• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.47-64
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• 1998

This paper seeks to find out possibility of introducing market order into Korean fisheries regulatory system. Hayek tells us that market order is equivalent to spontaneous order, while regulations are man-made order created based on incomplete knowledge. He also sees market competition as a discovery procedure of knowledge and information. From this perspective is discussed Korean fisheries regulatory reform-particularly issues of establishing property right on fishery resources. It appears that there is quite a large room for substituting market functions for the regulations regarding fishery resources management, even though fishery resources have a very nature of common pool. Advanced fisheries suggest that successful regulatory reform require a well-prepared strategic plan and check list. In addition, the government should be able to secure sufficient monitoring and surveillance power and to play an important role as a fair supervisor.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.249-273
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• 2010

Often in practice, the implied volatility of an option is calculated to find the option price tomorrow or the prices of, nearby' options. To show that one does not need to adhere to the Black- Scholes formula in this scheme, Figlewski has provided a new pricing formula and has shown that his, alternating passive model' performs as well as the Black-Scholes formula [8]. The Figlewski model was modified by Henderson et al. so that the formula would have no static arbitrage [10]. In this paper, we show how to construct a huge class of such static no arbitrage pricing functions, making use of distortions, coherent risk measures and the pricing theory in incomplete markets by Carr et al. [4]. Through this construction, we provide a more elaborate static no arbitrage pricing formula than Black-Sholes in the above scheme. Moreover, using our pricing formula, we find a volatility curve which fits with striking accuracy the synthetic data used by Henderson et al. [10].

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.21-36
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• 2020

Purpose - This study analyzes the effect of sellers' dishonesty on various market outcomes such as seller profit, buyer profit, and market welfare, through precisely measuring the level of sellers' information disclosure and its economic impacts. As an explicit observation of sellers' dishonesty is not easy in most other settings, this study is expected to suggest unique and meaningful implications on the effect of sellers' incomplete information disclosure to researchers, managers, and policy makers. Design/methodology/approach - In order to precisely measure the level of sellers' dishonesty under information asymmetry, this study analyzes the data from an incentive-based economic experiment using z-Tree software. This experimental method enables us to focus on the strategic interactions among participants, observe the integrity of seller's information disclosure, and reproduce real market situations. Findings - The analysis of sellers' dishonesty has provided the following important and counterintuitive findings about the reality of buyer-seller interactions under information asymmetry. First, sellers' lies do not affect seller profit even when they are very intensive. Second, sellers' dishonesty negatively affects buyer profit and the entire market welfare. Third, a seller's quality claim has a positive effect on the seller profit only when a seller is being honest. Research implications or Originality - This study analyzes sellers' dishonesty using incentive-based economic experiment using z-Tree software which provides a straightforward examination on dishonest behavior of sellers, that is not readily available with other types of observational or experimental data.

• The Pure and Applied Mathematics
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.307-316
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• 2014

We prove the existence of the risk-efficient options proposed by Xu [7]. The proof is given by both indirect and direct ways. Schied [6] showed the existence of the optimal solution of equation (2.1). The one is to use the Schied's result. The other one is to find the sequences converging to the risk-efficient option.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.23 no.1_2
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• pp.293-310
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• 2007

Recently a risk measure pricing and hedging is replacing a utility-based maximization problem in the literature. In this paper, we treat the optimal problem of risk measure pricing and hedging in the friction market, i.e. in the presence of transaction costs. The risk measure pricing is also verified with the contexts in the literature.

• Journal of the Korean Statistical Society
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• v.36 no.2
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• pp.237-256
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• 2007

This paper studies the problem of option pricing in an incomplete market. The market incompleteness comes from the discontinuity of the underlying asset price process which is, in particular, assumed to be a compound Poisson process. To find a reasonable price for a European contingent claim, we first find the unique minimal martingale measure and get a price by taking an expectation of the payoff under this measure. To get a closed-form price, we use an asymptotic expansion. In case where the minimal martingale measure is a signed measure, we use a sequence of martingale measures (probability measures) that converges to the equivalent martingale measure in the limit to compute the price. Again, we get a closed form of asymptotic option price. It is the Black-Scholes price and a correction term, when the distribution of the return process has nonzero skewness up to the first order.

• The Korean Journal of Applied Statistics
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• v.21 no.5
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• pp.755-763
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• 2008

This paper approaches the problem of option pricing in an incomplete market, where the underlying asset price process follows a compound Poisson model. We assume that the price process follows a compound Poisson model under an equivalent martingale measure and it converges weakly to the Black-Scholes model. First, we express the option price as the expectation of the discounted payoff and expand it at the Black-Scholes price to obtain a pricing formula with three unknown parameters. Then we estimate those parameters using the market option data. This method can use the option data on the same stock with different expiration dates and different strike prices.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.219-234
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• 2021

Armington elasticity has been a methodology for analyzing how much imports could increase in response to importing price cuts, assuming the possibility of incomplete substitution of domestic and imported products. This study calculates Armington elasticity values in Korean fisheries sector and presents an analysis method for classifying items based on price and preference differences. The model is modified reflecting the characteristics of the fisheries market along with the typical OLS, PAM, and ECM models. The result's implication is that products with a high import growth rate do not necessarily show a high Armington value, but it could be seen that price is not the only factor facilitating fisheries imports increase. Considering the items of which demand increases due to importing price cuts have an indiscriminate demand between domestic and imported products, the results could be interpreted that the Korean fisheries importing market has been easily affected by the changes in import prices. Fisheries grouping by price and preference demonstrates that explanatory variables other than price should be considered when estimating import demand.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.59-68
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• 2009

This study empirically analyzes game engine supplier's licensing strategy connected with supplier's technological regime and technological innovation. The results show that game engine supplier's technological regime is heterogeneously differentiated and it's user friendliness increases. "User Friendliness" of supplier's technological regime enables supplier's efficient technological transfer and increases supporting capability. Technological knowledge factors such as modularity of game engine structure, generic capability, codifiability of tacit game engine knowledge and degree of innovation turn incomplete technological market into efficient technological market by increasing supporting capability and by reducing transaction cost.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.59-86
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• 2011

This paper examines a country's strategic optimal tariff policy against a foreign firm with market power. That is, the purpose of the paper is, under asymmetric information, to reexamine the problem of optimal tariff policy against a foreign monopolist from another country's welfare standpoint. This is to extend the analysis of Brander and Spencer(1984) which is both analytic and elaborate. The incentive compatible tariff schedule is derived, and then policy implications are investigated. The main result is that, under incomplete information, the optimal tariff is elevated above its full-information counterpart in order to capture foreign rents. Moreover, it suggests that trade policies motivated by rent extraction are unlikely to be robust to the introduction of incomplete information. This research complements an existing literature on the strategic trade policy in terms of asymmetric information.