives and non-regulatory alternatives. The self-regulatory management system and the ITQ system are cooperative-based co-management between government and fishermen as an alternative management strategy ; it is gaining the increasing attention to improve the effectiveness of fisheries management in Korea. It is expected not only to positively improve function in fisheries regulation, but also to decrease inefficiency in fisheries policies. However, these systems have many problems. The monopolization of rent is one of the typical examples. As solutions for the problem in the aspect of fishery management, fisheries policy is need of approach to industrial organization. For instance, Contestable market theory is one of the good theoretical background, it mean that market is able to free entry and free exit. Thus, fisheries management carry out policies such as revitalization of the used market of capital goods in fisheries, organize of the self-regulatory management group. Conclusively, as the exploiters and managers, fishers and the government should put emphasis on improving economic efficiency so that fishery would grow as an industry that contributes to the increase of social welfare, and the change to that direction will be the only way for our fisheries to preserve its importance.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
• /
• v.16 no.2
• /
• pp.295-326
• /
• 2015

Under the revision of medical law on February 1, 2012, health care providers are banned from opening 2 or more medical institutions and being involved in managing the institutions. However, purpose of the legislation of the revised law is unclear and even confirmation of such purpose of the legislation based on the calculation of multiple legislative backgrounds cannot be appropriate means of achieving such purposes. This article confirms and reviews the development of revision of medical law and history of the principle of 'one person-one medical institution', and legislative purpose of the revised medical law as well as examines unconstitutionality of such revision based on limited fundamental rights by the revision, principle of clarity, and principle of the prohibition of excessive restriction.