Vehicle Emergency Lamp Fuzzy Control Systems Using The GPS (GPS를 이용한 자동차 비상등 작동 장치)
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- Journal of the Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers
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- v.51 no.6
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- pp.276-281
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- 2014
Necessities of a traffic means work a car in the modern society human to an usability of a life is enjoying. On the other hand, the damage by traffic accident increment the human quotient worked as we were in proportion to the vehicle which increased. Passing an examination moves necessarily on an obstacle to suddenly appear at the fronts if a car travels and the vehicles which stopped suddenly. Dynamic passing an examination about an obstacle turn on Vehicle Emergency Lamp to by hand when is unhurried, and can turn off, but to appear urgently dynamic passing an examination in time human is instinctive, but cannot inform an emergency to a back vehicle, and a rear-end collision occurs. A car we synthesize a speed of a vehicle, and this unit analyzes as we use GPS, and to drive runs Vehicle Emergency Lamp to automatic in the situations that shall turn on emergencies etc. If a speed of a vehicle continuously slows down in too high-speed driving or low-speed driving, or we are stopped, Vehicle Emergency Lamp is always turned on. It was built if we rise again as clearing itself from risk, and a speed of a vehicle judges, and we turn off Vehicle Emergency Lamp to automatic. It runs till rear-end collision sensor operates, and by hand reset does Vehicle Emergency Lamp a driving vehicle collides from behind to a back vehicle or when a driving vehicle was overthrown. It is shortened very much to the chain rear-end collision traffic accident that is a traffic accident of large size if we use this unit. And we did authentication through the experiment which a driver was helpful to unnecessary operation and a relaxed safe driving during drivings.
KOSPI200 index is the Korean stock price index consisting of actively traded 200 stocks in the Korean stock market. Its base value of 100 was set on January 3, 1990. The Korea Exchange (KRX) developed derivatives markets on the KOSPI200 index. KOSPI200 index futures market, introduced in 1996, has become one of the most actively traded indexes markets in the world. Traders can make profit by entering a long position on the KOSPI200 index futures contract if the KOSPI200 index will rise in the future. Likewise, they can make profit by entering a short position if the KOSPI200 index will decline in the future. Basically, KOSPI200 index futures trading is a short-term zero-sum game and therefore most futures traders are using technical indicators. Advanced traders make stable profits by using system trading technique, also known as algorithm trading. Algorithm trading uses computer programs for receiving real-time stock market data, analyzing stock price movements with various technical indicators and automatically entering trading orders such as timing, price or quantity of the order without any human intervention. Recent studies have shown the usefulness of artificial intelligent systems in forecasting stock prices or investment risk. KOSPI200 index data is numerical time-series data which is a sequence of data points measured at successive uniform time intervals such as minute, day, week or month. KOSPI200 index futures traders use technical analysis to find out some patterns on the time-series chart. Although there are many technical indicators, their results indicate the market states among bull, bear and flat. Most strategies based on technical analysis are divided into trend following strategy and non-trend following strategy. Both strategies decide the market states based on the patterns of the KOSPI200 index time-series data. This goes well with Markov model (MM). Everybody knows that the next price is upper or lower than the last price or similar to the last price, and knows that the next price is influenced by the last price. However, nobody knows the exact status of the next price whether it goes up or down or flat. So, hidden Markov model (HMM) is better fitted than MM. HMM is divided into discrete HMM (DHMM) and continuous HMM (CHMM). The only difference between DHMM and CHMM is in their representation of state probabilities. DHMM uses discrete probability density function and CHMM uses continuous probability density function such as Gaussian Mixture Model. KOSPI200 index values are real number and these follow a continuous probability density function, so CHMM is proper than DHMM for the KOSPI200 index. In this paper, we present an artificial intelligent trading system based on CHMM for the KOSPI200 index futures system traders. Traders have experienced on technical trading for the KOSPI200 index futures market ever since the introduction of the KOSPI200 index futures market. They have applied many strategies to make profit in trading the KOSPI200 index futures. Some strategies are based on technical indicators such as moving averages or stochastics, and others are based on candlestick patterns such as three outside up, three outside down, harami or doji star. We show a trading system of moving average cross strategy based on CHMM, and we compare it to a traditional algorithmic trading system. We set the parameter values of moving averages at common values used by market practitioners. Empirical results are presented to compare the simulation performance with the traditional algorithmic trading system using long-term daily KOSPI200 index data of more than 20 years. Our suggested trading system shows higher trading performance than naive system trading.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.