• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.53-61
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• 2024

Global Navigation Satellite Systems are expected to meet system-defined integrity requirements when users utilize the system for safety critical applications. While the guaranteed integrity performance of GPS and Galileo is publicly available, their integrity assurance procedure and related methodology have not been released to the public in an official document format. This paper summarizes the integrity assurance procedures of Global Positioning System (GPS) and Galileo, which were utilized during their system development, through a literature survey of their integrity assurance methodology. GPS Block II assures system integrity using the following methods: continuous performance monitoring and maintenance on Space Segment (SS) and Control Segment (CS), through a cause and effect analysis of anomalies and a failure analysis. In GPS Block III, to achieve more stringent integrity performance, safety requirements are integrated into the system design and development from its starting phase to the final phase. Galileo's integrity performance is provided in the Integrity Support Message (ISM) format, as Galileo utilizes a Dual Frequency Multi Constellation (DFMC) Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) to serve safety critical applications. The integrity performance of Galileo is ensured by using a methodology similar to GPS Block II (i.e. continuous performance monitoring and maintenance on the system). The integrity assurance procedures reviewed in this paper can be utilized for a new satellite navigation system that will be developed in the near future.

• Proceedings of the KSR Conference
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• 2009.05a
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• pp.855-859
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• 2009

In this paper, we introduce the estimation method by Risk or SIL(Safety Integrity Level) for the criterion of safety assurance and summarize each application method and target. IEC 62278(EN 50126) which is international standard for the specification and verification of the railway system RAMS indicate a criterion of safety assurance. Especially, it recommend the safety verification by continuous verification as the order of requirement establishment, design, manufacture, installation, operation, and maintenance for the equipment not easy to quantify the operation environment. In this paper, we study the SIL requirement allocation method relating to internal new system development and existing system improvement by analysing SIL recommendations which were used to understand SIL for a train control equipment in 1990s in IRSE and theoretically their allocation background. This paper help the safety management of Korea train control system to develope the quantitative management procedure as international level by analyzing the SIL requirement allocation by operation agency and the right SIL verification procedure by manufacture and indicating the example to assure safety because it is necessary for improvement and localization for the Korea train control system having highly dependence on aboard technology.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38C no.7
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• pp.595-604
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• 2013

Devising a secure authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol for two entities communicating over an open network is a matter of current research. McCullagh et al. proposed a new two-party identity-based AKA protocol supporting both key escrow and key escrow-less property instantiated by either in a single domain or over two distinct domains. In this paper, we show that their protocol over two distinct domains suffers from masquerading attack and therefore does not satisfy the claimed security. The attack is made possible due to the lack of sufficient authentication of entity and integrity assurance in the protocol. We then propose an efficient verifiable key agreement protocol by including signature primitive in the authentication procedure to solve the problem of McCullagh et al.'s protocol.