• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.171-202
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• 2018

Issue ownership concerns a party's issue handling reputation. When a party is perceived to have the best solution for an issue, voters identify the party as the owner of the issue. Extant literature of issue ownership voting shows that voters tend to vote for a party that they identify as the owner of an issue they concern most. That is, the effect of issue ownership on voting is conditioned by the perceived salience of the issue in question. This study investigates another condition of issue ownership voting: i.e. party behavior in election campaigns. It argues that the effect of issue ownership on voting is conditional: it depends on party behavior as well as issue salience. During the campaign in the 2016 legislative election, only the Democratic Party of Korea, the opposition party at that time, actively presented itself as the owner of economic issues. The analysis results of this study show that the identification of the Democratic Party as the economic issue owner affects voting for the party when a voter thinks the economy to be the most important issue. However, the identification of the other parties as the economic issue owner does not affect voting for them under the same condition. The results support the argument that party behavior as well as issue salience are conditions of issue ownership voting.

• Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.23-39
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• 2019

Assuming that a political party has a strong incentive to gain votes via issue setting as part of its campaign strategy, this study utilized a Web experimental survey to explore the extent to which three issue-related campaign advertising strategies - namely, issue ownership, issue convergence, and issue trespassing - affected voters' perceptions toward parties' issue-handling capabilities. Our empirical results show that issue ownership perceptions exist in Taiwan. In the 2012 Taiwan presidential election, as issue ownership advertisements may reinforce voters' beliefs regarding parties' issue-handling capabilities, issue trespassing advertising may improve a party's image on the disadvantageous issue dimension. At least our data shows that the Kuomintang's (KMT) advertisements have both effects.

• Journal of Korean Library and Information Science Society
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• v.21
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• pp.325-361
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• 1994

The Library of Congress' proposal to license LC MARC database and the following debate over the proposal shows that the issue on ownership of bibliographic databases, which surfaced as a topic of concern in the international library community with the OCLC's a n.0, pplication for copyright of its databases in 1982, is not fading or dead into the 1990s. In particular, the way that technological developments are outpacing the ability of the relevant organizations and legal systems to make necessary adjustments is giving the library profession a warning that cooperative efforts for further development of the international library systems, such as the UBC program, might be seriously impeded without a swift and amicable agreement on the controversial 'database ownership' issue. Here, the purpose of this paper lies in discussing the 'database ownership' issue from a macro and long-term perspective, with emphasis on its potential impacts on, and implications for, international information flows. To the end, the specific questions covered in this paper include : 1) what are the major causes of the database ownership controversy? 2) what are the potential impacts of the database ownership issue on the library profession's cooperative efforts toward free bibliographic information flows at the international level? And finally, 3) what are the implications of the database ownership issue for the Korean Library Community, which is making efforts toward the establishment of a national library network in near future through linking various library automation systems.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2011.02a
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• pp.340-349
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• 2011

During the negotiation and resolution of delay and disruption disputes on construction projects, the use and misappropriation of float, and the question of float ownership, are considered to be a major concern to those involved. Most practitioners and authors are of the opinion that it is an issue that should be clearly defined and addressed within the provisions of the contract. However, the terms "float" or "ownership of float" are rarely mentioned (if at all) in most of the standard forms of Australian construction contracts, giving little guidance to those involved as to how this issue should be addressed. In October 2002 the United Kingdoms Society of Construction Law (SCL) published a Delay and Disruption Protocol (the Protocol) that contains a suggested approach to the issue. The aim of this research was to obtain an Australian opinion of the suitability of the SCL's Delay and Disruption Protocols suggested approach to the issue of float and ownership of float for use by the Australian construction industry. Qualitative interviews were carried out with Australian construction industry experts experienced in the administration, negotiation, and resolution of delay and disruption disputes to obtain their opinions of the suitability of the SCL's proposed approach. Results indicate general confusion and uncertainty as to how the issue of float and float ownership should be addressed in general, with the SCL's approach adding further to that confusion.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.647-656
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• 2020

This study empirically examines the effect of ownership structure on bank diversification and risk-taking behavior. The population of this study is based on all commercial banks listed in Bangladesh. Thirty-two conventional commercial banks were randomly selected from thirty-three conventional banks for this study. Data was collected from the annual reports of the concerned banks from 2000 to 2017. To analyze the data, we had applied the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The results of the analysis show that ownership structure i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership, general public ownership, and ownership concentration have a significant negative impact on bank diversification. On the other hand, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and general public ownership have a significant positive impact on Z-score, and ownership concentration has an insignificant but positive impact on the Z-score of banks in Bangladesh. Therefore, the study opposes the benefits of diversification and promotes ownership structure which is capable of ensuring better financial stability by reducing the probability of risk. The policy-makers especially, Bangladesh banks should evaluate the fact of this study to issue guidelines on corporate governance, bank diversification, and risk-taking behavior of commercial banks.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.27-37
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• 2015

Purpose - This study first explores the possible dynamic relationship between ownership structure and firm performance using a panel of 4,900 Chinese-listed small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 1999 to 2012. Research design, data, and methodology - We address this issue through a dynamic panel model using a method of moments (GMM) technique and dynamic simultaneous equations to alleviate the potential endogenous problem: unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity. Results - Under the framework of dynamic endogeneity, firm performance has a significantly positive influence on ownership, but not vice versa. Ownership and performance can be explained by their owned lagged values, respectively. Moreover, intertemporal endogeneity exists among ownership, investment, and performance through the application of system dynamic equations, which implies that the relationship among ownership structure, investment, and firm performance is dynamic by nature. Conclusions - This study also significantly contributes to a better understanding of dynamic corporate governance by providing further empirical evidence from the largest capital market in the Asian region.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.399-422
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• 2007

Like in other trade negotiations covering comprehensive sectors, it is reported that KOREA-US FTA tried so-called 'package deal' at the last minutes, when telecom services sector was positioned at the forefront and expected to partly play a role in buffering US' market-opening pressure on other sectors. Before everything else, Korean negotiators had to enhance the value of foreign ownership deregulation in telecom services sector as a leverage in the course of KOREA-US FTA negotiations. In addition, since foreign ownership change, if any, is highly sensitive issue either politically or policy-wise, it seems very difficult to find a breakthrough. Focusing on foreign ownership regulation in telecom services sector, this paper seeks how Korea has developed its strategic reasoning for negotiations and evaluates the outcomes of KOREA-US FTA negotiations.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.5-15
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• 2016

This study examines whether Korean rating agencies such as Korea Investors Service (KIS), National Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), and Korea Ratings Corporation (KR), incorporate corporate governance into their corporate bond ratings in Korea. We find that the Korean rating agencies assign higher ratings to the bonds issued by Chaebol (Korean business group) affiliated firms. Our results also indicate that those rating agencies give higher ratings to the bonds with greater foreign investor share ownership. Moreover, if the rating agencies value corporate governance, higher rated firms should issue bonds at lower yield to maturity. We discover that Chaebol affiliation is counted favorably by the rating agencies. We find that investors are willing to pay lower risk premium for bonds with higher institutional ownership, but higher risk premium to bonds with greater equity ownership in the form of depository receipts. Therefore, even if the rating agencies and investors in Korea consider corporate governance (Chaebol affiliation and ownership structure) an important determinant in bond ratings and the yields to maturity, they have opposite views on institutional ownership and share ownership in the form of depository receipts.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.53-58
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• 2022

Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.133-141
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• 2013

After Presidential Declaration of Korea's Rights in the Surrounding Seas(Lee, Seung-Man Line), Japanese government objected to the Korean government's Declaration of the Peace Line. Japan didn't agree with Korean's ownership of Dokdo and has tried to develop the Dokdo issue into an international dispute and solved it by resorting the International Court of Justice(ICJ) since 1954. As mentioned before, ICJ doesn'thave the right of compulsory jurisdiction of ownership of Dokdo between Korea and Japan. Therefore, we don'thave to agree with Japan's suggestion of bringing a case to ICJ to solve the Dokdo issue. It is not the best way to maintain the international peace judging by ICJ as well. When Japan try to institute case unilaterally, We should remember that it is possible to give the expanding jurisdiction to the ICJ. It is the best way that solving the dispute of Dokdo is to establish the sovereignty over Dokdo while strengthen the control the Dokdo effectively. In conclusion, no matter how Japan claims ownership of Dokdo, it cannot be subject to negotiation.