• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권13호
• /
• pp.687-738
• /
• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권8호
• /
• pp.1-48
• /
• 2010

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the Untied Nations' efforts for peace on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. The Untied Nation tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the end of 1950. Once the CCF's entry into the war had been confirmed, the war situation moved to a new phase, and the UN forces, which had guided the war in an effort to destroy the NKP A forces, and to punish North Korea, had to set up new guidelines to cope with the new situation. Accordingly, in late November, 1950, the UN forces camp, mainly the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations Command, discussed various options, such as an expansion of the war up to the Chinese territory, a cease fire along the 38th Parallel, or a forced and inevitable evacuation. The Korean delegation to the UN insisted that "the unification of Korea should be achieved only by victory in the war. The Chinese intervention in the war is a Challenge to the UN in the same way as the North Korean invasion. The UN participation in the war was to repulse the invasion. With the same spirit we should drive back the Chinese Communists." The Korean delegation also emphasized to the friendly nations the political objective and will of unification, and that a cease fire at a threshold of unification might return us to the status quo ante bellum, and would be contrary to the Korean nation's desire. At that time, particularly, the US strongly considered the employment of nuclear weapons as one of the new strategies to cope with the Chinese invasion. The international effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. The British Prime Minister who had not wanted the expansion of war in the Far East, especially from the view point of the interest of NATO's security, visited Washington. so the conference had a very important meaning for the UN forces' new strategy. On the other hand, at the UN, on the 5th of December, the very day Truman and Attlee agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask China and North Korea not to cross the 38th Parallel, and sounded out both sides about a cease fire along the 38th Parallel. The United States and the United Kingdom gave their assent, but China and North Korea gave no direct response. The CCF, who were securing the initiative of operation, were not agreeable with the proposal of the UN forces. The Untied Nation has tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the December of 1950 and January of 1951. The Untied Nations' has achieved great results to negotiate for the peace plan on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. It's the results considering both the operation situation and political opinions.

• 한국방사선학회논문지
• /
• 제17권2호
• /
• pp.267-275
• /
• 2023

전 세계적으로 방사선종사자들의 피폭 기록은 관심의 대상이며 피폭이 일어나는 분야에 대한 분석이 수행되고 있다. 한국에서는 유관부처에 따라 보건복지부, 농림축산식품부, 원자력안전위원회에서 종사자들의 피폭을 11개 업종으로 나누어 기록을 수집 분석하고 있다. 그러나 이러한 분류 체계는 유엔방사선영향과학위원회를 비롯한 주요 국가들의 분류 체계와는 정합성이 부족하다. 국내의 종사자 피폭 분류 체계는 명확한 분류 기준이 없고 업종 특성 등을 반영해주지 못하고 있다. 유엔방사선영향과학위원회의 분류 체계를 바탕으로 국내의 분류 체계를 핵주기 분야, 의료분야, 산업분야, 그 외 분야(교육/연구, 군사/공공)의 5개 대분류 체계와 그에 따른 세 분류 및 직군 분류를 본 연구를 통해 제안하였다.

• 정보교육학회논문지
• /
• 제11권2호
• /
• pp.139-146
• /
• 2007

현재 RFID(Radio Frequency Identification) 카드를 이용한 활용분야는 의료, 유통, 군사, 제조, 보안, 등 다양하게 확장되고 있다. RFID 기술은 식별 대상을 원거리에서 무선 주파수를 통해 한꺼번에 많은 정보를 인식할 수 있는 장점으로 인하여, 기존에 사용하던 바코드를 대체할 기술로서 주목받고 있다. 또한, 학교에서도 도서대출 관리 및 학생출석 관리 등의 RFID를 이용한 시스템에 대한 관심이 높아지고 있다. 본 논문은 RFID 카드를 이용한 출석관리 시스템을 개발하였으며, 교수들은 출석현황을 모바일로 확인할 수 있도록 하였고, 학생들은 웹을 통해서 언제든지 자신의 출석현황을 조회할 수 있도록 하였다. 그리고 학생들의 정보는 RFID 태그가 내장된 학생증을 소지하는 것만으로도 RFID 카드 판독기를 통해 정보가 수신된 후 DB에 저장되게 하였으며, 교수와 학생은 각각 관리자 프로그램과 웹 프로그램을 통해 출석부와 시간표를 관리하고 출력할 수 있다.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권8호
• /
• pp.49-168
• /
• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• 해양안보
• /
• 제1권1호
• /
• pp.93-117
• /
• 2020

2019년 5월과 6월, 호르무즈 해협에서 상선들의 연이은 피격으로 호르무즈 해협에서 해양안보의 불확실성은 증대되고 다수 국가들이 관심을 가지고 역내 안정을 도모하려 노력하고 있다. 한국도 청해부대 임무구역 확장이라는 독자적인 형태로 호르무즈 해협인근의 해양안보 안정화를 위해 노력 중이나, 호르무즈 해협의 주요 역내 행위자인 이란에 대한 세부적인 연구는 미진한 상황이며, 이란 또한 공식적으로 자국의 해양전략을 발표한 바가 없다. 따라서 본 연구는 현실주의적 시각, 특히 케네스 월츠로부터 시작된 방어적(구조적) 현실주의의 관점에서 아랍-페르시아의 양극체제로서의 중동의 정세를 분석하고, 아울러 이란의 독특한 이중화된 군 구조와 구분된 역할, 그리고 전력구성을 연구함으로서 이란의 국가전략과 해양전략을 도출하였다.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
• /
• 제33권2호
• /
• pp.443-469
• /
• 2018

스푸트니크 1호 발사 이래 60년이 지난 지금 우주에 대한 고려 없이 경제적, 정치적인 인간의 삶을 생각하는 것은 불가능해졌다. 그러나 우주가 전쟁의 장이될 수 있다는 우려도 확산되고 있다. 따라서 우주상 군비경쟁을 방지하기 위한 여론이 더욱 커지고 있다. 따라서 우주상 군비경쟁을 방지하기 위한 행동규범이나 국제법을 설정하는 것이 필요하다. 그러나 국제 사회에서 각국의 입장과 이해 상충으로 인해 구속력 있는 우주 군비통제방안을 수립하는 것은 매우 어렵다. 그럼에도 불구하고 우주의 평화적 이용을 위해서는 장기적이고 지속적이며 체계적인 접근이 필수적이다. 모든 국가는 국익이나 우주 개발 수준에 따라 입장이 다르기 때문에 포괄적 조약을 체결하기 위한 조건은 아직 성숙하지 못했다. 그러나 우주의 지속적인 개발을 위한 우주행동 강령 및 우주 파편에 대한 협력체계 구축 노력 뿐만 아니라 발사 통지와 같은 실용적이고 투명한 신뢰구축 방안에 대한 협력을 지속적으로 추진해야 할 것이다. 우주강국과 개발 국가들의 자발적인 참여를 확보하기가 쉬운 연성적인 조치 (TCBM, 행동 규범)로부터 시작하여 포괄적이고 구속력 있는 조약과 같은 경성적인 조치가 단계적으로 이루어져야 할 것이다. 또한 군비통제 이론에 입각하여 상호정보와 인력을 교환하고 정보를 공유하는 대화의 장을 지속적으로 만들어 나가야 할 것이다. 이러한 노력에 우주강국(미국, 러시아, 중국)이 적극적으로 참여한다면 국제 평화에 기여하게 될 것이다. 또한 지역간 협력을 통해 파트너십을 증진할 필요도 있다. 우주법의 효율성을 제고하기 위해 더 많은 국가가 기존의 국제법에 참여하도록 여론을 형성하고 주도해 나가야 할 것이다. 이러한 노력들이 우주의 안보력 강화에 기여하게 될 것이다.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
• /
• 제31권2호
• /
• pp.237-269
• /
• 2016

Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) is the only intergovernmental space cooperation organization in Asia. Since its establishment to date, eight countries have signed the convention and become member states. South Korea participated actively in the preparatory phase of creating the organization, and one conference organized by AP-MCSTA which is the predecessor of APSCO was held in South Korea. However, after the APSCO Convention was opened for signature in 2005 to date, South Korea does not ratify the Convention and become a member. The rapid development of space commercialization and privatization, as well as the fastest growing commercial space market in Asia, provides opportunities for Asian countries to cooperate with each other in relevant space fields. And to participate in the existing cooperation framework (e.g., the APSCO) by the Asian space countries (e.g., South Korea) could be a proper choice. Even if the essential cooperation in particular space fields is challenging, joint space programs among different Asian countries for dealing with the common events can be initiated at the first steps. Since APSCO has learned the successful legal arrangements from ESA, the legal measures established by its Convention are believed to be qualified to ensure the achievement of benefits of different member states. For example, the regulation of the "fair return" principle confirms that the return of interests from the relevant programs is in proportion to the member's investment in the programs. Moreover, the distinguish of basic and optional activities intends to authorize the freedom of the members to choose programs to participate. And for the voting procedure, the acceptance of the "consensus" by the Council is in favor of protecting the member's interest when making decisions. However, political factors that are potential to block the participation of South Korea in APSCO are difficult to be ignored. A recent event is an announcement of deploying THAAD by South Korea, which causes tension between South Korea and China. The cooperation between these two states in space activities will be influenced. A long-standing barrier is that China acts as a non-member of the main international export control mechanism, i.e., the MTCR. The U.S takes this fact as the main reason to prevent South Korea to cooperate with China in developing space programs. Although the political factors that will block the participation of South Korea in APSCO are not easy to removed shortly, legal measures can be taken to reduce the political influence. More specifically, APSCO is recommended to ensure the achievement of commercial interests of different cooperation programs by regulating precisely the implementation of the "fair return" principle. Furthermore, APSCO is also suggested to contribute to managing the common regional events by sharing satellite data. And it is anticipated that these measures can effectively response the requirements of the rapid development of space commercialization and the increasing common needs of Asia, thereby to provide a platform for the further cooperation. In addition, in order to directly reduce the political influence, two legal measures are necessary to be taken: Firstly, to clarify the rights and responsibilities of the host state (i.e., China) as providing assistance, coordination and services to the management of the Organization to release the worries of the other member states that the host state will control the Organization's activities. And secondly, to illustrate that the cooperation in APSCO is for the non-military purpose (a narrow sense of "peaceful purpose") to reduce the political concerns. Regional cooperation in Asia regarding space affairs is considered to be a general trend in the future, so if the participation of South Korea in APSCO can be finally proved to be feasible, there will be an opportunity to discuss the creation of a comprehensive institutionalized framework for space cooperation in Asia.