• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.796-811
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• 2006

This paper aims to develop methodology and indicators to review effective competition in Korean mobile telecommunication market. After examining strengths and weaknesses of other countries' experiences, we proposed several indicators for the assessment of competition. Developed from criteria such as transparency, regulation cost, policy objectives, proposed indicators comprise market structure, behaviour of sellers and consumers, and consumer benefits. These indicators are applied to the Korean mobile market. During the period 2001-2004, 'the competition assessment index' increased steadily, meaning the state of competition was aggravated during this period.

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.148-167
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• 2012

This paper analyzes the impact of the change in telecommunication regulation changes including the unification of telecommunication service on network investment. The unification of telecommunication service plays a role of separating behavior regulation from entrance regulation and reducing entrance constraints. Therefore, it is expected that the market spillover effect is high through the improvement of behavior regulation. In addition, the effects of the other regulation changes in the 2010 Telecommunications Business Act revision are analyzed. This paper discusses critical factors affecting the decision making process in respect to the firm level and analyzes the impact path guiding investment and innovation. The key findings are as follows. First, the impact of entrance deregulation depends on the intensity of deregulation. If the intensity is not high, this regulation increases the incentive on investment and innovation. However, if the intensity is high as shown in abolishing of licensing, it affects the incentive negatively. Second, if interconnection regulation focuses on existing facilities or the intensity is not strong, this light handed regulation might increase investment and innovation. However, if interconnection obligation is expanded to the facility not constructed or the facility applying new technology, this regulation might deteriorate investment. Third, price deregulation increases the competition of service but it also increases the business opportunity, which means positive effect on investment. Finally, the paper proposes the guideline for telecommunications policy.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.447-456
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• 2010

Asymmetric regulation as applied to mobile termination rates refers to regulatory arrangements in which different mobile operators charge different termination rates, even though the services provided are essentially identical. The asymmetric regulation has been frequently used as a regulatory tool to support new entrants to a mobile market. This paper examines the economic effects of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates using a theoretical model and its simulation. The result shows that when there is no noticeable difference in brand loyalty between mobile operators with the high degree of substitutability between services provided by mobile operators, and the costs of new entrants are low, a reduction in the asymmetry of mobile access prices results in an enhancement of consumer welfare. These findings provide positive evidence for the argument that in certain situations asymmetric pricing of mobile access services may be counterproductive for consumer welfare.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.97-108
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• 2006

The purpose of this study is to generate a proper regulation improvement direction of the public If project contract law through the current four contract methods and three methods of the awarding party of a contract method. The research method for this paper is derived from the written materials of the present public IT project contract law. Two problems have been processed in order to produce the results: the current contract methods and the awarding party of a contract method. The current contract methods consist of a competition contract, a private contract, and a supply methodology contract, The methods of the awarding party of a contract display a qualified evaluation regulation, the 2nd step competition bid, a standard cost separation tender, and a contract by a negotiation. The results exhibit that the general competition contract consists of four improvement items. The contract by a negotiation contains five improvement items. The group private contract has one improvement item. And the private contract includes one improvement item. These results implicate that the current public IT project contract law demands better improvement work for the ubiquitous Korea.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.75-92
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• 2014

Broadcast-telecommunication bundling services provide customized services and reduce household telecommunication costs, contributing to the improvement of users' welfare. However, following the recent fierce competition of broadcast-telecommunication providers, the Korea Communications Commission, an organization that regulates promotional gifts and fee-reduction benefits to attract subscribers, has imposed a series of regulations. The excessive offering of promotional gifts can distort fair market competition and damage users. Yet if all bundling services are regulated uniformly, some benefits for users may be reduced, and the autonomous marketing competition of service providers may be restricted, thereby shrinking the entire communications market. Therefore, this study attempts to investigate domestic and foreign regulations on promotional gifts and other offerings related to broadcast-telecommunication bundling services, to analyze problems with respect to the current regulations and to propose an improvement plan. The study asserts that it is necessary to improve the violation decision criteria of the Korea Communications Commission and its regulations on broadcast-telecommunication service providers' promotional gifts in order to regulate the bundling services reasonably. In addition, it proposes a proper regulation of the OTS(Olleh TV Skylife) product, a new service emerging in the evolution of the bundling service type.

• 한국디지털정책학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2006.06a
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• pp.319-353
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• 2006

The purpose of this study is to generate a proper regulation improvement direction of the public IT project contract law through the current four contract methods and three methods of the awarding party of a contract method. The research method for this paper is derived from the written materials of the present public IT project contract law. Two problems have been processed in order to produce the results: the current contract methods and the awarding party of a contract method. The current contract methods consist of a competition contract, a private contract, and a supply methodology contract. The methods of the awarding party of a contract display a qualified evaluation regulation, the 2nd step competition bid, a standard cost separation tender, and a contract by a negotiation. The results exhibit that the general competition contract consists of four improvement items. The contract by a negotiation contains five improvement items. The group private contract has one improvement item. And the private contract includes one improvement item. These results implicate that the current public IT project contract law demands better improvement work for the ubiquitous Korea.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.587-596
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• 2008

Facility-based competition (FBC) in the telecommunications market is considered to have lower static efficiency in the short term and higher dynamic efficiency in the long term. Under service-based competition (SBC), the entrant can reduce its setup costs by leasing network facilities from the incumbent, which makes the entrant viable, pushes the market price down and promotes static efficiency. This paper attempts to measure static efficiency by comparing the profits of the incumbent and entrant in terms of consumer surplus and social welfare under each competition type by extending the Stackelberg model. The results, assuming a linear demand function and variation in regulatory level, show that FBC results in higher social welfare than SBC on the whole. However, SBC accompanied by strong regulation is also shown to have the potential to be superior over FBC. It is also revealed that FBC exhibits a higher producer surplus (particularly, the incumbent's producer surplus) and is, therefore, more desirable in terms of dynamic efficiency. When the entrant's cost is high in FBC, social welfare is shown to be lowered, implying that cost competitiveness is a necessary condition for social welfare.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2008.05a
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• pp.947-951
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• 2008

Subsidiary business between mobile carriers and handset manufacturers has been banned by Korean regulator due to the concern that it may cause the unfair competition in the market. But the opinion that the current regulation has to be consolidated is increasing to follow recent market trends, ensuer the fair competition and increase the users' benefit. In this paper, I analysed trends of the mobile telecommunication market and proposed desirable direction of regulatory improvement.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.83-102
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• 2017

Price control can restore efficiency in some cases, but an uncarefully designed policy fails to restore efficiency, yields side effects, or even exacerbates efficiency losses. This paper shows that the copyright royalty rule, which takes the greater of ad valorem royalties and perunit royalties, tends to fix the prices of final goods at a specific level. Such a rule weakens competition as it prevents prices from decreasing even when market conditions change, having negative effects on social welfare as well as consumer surplus. Counterfactual analyses using estimation results in the Korean online music service industry show that firms could have profitably reduced prices if the ad valorem rule had been applied instead, although they did not have an incentive to do so under the original combination rule.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.10
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• pp.1731-1737
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• 2007

The Korea electricity wholesale market is operated under the cost-based-pool system and the government regulation to the new generation capacities in order to insure the resource adequacy. The goal of government's regulation is the electricity market stability by attracting proper generation investment while keeping the reliability of system. Generation companies must mandatory observe that government plan by now. But if the restructuring is to be complete, generation companies should not bear any obligation to invest unless their profitability is guaranteed. Namely the investors' behavior will be affected by the market prices. In this paper, the system dynamics model for Korea wholesale electricity market to examine whether competitive market can help to stabilize is developed and analyzes the investors behavior. The simulation results show that market controlled by government will be operated stable without resulting in price spike but there is no lower price because of maintaining the reasonable reserve margin. However, if the competition is introduced and the new investment is determined by the investor's decision without government intervention, the benefits from lower wholesale price are expected. Nevertheless, the volatility in the wholesale market increases, which increases the investment risks.