• Language and Information
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.123-140
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• 2014

The aim of this paper is twofold: to identify two types of even if concessive conditionals, standing-ifs and introduced-ifs (Bennett 1982) in terms of whether the truth of the consequent is 'entailed' (the consequent-entailment problem in terms of Lycan 2001); and to analyze these two types of concessive conditionals in a compositional way. Here we argue that, following Guerzoni and Lim (2007), even if conditionals can be analyzed as the cases where even gets its focus in conditionals. We also argue that the consequent-entailment problem can be accounted for in a compositional way if we identify the focus as well as the scope of even in conditionals correctly. We further argue that the analysis presented in this paper supports the scope theory of even, among two theories of even previously proposed in various works. We also consider the possibility where concessive conditionals without even can be analyzed as an extension of the analysis proposed in this paper.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.145-184
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• 2016

Williamson(1994) proved incompatibility of Gab Theory and Tarski T-schema. But this does not means that Gab Theory could not involve intuition on truth that is expressed by T-schema. I will show that Gab Theory and mutual entailment of 'p' and 'it is true that p'(p⊨T

and T

⊨p) are compatible. It will draw that Gab Theory can involve minimal intuition on truth. After all what I want to reveal is logical space for Gab Theory through the compatibility of the mutual entailment and negation of the Principle of Bivalence. To prove the compatibility, I will present a consequent relation which should be accepted whenever we accept Gab Theory and demonstrate Gab Theory and the mutual entailment imply following two thesis; 1) not-T

and T are not equivalent. 2) p entails T

but not-T

does not entails not-p.