• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.14 no.2
• /
• pp.43-52
• /
• 1989

The present paper analyzes performance of a variant of rate-of-return regulation called the ex-post adjustment regulation put in effect in the Korean petroleum refinery sector. Unlike the traditional rate-of-return regulation on a monopoly, the regulation is first for the oligopolistic industry as a whole and second of the ex post nature. Under the regulation, at the end of each year, each firm is responsible to pay a certain portion of the excess of the total realized profits in the industry over the allowed profits. It is shown that if the excess profits are completely collected(including the interests), the social optimum can be realized. When only a portion of the excess profits can be collected, the regulation generally increases consumer surplus by making the firms more competitive. Each individual firm's production under the regulation depends on whether the firm's output is regarded as a strategic substitute or complement of other firms'output.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
• /
• 2008.11a
• /
• pp.601-605
• /
• 2008

In the current Public-Private Partnership, Applying Ex-post management is rising after the completion of construction. So, Advanced countries of construction are getting additional profit from Re-financing while repairing system about Re-financing. But within the our country positive introduction is difficult because of insufficient of social sympathy about Re-financing, shortage of support from government and imperfection of detail regulation. So this study analyzes the cases of Ex-post management Which are applied to Public-Private Partnership that is adopted by project financing in domestic and overseas field and considers plans which can apply more efficiently in Public-Private Partnership. We anticipate that the results of this study can be utilized for materials that can help people who want to understand hereafter introduction of Ex-post management in domestic Public-Private Partnership and expect that the materials can be used for data developing system of Ex-post management.

• Informatization Policy
• /
• v.26 no.1
• /
• pp.83-105
• /
• 2019

The purpose of this study is to analyze the domestic and overseas laws and regulators' decisions related to zero-rating (ZR) practices through a comparative approach and to support development of the ex-post regulation. Although most countries are adopting ex-post regulatory approaches toward the globally increasing ZR practices, there is no uniform standards or an approach to consider when deciding whether to allow mobile ISPs' zero-rating practices in the market. However, in recent years, some countries have been improving their policy transparency with respect to ZR through enacting and amending relevant laws as well as making trial decisions. The comparative analysis shows that each country investigates restriction of the user choice and ISPs' adherence to the obligation of non-discrimination in order to judge whether the user benefits are damaged by the ZR practices. It also investigates ISP-CP's market positioning and ISP's vertical integration for profit squeeze to find out whether they harm fair competition with ZR practices in the mobile ecosystem. Based on the results of the comparative analysis, we suggest the desirable ZR regulatory directions under the domestic legislative status.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.29 no.11B
• /
• pp.1001-1011
• /
• 2004

The structure of info-communications industry has been changing from vertical integration to horizontal layered disintegration as the Internet technology has been rapidly developed. Considering with this background, EU has decided to introduce new regulatory framework called 2003 framework and asked member states to shift to new framework by July 2003. The key words of the new framework is to be denoted by the following three characteristics: Introduction of cross-media regulatory framework Alleviation of entry regulation by general authorization, Transition from ex ante regulation to ex post regulation.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.13 no.2
• /
• pp.207-214
• /
• 2009

This paper provides the analysis of economic theories about bundling in telecommunications service. First, the negative aspect of bundling is discussed. Second, the competitively neutral aspect of bundling which is counter response of negative effect is analyzed. Third, some variables affecting the bundling is investigated and the corresponding effect of bundling is discussed. The bundling can increase the social welfare under some circumstance while it sometimes decreases economic efficiency by detering the entry of competitive firms. Finally, regulatory approaches on bundling such as the criteria of bundling provision, the requirement of equal access, the discounting scheme ad a price control, ex anti regulation vs. ex post regulation, and the criteria of predatory pricing are provided.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Railway
• /
• v.17 no.6
• /
• pp.452-456
• /
• 2014

This article analyzes the new approach to regulation with regards to the railway industry and determines the government's new role. For this purpose, the regulations are categorized into three dimensions (economic, societal and administrative), following the criteria adopted by the Regulatory Reform Committee. Furthermore, these items are analyzed as compulsory vs. incentive, and prior vs. ex post, according to the managerial characteristics. As a result, some recommendations were derived: the economic regulations should be deregulated and the societal regulations should be modified in order to rationalize the criteria. From this perspective, the government's role needs to be repositioned in order to activate the railway industry.

• Journal of Legislation Research
• /
• no.44
• /
• pp.63-101
• /
• 2013

This article firstly explores into the concepts, components, and pictures of institutional realization of competition and diversity respectively on the premise that competition and diversity comprise the primary objectives to be pursued by the broadcasting-related laws which provide the concrete measures of media policy, and argues that while the competition objective has differentiation factors, there are also particularities in the diversity value in the broadcasting-related laws as sector-specific competition laws. Then assuming that special competition rules including structural regulatory measures particularly in the broadcasting market are required in order to realize values of competition and diversity harmoniously, this article suggests the following improvement directions for regulations aimed at protection of competition and diversity in the broadcasting-related laws. The first one is with the improvement method for regulations aimed at protection of competition. Regulation on share of audience as an ex ante regulation of status and regulation on prohibited activities as an ex post regulation of conduct may play important roles in substituting the causative regulation while seeking for diversity value. For this purpose, it is needed to develop a concrete method that incorporates diversity-related factors as consideration factors in the standard for determining illegality of prohibited activities by inference to methods of determining illegality in the competition law. The second one is with the improvement method for regulations aimed at protection of diversity. This could be considered from three viewpoints that are the setting of regulatory objectives, the identification of alternative regulatory measures, and the choice of regulatory measures and levels suitable for regulatory objectives. From these viewpoints, the regulatory framework should be improved mainly with institutional measures in which diversity value is used for tools of assessment and analysis, not just remaining as mere rhetorical devices, and whether or to what extent to maintain regulations seemingly unreasonable in terms of harmonization with economic objectives such as competition should be discreetly reviewed.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.42 no.1
• /
• pp.57-95
• /
• 2020

As a case study of an ex-post evaluation of regulations, in this paper I evaluate the 'uniform settlement rate requirement', a regulation that was introduced in 1986 and that was applied to the international telephone market in the U.S. for more than 20 years. In a bilateral market between the U.S. and a foreign country, each U.S. firm and its foreign partner jointly provide international telephone service in both directions, compensating each other for terminating incoming calls to their respective countries. The per-minute compensation amount for providing the termination service, referred to as the settlement rate, is determined by a bargaining process involving the two firms. In principle, each U.S. firm could have a different settlement rate for the same foreign country. In 1986, however, the Federal Communications Commission introduced the Uniform Settlement Rate Requirement (USRR), which required all U.S. firms to pay the same settlement rate to a given foreign country. The USRR significantly affected the relative bargaining positions of the U.S. and foreign firms, thereby changing negotiated settlement rates. This paper identifies two main routes through which the settlement rates are changed by the implementation of the USRR: the Competition-Induced-Incentive Effect and the Most-Favored-Nation Effect. I then empirically evaluate the USRR by estimating a bargaining model and conducting counterfactual experiments aimed at measuring the size of the two effects of the USRR. The experiments show remarkably large impacts due to the USRR. Requiring a uniform settlement rate, for instance, results in an average 32.2 percent increase in the negotiated settlement rates and an overall 13.7 percent ($3.43 billion) decrease in the total surplus in the U.S. These results provide very strong evidence against the implementation of the USRR in the 1990s and early 2000s.

• 한국디지털정책학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 2006.06a
• /
• pp.113-123
• /
• 2006

The purpose of this paper is twofold; 1) to evaluate the efforts of participatory government in regulatory reform, 2) to propose the strategies and tasks for future regulatory reform in Korea. An ex-post evaluation model for regulatory performance is applied to process, output, and outcome of the regulatory reform. The results of the evaluation show that there is still room for improvement in many aspects of regulatory reform. While there has been substantial advance in regulatory quality and management, carefully planned strategies are essential for Korean regulatory reform to move to the next stage of regulatory reform. Thus, based on the evaluation, future strategies and tasks for regulatory reform are presented as short-term tasks, mid to long range tasks, and continuous tasks.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.459-483
• /
• 2010

This paper constructs the two-part tax-a combined form of output tax and entrance fee-for polluting oligopolists under endogenous entry. In the presence of external damage that varies exogenously with aggregate output, we show that the two-part tax produces the ex post Pigouvian rule and thus achieves the first-best optimum. We also examine a detailed analysis of the impact of the two-part tax on social welfare and government revenues. Finally, when estimation errors exist in the process of regulation, we identify the incentive conflicts between interest groups and analyze the effects of estimation errors on determining optimal tax. In particular, we show that if the regulator takes care of both welfare loss and revenue gain under the proposed two-part tax, not only over-estimation on the slope of external damage but also under-estimation on the slope of market demand should be taken into the policy consideration.