• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.101-106
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• 2020

Since computer became available, much effort has been made to achieve information security. Even though memory protection defense mechanisms were studied the most among of them, the problems of existing memory protection defense mechanisms were found due to improved performance of computer and new defense mechanisms were needed due to the advent of the side-channel attacks. In this paper, we propose JMP+RAND that embedding random values of 5 to 8 bytes per page to defend against memory sharing based side-channel attacks and bridging the gap of existing memory protection defense mechanism. Unlike the defense mechanism of the existing side-channel attacks, JMP+RAND uses static binary rewriting and continuous jmp instruction and random values to defend against the side-channel attacks in advance. We numerically calculated the time it takes for a memory sharing-based side-channel attack to binary adopted JMP+RAND technique and verified that the attacks are impossible in a realistic time. Modern architectures have very low overhead for JMP+RAND because of the very fast and accurate branching of jmp instruction using branch prediction. Since random value can be embedded only in specific programs using JMP+RAND, it is expected to be highly efficient when used with memory deduplication technique, especially in a cloud computing environment.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.13C no.4 s.107
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• pp.397-404
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• 2006

Successful software attacks require both injecting malicious code into a program's address space and altering the program's flow control to the injected code. Code section can not be changed at program's runtime, so malicious code must be injected into data section. Detoured flow control into data section is a signal of software attack. We propose a new software attack detection method which verify the target address of CALL, JMP, RET instructions, which alter program's flow control, and detect a software attack when the address is not in code section. Proposed method can detect all change of flow control related data, not only program's return address but also function pointer, buffer of longjmp() function and old base pointer, so it can detect the more attacks.

• Asia-pacific Journal of Multimedia Services Convergent with Art, Humanities, and Sociology
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.297-304
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• 2015

Zeus is one of the will-published malwares. Generally, it infects PC by executing a specific binary file downloaded on the internet. When infected, try to hook a particular Windows API of the currently running processes. If process runs hooked API, this API executes a particular code of Zeus and your private information is leaked. This paper describes techniques to detect and hook Windows API. We believe the technique should be able to detect modern P2P Zeus.