• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
• /
• v.42 no.4
• /
• pp.39-48
• /
• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.248-274
• /
• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
• /
• 2007.11a
• /
• pp.90-96
• /
• 2007

In multi-location inventory systems, lost sales due to stockout decreases not only retailers' profit but also whole supply chain's profit. Transshipment between retailers has been considered to be a major solution to the stockout problem, and many supply chains implement transshipment coalition among retailers. However, in practical situations, retailers occasionally refuses to accept the transshipment requests, mainly because they concern the future stockout possibilities of their own. Thus, the objective of this research is to analyze the effect of retailers' interaction under the transshipment coalition environment based on the simulations, and to provide effective policies to promote retailers' transshipment cooperation. Policies using penalty and incentive scheme are proposed, and it is shown that using proposed policies both the retailers' and the headquarter's profit can be increased.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
• /
• v.7 no.3
• /
• pp.97-102
• /
• 2019

This study suggests a solution of an incentive system from the viewpoint of the external effect on the renting of firefighting qualifications and on rental agencies. Currently, the Human Resources Development Service of Korea does not have a penalty for neglecting to perform a search into qualification lending and rental agencies. In the short term, the penal clause should be strengthened so that companies and qualification holders cannot borrow or lend their qualifications. In addition, the Human Resources Development Service of Korea will increase the number of personnel dedicated to investigating the loaning of qualifications. It is necessary for the government to establish a penalty for neglecting to investigate the lending of qualifications for the Human Resources Development Service of Korea. In the long term, the state needs to make only minimal regulations. Also, the state needs to make companies and qualification holders feel like they benefit more when they are not borrowing or lending qualifications. The anticipated effect of this study is that the government will intervene appropriately by applying firefighting qualifications according to market principles. It can also be used as a basis for the revision of related laws on the renting of national technical qualification certificates and the investigation of rental agencies.

• Health Policy and Management
• /
• v.27 no.2
• /
• pp.121-127
• /
• 2017

The effort to measure and improve the quality of healthcare is a common health policy issue worldwide. Korean Value Incentive Programme is one of that effort, but some concerns exist. Compared to pay for performance program in other countries, it measures healthcare quality with relatively narrow performance domain using a small number of clinical indicators. It was designed without involving hospitals and other key stakeholder, and program participation was mandated. Highest and lowest performers get bonus and penalty using relative ranking. As a suggestion for development, the direction for quality management at the national level should be given first. Therefore the philosophy or strategy for quality improvement should be reflected to the program. And various domains and indicators of healthcare quality should be developed with active communication with healthcare providers. The evaluation method is necessary to be changed to provide achievable goal to the healthcare providers and attract quality improvement.

• Safety and Health at Work
• /
• v.12 no.1
• /
• pp.20-27
• /
• 2021

Background: Incentive and penalty (I/P) programs are commonly used to increase employees' safety outcomes, but its influence on employees' safety outcomes is under-investigated. Moreover, under developed economies lack safety culture and there is dearth of literature focusing on empirical studies over there [1]. Based on these gaps, this study attempts to see the impact of I/P programs on safety outcomes in a developing country. Methods: The study was carried out in three stages, where Stage I revealed that selected 45 organizations were deficit of safety culture and practices, while only three firms were found good at safety practices. At Stage II, these three firms were divided in two clusters (groups), and were probed further at Stage III. At this stage group, one was manipulated by providing incentives (experimental group) and employees' responses in terms of safety motivation and performance were noticed. Results: It was observed that the experimental group's safety motivation and performance had improved (both for immediate and 1-month later performance). The results were further probed at Phase 3 (after 3 months), where it was found that the benefits of I/P programs were not long lasting and started replenishing. Conclusion: Findings of the study helped researchers conclude that safety incentives have only short-term influence on safety outcomes, while a long-term and permanent solution should be found.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.26 no.1
• /
• pp.89-100
• /
• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the differences between the severity of punishments for traffic laws related offenders and the choice of policy measures with a view to reducing traffic accidents. To this end, government data on the drivers given a sentence of license suspension or revocation were collected and analyzed in terms of sex, age, type of driver's license, driving career, number of traffic laws violations, and number of traffic accidents generated. The statistics of analysis of covariance and tests of significance were used and conducted to compare the effectiveness of punishment for the penalty and the incentive groups. The results showed that the incentive policy measure on the drivers who violate traffic regulations repeatedly is more effective to reduce the number of traffic offenders and traffic accidents.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
• /
• v.17 no.3
• /
• pp.143-148
• /
• 2015

The study examined the relationship between workers' safety awareness, safety performance and the components of the intelligent image analysis system in accordance with preventing the workers from safety hazard in dangerous working area. Based on the safety performance model, we include safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation, and we also define three additional factors of the intelligent image analysis system such as functional feature, penalty and incentive by using factor analysis. SEM(Structural Equation Modeling) analyses on the data from the total of 73 workers showed that functional feature of intelligent analysis system and incentive were positively related to safety knowledge and safety motivation. And mediation effects of the relationship were verified to safety compliance and safety participation through safety knowledge as well.

• Journal of agriculture & life science
• /
• v.46 no.6
• /
• pp.185-195
• /
• 2012

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how strategically the bilaterally monopolistic firms, only-one-seller and only-one-buyer, behave in a situation in which each firm has uncertain information on its opponent firm's cost. Even though the two firms know that seeking integrated profit leads to the optimized profit for both firms, each firm has an incentive to opportunistically behave to increase its share of the integrated profit. These opportunistic behaviors of the firms are analyzed through a game theoretic approach especially finding Nash equilibrium mixed strategies for the strategic profiles such as true-report or not and monitoring or not. The comparative statics to the Nash equilibrium mixed strategies shows that as the profit share increases the probability of monitoring an opponent firm is decreased while the probability increases as the size of the overstated production cost increases. This study also shows that high penalty and low monitoring cost lead to high probability to tell the truth of the production cost.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.31 no.4
• /
• pp.763-777
• /
• 2021

Information security started as an IT operation process and is now recognized as an important issue of information technology, and each international organization is newly defining the concept. Information security itself is a new combination of IT technologies, a set of technologies and a technology area. As IT outsourcing becomes common in many public sectors, SLAs are introduced to evaluate the level of IT services. In the area of information security, many studies have been conducted on the derivation and selection of SLA performance indicators, but it is difficult to find a way to apply the performance indicators to service level evaluation and performance systems. This thesis conducted a study on the application of a service evaluation system for information security performance indicators based on the public sector and a performance system including compensation regulations. It presents standards and rewards(incentive and penalty) that define expectation and targets of performance indicators that take into account the environment and characteristics of a specific public sector, and defines appropriate SLA costs. It proposes a change plan for the organizational structure for practical SLA application and service level improvement.