• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.515-536
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• 2000

This study analyzes the U.S. case law which challenges the legal conclusions of the district court with respect to the applicability, and effect, of the doctrine of waiver and estoppel in addition to the doctrine of documentary cure. The impliations are as follows. First, the documentary cure requirement can not be interpreted to mean early enough to allow the beneficiary to cure and represent the documents before the presentment deadline or expiry date of letter of credit. The mere fact that the presentment period expired before the completion of bank's review and notification process does not compel any conclusion about whether the examiner spent a reasonable amount of time examining the documents. Indeed, the reasonable time requirement does not imply that banks examine a presentation out of order or hurry a decision based upon particular needs or desires of a beneficiary. Secondly, even if the doctrine of waiver can apply to letter of credit governed by the strict compliance standard, a one-time acceptance of discrepant documents by a bank does not waive the bank's right to insist upon conforming documents in all subsequent letter of credit transactions between the bank and beneficiary. Revised UCC Article 5 is highly persuasive on this point: waiver of discrepancies by issuer or an applicant in one or more presentation does not waive similar discrepancies in a future presentation. Neither the issuer nor the beneficiary can reasonably rely upon honor over past waivers as a basis for concluding that a future defective presentation will justify honor.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.12
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• pp.429-460
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• 1999

The letter of credit is quintessentially international. In the absence of international legal system, a private system based on banking practices has evolved, commanding the adherence of the international letter of credit community and providing the foundation of th reputation of this instrument. To maintain this international system, it is vital that international standard banking practice should not be subject to local interpretations that misconstrue or distort it. The UCP is a formulation of international standard banking practice. It is neither positive law nor a "contract term" in any traditional sense and its interpretation must be consonant with its character as a living repositary of international understanding in this field. As a result, the interpretation and application of specific articles of the UCP must be consistent with its evolving character and history and with the principles upon which sound letter of credit practice is predicated. This study, especially, focuses on article 13 and article 14 of the UCP500. Article 13(b) of UCP500 stipulates that banks will have a reasonable time, not to exceed seven days, to examine documents to determine whether they comply facially with the terms of the credit. The seven-day provision is not designed as a safe harbor, because the rule requires the issuer to act within a reasonable time. But, by virtue of the deletion of the preclusion rule in the document examination article in UCP500, however, seven days may evolve as something of a safe harbor, especially for banks that engage in strategic behavior. True, under UCP500 banks are supposed to examine documents within a reasonable time, but there are no consequences in UCP500 for a bank's violation of that duty. It is only in the next provision. Courts might read the preclusion more broadly than the literal reading mentioned here or might fashion a common-law preclusion rule that does not require a showing of detriment. Absent that kind of development, the change in the preclusion rule could have adverse effects on the beneficiary. The penalty, strict estoppel or strict preclusion, under UCP500 and 95UCC differs from the classic estoppel. The classic estoppel rule requires a beneficiary to show three elements. 1. conduct on the part of the issuer that leads the beneficiary to believe that nonconforming documents do conform; 2. reasonable reliance by the beneficiary; and 3. detriment from that reliance. But stict preclusion rule needs not detrimental reliance. This strict estoppel rule is quite strict, and some see it as a fitting pro-beneficiary rule to counterbalance the usually pro-issuer rule of strict compliance.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.41
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• pp.201-228
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• 2011

In 97hu2200, the Supreme Court of Korea suggested five requirements to apply the doctrine of equivalents, i.e. identity of problem-solving principles, interchangeability, ease of interchangeability, exception of known arts and file-wrapper estoppel. There have been arguments on whether the standard of ease of interchangeability could be regarded as the same as the obviousness standard in deciding patentability. The side who thinks that they are different (hereinafter, the side of difference) considers that the standard of ease of interchangeability is narrower than the obviousness standard. This side criticizes the side who thinks that they are the same each other (hereinafter, the side of the same) on the reason that doctrine of equivalents can be overly expanded. On the other hand, 'the side of the same' argues that every accused invention having no inventive step from the perspective of the patented invention should be considered to infringe. 'The side of the same' points that if the standard of ease of interchangeability is considered as narrower than the obviousness standard, 'grey area' should exist where the patent law cannot work. The difference between the two side may cause contradictory results in the decision of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Because 'the side of difference' construes claims narrowly than 'the side of the same,' an accused invention in the grey area is not regarded to infringe. 'The side of the same,' however, considers the accused invention to fall into the scope of the patent under the doctrine of equivalents. This paper concludes that the standard of ease of interchangeability should be regarded as the same as the obviousness standard from the perspective of economics of innovation.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.225-261
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• 2005

Under Article IV of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), in order to obtain the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, a party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall supply (a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. In addition, if the arbitral award or arbitration agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language, and the translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. In a case where a Vietnamese company which had obtained a favorable arbitral award in Vietnam applied for recognition and enforcement of a Vietnamese arbitral award before a Korean court, the recent Korean Supreme Court Judgment (Docket No. 2004 Da 20180. 'Judgment') rendered on December 12, 2004 has alleviated the document requirements as follows : The Judgment held that (i) the party applying for recognition andenforcement of a foreign arbitral award does not have to strictly comply with the document requirements when the other party does not dispute the existence and the content of the arbitral award and the arbitration agreement and that (ii) in case the translation submitted to the court does not satisfy the requirement of Article 4, the court does not have to dismiss the case on the ground that the party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award has failed to comply with the translation requirement under Article 4, and instead may supplement the documents by obtaining an accurate Korean translation from an expert translator at the expense of the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award. In this regard, the author fully supports the view of the Judgment. Finally, the Judgment held that, even though the existence of a written arbitration agreement was not disputed at the arbitration, there was no written arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and wenton to repeal the judgment of the second instance which admitted the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. In this regard, the author does not share the view of the Judgment. The author believes that considering the trend of alleviating the formality requirement of arbitration agreements under Article 2 of the New York Convention, the Supreme Court could have concluded that there was a written arbitration agreement because the defendant participated in thearbitration proceedings in Vietnam without disputing the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement. Or the Supreme Court should have taken the view that the defendant was no longer permitted to dispute the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement because otherwise it would be clearly against the doctrine of estoppel.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.71-96
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• 2008

Arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, whereby contractual parties may only be required to submit a dispute to arbitration pursuant to their formal agreement. However, there are several important exceptions to this rule that have developed under common law notions of implied consent. These doctrines may serve either to benefit or to harm a nonsignatory to an arbitral agreement because either (1) the nonsignatory may compel a signatory to the agreement to arbitrate a dispute or (2) the nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute despite never having signed an arbitration agreement. The Court has a long-standing domestic policy of favoring arbitration, and these doctrines reflect that policy. 1. incorporation by reference An arbitration clause may apply to a party who is a nonsignatory to one agreement containing an arbitration clause but who is a signatory to a second agreement that incorporates the terms of the first agreement. 2. assumption An arbitration clause may apply to a nonsignatory who has impliedly agreed to arbitrate. Under this theory, the nonsignatory's conduct is a determinative factor. For example, a nonsignatory who voluntarily begins arbitrating the merits of a dispute before an arbitral tribunal may be bound by the arbitrator's ruling on that dispute even though the nonsignatory was not initially required to arbitrate the dispute. 3. agency A nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may be bound to arbitrate a dispute stemming from that agreement under the traditional laws of agency. A principal may also be bound to arbitrate a claim based on an agreement containing an arbitration clause signed by the agent. The agent, however, does not generally become individually bound by executing such an agreement on behalf of a disclosed principal unless there is clear evidence that the agent intended to be bound. 4. veil piercing/alter ego In the corporate context, a nonsignatory corporation to an arbitration agreement may be bound by that agreement if the agreement is signed by its parent, subsidiary, or affiliate. 5. estoppel The doctrine of equitable estoppel is usually applied by nonsignatory defendants who wish to compel signatory plaintiffs to arbitrate a dispute. This will generally be permitted when (1) the signatory must rely on the terms of the contract in support of its claims against the nonsignatory, or (2) the signatory alleges that it and the nonsignatory engaged in interdependent misconduct that is intertwined with the obligations imposed by the contract. Therefore, this article analyzed these doctrines centering around case-law in America.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.161-178
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• 2009

This article focuses on the enforceability of arbitration agreements m the dispute of standby letter of credit, especially with the case analysis of the leading case from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. In Nova Hut a.s. v. Kaiser Group International Inc. case, while the underlying contract contained an arbitration clause, a guarantee to assure contractor's performance did not contain an arbitration clause. Nova Hut drew on the standby for the Contractor's failure to deliver contractual obligations. Against the Kaiser's action under US Bankruptcy law, Nova Hut moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, to compel arbitration, and to dismiss the complaint. The US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware denied Nova Hut's motions. On appeal, Kaiser argued that it was not subject to arbitration since it was not a party to the contract. It also argued that Nova Hut had waived its right to arbitration by filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and commencing legal actions in other countries. The appeals court noted that in order to avoid arbitration on those grounds prejudice must be shown. It indicated that because there was no long delay in requesting arbitration and no discovery conducted m the course of litigation, the Kaiser could not demonstrate actual prejudice on the part of Owner. In light of public policy favoring arbitration, the nature of the claims in the parties' agreements, Kaiser's conduct in embracing the agreements, and their expectation of benefit, the appeals court ruled that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied in requiring the Parent to arbitrate.