• ETRI Journal
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.80-88
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• 2014

Recently, the idea of the smart grid has been gaining significant attention and has become a hot research topic. The purpose of this paper is to present a novel smart grid management scheme that uses game theory principles. In our proposed scheme, power appliances in the smart grid adaptively form groups according to the non-cooperative hedonic game model. By exploiting multi-appliance diversity, appliances in each group are dynamically scheduled in a cooperative manner. For efficient smart grid management, the proposed coopetition game approach is dynamic and flexible to adaptively respond to current system conditions. The main feature is to maximize the overall system performance while satisfying the requirements of individual appliances. Simulation results indicate that our proposed scheme achieves higher energy efficiency and better system performance than other existing schemes.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.5
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• pp.2319-2337
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• 2019

In this paper, we study the distributed cooperative caching for Internet content providers in a small cell of heterogeneous network (HetNet). A general framework based on bankruptcy game model is put forth for finding the optimal caching policy. In this framework, the small cell and different content providers are modeled as bankrupt company and players, respectively. By introducing strategic decisions into the bankruptcy game, we propose a caching value assessment algorithm based on analytic hierarchy process in the framework of bankruptcy game theory to optimize the caching strategy and increase cache hit ratio. Our analysis shows that resource utilization can be improved through cooperative sharing while considering content providers' satisfaction. When the cache value is measured by multiple factors, not just popularity, the cache hit rate for user access is also increased. Simulation results show that our approach can improve the cache hit rate while ensuring the fairness of the distribution.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.17-30
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• 2021

At present, multiple input multiple output radars offer accurate target detection and better target parameter estimation with higher resolution in high-speed wireless communication systems. This study focuses primarily on power allocation to improve the performance of radars owing to the sparsity of targets in the spatial velocity domain. First, the radars are clustered using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. Next, cooperative and noncooperative clusters are extracted based on the distance measured using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. The power is allocated to cooperative clusters using the Pareto optimality particle swarm optimization algorithm. In addition, the Nash equilibrium particle swarm optimization algorithm is used for allocating power in the noncooperative clusters. The process of allocating power to cooperative and noncooperative clusters reduces the overall transmission power of the radars. In the experimental section, the proposed method obtained the power consumption of 0.014 to 0.0119 at K = 2, M = 3 and K = 2, M = 3, which is better compared to the existing methodologies-generalized Nash game and cooperative and noncooperative game theory.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.183-192
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• 2014

This paper proposes a payment-based power control scheme using non-cooperative game with a novel pricing function in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The proposed algorithm considers the fairness of power control among second users (SUs) where the value of per SU' signal to noise ratio (SINR) or distance between SU and SU station is used as reference for punishment price setting. Due to the effect of uncertainty fading environment, the system is unable to get the link gain coefficient to control SUs' transmission power accurately, so the quality of service (QoS) requirements of SUs may not be guaranteed, and the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is not ensured. Therefore, an alternative iterative scheme with sliding model is presented for the non-cooperative power control game algorithm. Simulation results show that the pricing policy using SUs' SINR as price punishment reference can improve total throughput, ensure fairness and reduce total transmission power in CRNs.

• IEMEK Journal of Embedded Systems and Applications
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.195-201
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• 2023

The degree of contribution each sensor makes towards the total information gathered by all sensors is not uniform in spatially correlated sensor fields. Considering bit allocation problem in such a spatially correlated sensor field, the number of bits to be allocated to each sensor should be proportional to the degree of contribution the sensor makes. In this paper, we deploy Shapley value, a representative solution concept in cooperative game theory, and utilize it in order to quantify the degree of contribution each sensor makes. Shapley value is a system that determines the contribution of an individual player when two or more players work in collaboration with each other. To this end, we cast the bit allocation problem into a cooperative game called bit allocation game where sensors are regarded as the players, and a payoff function is given in the criteria of mutual information. We show that the Shapley value fairly quantifies an individual sensor's contribution to the total payoff achieved by all sensors following its desirable properties. By numerical experiments, we confirm that sensor that needs more bits to cover its area has larger Shapley value in spatially correlated sensor fields.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.5
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• pp.2286-2309
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• 2016

Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.614-618
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• 2012

Smart grid is widely considered to be a next generation power grid, which will be integrated with information feedback communications.However, smart grid communication technologies are subject to inefficient spectrum allocation problems. Cognitive radio networks can solve the problemof spectrumscarcity by opening the under-utilized licensed bands to secondary users. In this paper, adaptive cognitive radio spectrum sensing and sharing algorithms are developed for smart grid environments. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in comparison with other existing schemes.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.73-95
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• 2013

This paper analyzes a competitive shipping market in East Asia in order to explore how container carriers make decisions on ship size, number of ships, service frequency, and service route. A sequential-move game based on non-cooperative game theory is applied to establish the models for the decision-makings involving the transportation volumes, freight rates, costs, and market shares of the service routes from Shanghai or Hong Kong to the ports in Busan, Gwangyang, and Incheon. According to the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solutions proposed by these models, carriers' decisions in such a competitive environment vary depending on sailing distance, transport demand, and freight rates. Therefore, carriers are recommended to reflect the optimal equilibrium solutions and a variety of decision factors when formulating strategies for transportation networks and operating fleets. Furthermore, ports should establish management strategies for these factors to provide optimal equilibrium solutions for carriers' transportation networks.

• Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.63-72
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• 2010

This study aims to make a decision about the rational option for a multipurpose dams development of the Tumen river basin so that the adjoining countries will effectively deal with the chronic problems and fully satisfy the fast growing demand of water and power. It has been thus far investigated that the interests between North Korea and China closely depend on the selected option, and they are not well compatible with each other. These situations are defined in terms of the cooperative two-person nonzero-sum game. The Nash bargaining model is then applied to contemplate the rational option, considering two scenarios of economic growth of the North Korea. After analyzing the model, it was expected that 1) two multipurpose dams must be cooperatively developed, and 2) their benefits should be allocated according to demand of each country. The authors finally suggest that a cooperative organisation be established to effectively manage the dams beyond the border of the countries.