• Title/Summary/Keyword: epistemic asymmetry

Search Result 2, Processing Time 0.017 seconds

Bayesian concept of evidence (베이즈주의에서의 증거 개념)

  • Lee, Yeong-Eui
    • Korean Journal of Logic
    • /
    • v.8 no.2
    • /
    • pp.33-58
    • /
    • 2005
  • The old evidence problem raises a profound problem to Bayesian theory of confirmation that evidence known prior to a hypothesis explaining it cannot give any empirical support to the hypothesis. The old evidence problem has resisted to a lot of trials to solve it. The purpose of the paper is to solve the old evidence problem by showing that the problem originated from a serious misunderstanding about the Bayesian concept of confirmation. First, I shall make a brief analysis of the problem, and examine critically two typical Bayesian strategies to solve it. Second, I shah point out a misunderstanding commonly found among Bayesian discussions about the old evidence problem, the ignorance of the asymmetry of confirmation in the context of explanation and prediction. Lastly, 1 shall suggest two different concepts of confirmations by using the asymmetry and argue that the concept of confirmation presupposed in the old evidence problem is not a genuine Bayesian concept of confirmation.

  • PDF

Semantics for Specific Indefinites

  • Yeom, Jae-Il
    • Language and Information
    • /
    • v.1
    • /
    • pp.227-276
    • /
    • 1997
  • There has been no nuanimous analysis of specific indefinites. It is still disputed even whether specificity is a matter of semantics of pragmatics. In this paper, I introduce some properties of specific indefinites, and explain them based on the meaning of specificity. Specificity intuitively means that the speaker or someone else in the context has some individual in mind, which is generally accepted among liguistics. The main issue is how to represent the meaning of 'have-in-mind'. I review some philosophical discusstions of cognitive contact and show that when the use of an expression involves 'have-in-mind', the expression is rigid designator in the belief of the agent who has an individual in mind. in the use of a specific indefinite, this applies only to the information state of the agent of 'have-in-mind'. To represent this asymmetry, I propose a new theory of dynamic semantics, in which a common ground consists of multiple information states, as many as the number of the participants in a conversation. Moreover, each information state is structured as a set of epistemic alternatives, which is a set of possible information states of a participant in the context. Based on this semantics, the properties of specific indefinites are explained.

  • PDF