Principles of Space Resources Exploitation under International Law (국제법상 우주자원개발원칙)
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- The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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- v.33 no.2
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- pp.35-59
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- 2018
Professor Bin Cheng said that outer space was res extra commercium, while the moon and the other celestial bodies were res nullius before the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST). However, Article 2 of the OST made the moon and other celestial bodies have the legal status as res extra commmercium, not appropriated by any country or private enterprises or individual person, but the resources there can be freely available, as those on the high seas. The non-appropriation principle was introduced to corpus juris spatialis internationalis. Whether or not the non-appropriation principle is binding for the non-parties of the OST, many scholars see this principle as an international customary law, even developing into jus cogens. Article 11(2) of the Moon Agreement(MA) reconfirms the nonappropriation principle of Article 2 of the OST, but it has much less effect than the OST because the MA binds only the 18 parties involved. The MA applies only to the moon and celestial bodies other than the Earth in the Solar System, the OST's application scope extends to the Galaxy because the OST has no such substantive enactment. As referred to in the 2015 CSLCA of USA or Luxembourg's Law of Space Resources, allowing individuals and enterprises run by other countries to commercially explore and utilize the space resources, the question may arise whether this violates the non-appropriation principle under Article 2 of the OST and Article 11 of the MA. In the case of the CSLCA, the law explicitly specifies that sovereignty, possessory rights, and judiciary rights to a specific celestial body cannot be claimed, let alone ownership. This author believes that this law respects the legal status of outer space and the celestial bodies as res extra commmercium. As long as any countries or private enterprises or individuals respect the non-appropriation principle of outer space and the celestial bodies, they could use, exploit it. Another question might be raised in the difference between res extra commercium on the high seas and res extra commercium in outer space and the celestial bodies. Collecting resources on the high seas and exploiting space resources should be interpreted differently. On the high seas, resources can be collected without any obstacles like fishing, whereas, in the case of the deep sea-bed area, the Common Heritage of Mankind principles under the UNCLOS should be operated by the International Seabed Authority as an international regime. The nature or form of the sea resources found on the high seas are thus different from that of space resources, which are fixed on the moon and the celestial bodies without water. Thus, if individuals or private enterprises collect these resources from outer space and the celestial bodies, they might secure a certain section and continue collecting or mining works without any limitation. If an American enterprise receives an approval from the U.S. government, secures the best location and collects resources on the moon, can other countries' enterprises access to this area? How large the exploiting place can be allotted on the moon? How long should such a exploiting activity be lasted? Under the current international space law, these matters might be handled according to the principle of "first come, first served." As a consequence, the international community should provide a guideline or a proposal for the settlement of any foreseeable disputes during the space activity to solve plausible space legal questions in the near future.
One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.
1967 Outer Space Treaty(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; OST) is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law. OST is based on the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space announced by UNGA resolution. As of May 2013, 102 countries are states parties to OST, while another 27 have signed the treaty but have not completed ratification. OST explicitly claimed that the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies are the province of all mankind. Art. II of OST states that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means", thereby establishing res extra commercium in outer space like high seas. However 1979 Moon Agreement stipulates that "the moon and its natural resources are the Common Heritage of Mankind(CHM)." Because of the number of the parties to the Moon Agreement(13 parties) it does not affect OST. OST also established its specific treaties as a complementary means such as 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, 1975 Registration Convention. OST bars states party to the treaty from placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. It exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications. However OST does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit. China and Russia submitted Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT) on the Conference on Disarmament in 2008. USA disregarded PPWT on the ground that there are no arms race in outer space. OST does not have some articles in relation to current problems such as space debris, mechanisms of the settlement of dispute arising from state activities in outer space in specific way. COPUOS established "UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" based on "IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" and ILA proposed "International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Debris" for space debris problems and Permanent Court of Arbitration(PCA) established "Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities" and ILA proposed "1998 Taipei Draft Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Dispute" for the settlement of dispute problems. Although OST has shortcomings in some articles, it is very meaningful in international law in considering the establishment of basic principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. OST established the principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space as customary law and jus cogens in international law as follows; the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. The principles of global public interest in outer space imposes international obligations erga omnes applicable to all States. This principles find significant support in legal norms dealing with following points: space activities as the "province of all mankind"; obligation to cooperate; astronauts as envoys of mankind; avoidance of harmful contamination; space activities by States, private entities and intergovernmental organisations; absolute liability for damage cauesd by certain space objects; prohibition of weapons in space and militarization of the celestial bodies; duty of openness and transparency; universal application of the international space regime.
The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.