• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.323-333
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• 2005

The paper is to serve as a guide for deciding on a desirable direction for the vessel buyback program, reviewing their performance and economic effects from fish harvest reduction due to not reaching MSY. Compared with maximum willingness to pay for vessel buyback programs designed to avoid economic losses occurring as a result of overfishing, the portions of investment costs for buyback program are so small comparatively to the range of 0.32% to 12.19% at the annual base. The economic loss effects occurred in terms of the reduction of fishing harvest are comprehensively estimated at the present value of 30,877 billion won since 1971, and exceeded the revenues for fish harvests from 1999. In order to resole fish stocks through a vessel buyback program, this paper recommends that the yield should be reduced to less than the intrinsic growth rate. Otherwise, the buyback program policy eventually fails regardless of the temporal effect of benefits. This paper further argues that technical policy tools such as fishing grounds, fishing seasons, size of fish and minimum size of meshes should be effectively utilized.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.36 no.3 s.69
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• pp.119-139
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• 2005

The purpose of this paper is to provide information that will help both fishing industry and fisheries authority understand the principals of individual transferable quota(ITQ) fishery management. Theoretical frameworks and primary features of ITQ fishery managemenet are the assignment of exclusive property rights for harvest of common - property fisheries resources. An ITQ fishery management is fundamentally different from the conventional fishery management and it gives an individual fisherman the right to catch a specified quantity of fish, his quota. With ITQ, fisherman's quotas are transferable, in whole or in part. An ITQ is a property with certain rights of use, namely, the right to catch a given quantity and species of fish in a specific location during a specific period of time. The right is exclusive in the sense that no one else has the right to use the quota without the owner's permission. The property may be assigned, traded, and exchanged; i.e., the owner has the right to transfer an ownership to others. An ITQ fishery management leads to both economic efficiency and resource conservation. Motivations to overexploit stocks and to overcapitalize should be lessened because fishermen no longer have to compete for limited resources. There are significant positive net benefits and advantages with ITQ fishery management than without. The potential benefits and advantages of ITQ fishery management include increased profits, economic stability, improved product quality, safer working conditions, less gear conflict, elimination of the race - to - fish phenomenon, less by - catch, less gear loss, improved investment climate, mitigation of market gluts, waste reduction, addition to fisherman's wealth, and compensation for fisherman exiting the fishery. As an independent observe to Red Crab Trap Fishery some of the benefits, problems, and effects, an ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery is still far from to be implemented. Many different and difficult aspects (biological, socioeconomics, administrative) are involved considering the implementation of ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery. Among other fishery management tools, the implementation of ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery is considered to be the best in achieving the better conservation of fisheries resources and their more economic and rational exploitation. Korean fisheries authority should pay great attention to the experience of the economic effects of the ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery in the hope of being able to implement at least some of those experiences into the Korean fishery management.