• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.21-36
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• 2020

Purpose - This study analyzes the effect of sellers' dishonesty on various market outcomes such as seller profit, buyer profit, and market welfare, through precisely measuring the level of sellers' information disclosure and its economic impacts. As an explicit observation of sellers' dishonesty is not easy in most other settings, this study is expected to suggest unique and meaningful implications on the effect of sellers' incomplete information disclosure to researchers, managers, and policy makers. Design/methodology/approach - In order to precisely measure the level of sellers' dishonesty under information asymmetry, this study analyzes the data from an incentive-based economic experiment using z-Tree software. This experimental method enables us to focus on the strategic interactions among participants, observe the integrity of seller's information disclosure, and reproduce real market situations. Findings - The analysis of sellers' dishonesty has provided the following important and counterintuitive findings about the reality of buyer-seller interactions under information asymmetry. First, sellers' lies do not affect seller profit even when they are very intensive. Second, sellers' dishonesty negatively affects buyer profit and the entire market welfare. Third, a seller's quality claim has a positive effect on the seller profit only when a seller is being honest. Research implications or Originality - This study analyzes sellers' dishonesty using incentive-based economic experiment using z-Tree software which provides a straightforward examination on dishonest behavior of sellers, that is not readily available with other types of observational or experimental data.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.597-619
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• 2000

Marketable permit system (MPS) is a economic incentive instrument that allows polluters to achieve static and dynamic efficiency, However, Korea's atmospheric regulations are primarily based upon command and control (CAC) system and partly upon economic incentive instruments, which fail to realize its relative effectiveness, Accordingly, an introduction of MPS has been recommended with the cost effectiveness analysis in numerous studies, The literature, however, did not consider the relationship between MPS and the existing regulations, which is a key factor for the successful introduction of MPS, This paper provides a set of principles to judge how the existing regulations are reconciled with the introduction of MPS, In addition, authors execute an empirical study to show MPS's cost effectiveness when regulators apply MPS in Ulsan area for the abatement of sulfur dioxide, The results suggest that the regulations such as fuel regulation should be excluded when implementing MPS, and a flexibility in legal and regulatory system is to be required in order to secure a successful implementation of MPS.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.55-75
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• 2009

Price discounts presupposing churn-in are important tools of competition in many industries such as mobile telecommunication services and newspaper. In this case, consumers can get discount only through changing the provider. For analyzing this kind of competitions, we should consider the incentive of utilizing iterative switching. Hence, in this paper, we consider multi-stage equilibrium and can find that equilibria are different from one stage discount. In particular, when consumers' decisions are for maximizing multi-stage utility, discounts can bring about churn-out as well as churn-in and firms lose the incentive of discounts.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.1-29
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• 2009

This paper exploited the data reported in BK21 program of professors' research performances and analyzed the effects of reputational concerns on professors' research performances. According to the established theory of reputation effects in incentive provision, a professor's research incentive gets stronger if one's ability is less known, and one's colleagues' abilities are better known. We confirmed this theoretical hypothesis of reputation effects. Moreover, we found that a professor's research incentive was larger under inter-generational grouping in terms of age distribution and homogeneous grouping in terms of ability uncertainty.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.636-638
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• 2003

This paper presents a new approach which is able to determine the reasonable incentive levels of direct load control using sequential Monte Carlo simulation techniques. The economic analysis needs to determine the reasonable incentive level. However, the conventional methods have been based on the scenario methods because they had not considered all cases of the direct load control situations. To overcome there problems, this paper proposes a new technique using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo method is a simple and flexible tool to consider large scale systems and complex models for the components of the system. To show its effectiveness, numerical studies were performed to indicate the possible applications of the proposed technique.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.60 no.3
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• pp.517-523
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• 2011

A lot of DSM (Demand Side Management) programs have been implemented to promote the effective utilization of resources and the rational development of power industry, and various economic analyses and policy-based studies on DSM have been executed to determine effective subsidy budget. In this paper, a new objective function for deciding an optimal incentive allocation among various programs is presented by introducing the maximization of the total saving power of the programs. For simplicity, the objective function and the constraints is linearized to apply LP(Linear Programming) method. LP program based on Simplex Method was developed by MATLAB. An optimal incentive allocation of 4 DSM programs is presented by the use of the developed MATLAB program.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.209-228
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• 2002

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate strategies for the attraction of Korean finns into EU Objective 1 (less prosperous region).2(regions facing structural difficulties or conversion) on the basis of Korean foreign direct investment in the European Union(EU) in the past 10 years (the late 1980s-late 1990s). Of such strategies the most important was incentive packages for Korean finns by those regions. Nonetheless, these packages did not contribute to the development of the finns and regions because of limits to the finns' competitiveness(cost competitiveness) and the regions' competitiveness(low productivity and skills). Consequently, these strategies of EU Objective 1.2 regions did not provide an opportunity for pathways to successful development because the incentive packages provided to the finns and regions without the consideration of their internal and external circumstances.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.59-85
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• 2014

This paper analyses an impact of wage scheme and transparency of performance evaluation on the productivity. The main findings in this paper are as follows: First, the effect of wage scheme based on seniority system on the productivity is worse off than the performance pay. Second, there is a positive relationship between an incentive and the productivity, but, in the case of firms which individually informs the results of performance evaluation to their workers, it shows the hump-shaped relationship. Third, though the wage scheme is based on the performance, if the evaluation system is not transparent, the impact of incentive on the productivity is disappeared. Consequently, this paper implies that the appropriate incentive and the transparent performance evaluation system are required so as to improve the productivity.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.121-161
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• 2011

We study incentive structures of public developers and land owners in the process of public expropriations using a sequential game model. In the model, we show that there is an incentive for the public developer to give more compensation than just compensation that are defined by law. Also the model shows that there is an incentive for the land owners to revolt strategically against the public expropriation. Then an ideal authority delegation model is introduced to resolve the problems, where an independent appraiser determines the compensation for the expropriation. In the real world, improving the independence of appraisal process is critical to make the system closer to the ideal authority delegation model. So this paper concludes by making a few policy suggestions to improve the current appraisal system.

• Culinary science and hospitality research
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.71-94
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• 2002

The food service industry has grown up without an affection of economic collapse, and its kinds are being diversified and focused on many different aspects from physical taste to many other elements such as atmosphere, service quality, sanitation and etc.. Now it appeals to even familiarity. These Facts are well ref looted to Family Restaurant which has not been very popular so far, but now it takes its space in the market, and its management system is being introduced to other countries. The purpose of this study is to see how to satisfy them to make maximum business profit, and one possibility is "incentive". To accomplish research, theoretical and practical studies have been done and surveys have taken placed for substantial studies. The subjects were limited to employees in Family Restaurant in Seoul from February 20th to March 20th, 2001. Data, reliableness, and propriety were analyzed by SAS(Statistical Analyzed System). Sampling mode was randomness, and validation mode was limited to 223 papers. The followings are the results of this analysis First, Satisfaction of incentive were made by stability, impartiality and suitability regardless difference on companies, ages, departments, and authority of an employees. Second, Satisfaction on incentive for employees in Family Restaurants were not well received. Although these necessary demand, there is not yet incentive system operation to most of business. Especially, it is not even studied on Family Restaurants. This study should have been studied on more customers and spotted employees to be objective. It is strongly recommended to do this study without limitation and further studies is considered on this subjects.