• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.11a
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• pp.3-5
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• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.7 no.6
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• pp.1379-1397
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• 2013

We consider a system where a licensed radio spectrum is shared by multiple primary users(PUs) and secondary users(SUs). As the spectrum of interest is licensed to primary network, power and channel allocation must be carried out within the cognitive radio network so that no excessive interference is caused to PUs. For this system, we study the joint beamforming and power allocation problem via game theory in this paper. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative beamforming and power allocation game, subject to the interference constraints of PUs as well as the peak transmission power constraints of SUs. We design a joint beamforming and power allocation algorithm for maximizing the total throughput of SUs, which is implemented by alternating iteration of minimum mean square error based decision feedback beamforming and a best response based iterative power allocation algorithm. Simulation results show that the algorithm has better performance than an existing algorithm and can converge to a locally optimal sum utility.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.440-448
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• 2015

In this paper, we study the problem of selfish behavior of secondary users (SUs) based on cognitive radio (CR) with the presence of primary users (PUs). SUs are assumed to contend on a channel using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) and PUs do not consider transmission of SUs, where CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deference of packets. SUs are vulnerable to selfish attacks by which selfish users could pick short random deference to obtain a larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other SUs. In this paper, game theory is used to study the systematic cheating of SUs in the presence of PUs in multichannel CR networks. We study two cases: A single cheater and multiple cheaters acting without any restraint. We identify the Pareto-optimal point of operation of a network with multiple cheaters and also derive the Nash equilibrium of the network. We use cooperative game theory to drive the Pareto optimality of selfish SUs without interfering with the activity of PUs. We show the influence of the activity of PUs in the equilibrium of the whole network.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39B no.11
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• pp.790-802
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• 2014

In cognitive radio technology, secondary users can determine the absence of PU by periodic sensing operation and cooperative sensing between SUs yields a significant sensing performance improvement. However, there exists a trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of the primary users and the costs of false alarm probability. Therefore, the cooperation group must maintain the suitable size. And secondary users should sense not only the currently using channels and but also other candidates channel to switch in accordance with sudden appearance of the primary user. In this paper, we propose an effective group cooperative sensing algorithm in distributed network situations that is considering both of inband and outband sensing using evolutionary game theory. We derived that the strategy group of secondary users converges to an ESS(Evolutionary sable state). Using a learning algorithm, each secondary user can converge to the ESS without the exchange of information to each other.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.1996-2013
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• 2015

This paper considers a scenario that more D2D users exist in the cell, they compete for cellular resources to increase their own data rates, which may cause transmission interference to cellular users (CU) and the unfairness of resource allocation. We design a resource allocation scheme for selfish D2D users assisted by cooperative relay technique which is used to further enhance the users' transmission rates, meanwhile guarantee the QoS requirement of the CUs. Two transmission modes are considered for D2D users: direct transmission mode and cooperative relay transmission mode, both of which reuses the cellular uplink frequency resources. To ensure the fairness of resource distribution, Nash bargaining theory is used to determine the transmission mode and solve the bandwidth allocation problem for D2D users choosing cooperative relay transmission mode, and coalition formation game theory is used to solve the uplink frequency sharing problem between D2D users and CUs through a new defined "Selfish order". Through theoretical analysis, we obtain the closed Nash bargaining solution under CUs' rate constraints, and prove the stability of the formatted coalition. Simulation results show that the proposed resource allocation approach achieves better performance on resource allocation fairness, with only little sacrifice on the system sum rates.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.957-960
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• 2011

We present a fair and efficient solution for selfish readers with the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to mitigate the effects of RFID frequency interference. We compare the NBS with a solution derived by the max log-sum scheme that maximizes total utility and show that for selfish and rational readers, the NBS brings success in bargaining on resource allocation between readers unlike the max log-sum scheme, although the NBS has less total payoff compared to the max log-sum scheme.

• Proceedings of the IEEK Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.97-100
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• 2000

In previous research of social dilemma, there is no extended game that the players can select one game out of some social dilemma games. We propose this kind of game as ＂Distributed Social Dilemma＂ In this game, each player tries to acquire the adaptive strategy throughout local interactions. We make use of GA as evolutionary operations. In this paper, our purpose is to examine how the game selection of players influences the evolution of cooperation in distributed social dilemma. In order to examine, we formulate distributed social dilemma by Game Theory and use agent-based simulation that each agent is regard as player

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.55-62
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• 2014

A game theoretic approach is applied for studying the energy efficient rate scheduling. The individual utility function is defined first. Then, a non cooperative rate game is modeled in which each user decides the transmission rate to maximize its own utility. The utility function considered here is the consumed energy for the individual user's data transmissions. In particular, using the fact that the utility function is convex, we prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium in the energy efficient rate scheduling problem at hand. Accordingly, a non cooperative scheduling algorithm is provided. For better energy efficiency, the sum of the individual user's utility function is optimized Finally, the convergence analysis and numerical results to show the energy efficiency of the proposed algorithms are provided.