• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.75-94
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• 2008

In philosophy of mind, both reductionism and deflationism claim that the problem of mental causation is overstated, but the reason why they claim that way is quite different. On the one hand, for deflationism, since the problem of mental causation is bogus problem we need to focus on epistemology or scientific explanation rather than metaphysics. On the other hand, although the proponents of nonreductionism seem to think of the principles of causal closure of the physical and causal exclusion proposed by Jaegwon Kim as tenable, they do not go with the reductive approach to the problem of mental causation. Instead they stay with the concept of supervenience to overcome mental causation problem that, reductionists think, leads us to the dilemma situation. Of course, deflationists do not think that supervenience is plausible not as much as supervenience physicalists think that it is. If so, in what way and how do deflationists regard the problem of mental causation as a bogus problem? In this paper, I shall examine the most plausible response to mental causation problem, the contemporary version of mind-body problem by critically discussing and clarifying matters concerning the problem.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.53-85
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• 2012

There are various views in the boundary of deflationism of truth in regarding the nature and role of truth. This paper surveys the issue on how the core thesis uniting the deflationism is characterized. First, I will examine some comments on what is the central thesis supported or rejected by the deflationists and inflationists, mainly discussing Armour-Garb and Beall's work, and will show on which aspects they are unsatisfying. From this, I will suggest these statements: first, the central cores of deflationism are conceptual fundamentality and explanatory exhausting. Second, the particularity thesis, understood in an alternative way, cannot be a central claim of deflationism. Third, another important claim from deflationists, the expression thesis, can be derived from the two main thesis above. But it is still not clear enough what the non-expressive explanatory role of truth, which is denied by the expression thesis. So I will check some possible clarifications on it and discuss why they should be rejected. And I will introduce Dummett's view on the role of truth condition in truth conditional explanation of meaning, and I will claim that if Dummett is right why the role must be a inflated one. Finally, I will suggest a further implication that the understanding on the both sides can be widened by connecting considerations on both views.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.207-231
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• 2018

The identity theory of truth insists that a truth bearer is identical with a fact. First, I will consider how we can make the thesis intelligible. For this, I classify the identity relation which the identity theory discusses into two kind; trivial and non-trivial relation. And I show that the trivial one is not adequate to be qualified to be applied to the identity theory. The non-trivial relation can be adopted in robust or modest way. I argue that the robust kind of identity theory is incoherent itself. Then, I explain why we should compare the modest identity theory with the deflationism. From this comparing, I will draw the consequence that two choices are left to the modest theory. If they choose one way, there is no reason for us to prefer the identity theory to deflationism. On the other hand, in case that they choose the other way, I argue what kinds of interesting problem is left to be solved by the modest theorists. Finally, I will evaluate the limit and prospect of the result of the problem in case that the identity theorists achieve their goal.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.49-82
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• 2016

In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke's Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein's paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the 'determinate/infinistic' notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the 'indeterminate/finistic' notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein's context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke's adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.