• 무역상무연구
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• 제36권
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• pp.195-262
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• 2007

This paper attempts to assess the Basel Committee's bank supervisory standards and capital adequacy rules, and thereby rethink whether global convergence in banking regulation is desirable. To that end, it seeks to address the impetus for the creation of the Basel Committee, and explore driving forces behind the internationalization of bank regulatory and supervisory standards. Following the historical and theoretical analysis of the internationalization of bank regulatory standards, the movement toward global standards in banking is reviewed. More importantly, this paper seeks to explore the origins of the Basel Accord on bank capital adequacy. To do so, it largely relies on current theories on the process of negotiating the capital adequacy standards in the areas of political science and international political economy. At this point, this study takes a position as a break against the force of international market failure logic that has enjoyed an exceptionally positive reception among economists, political scientists, and legal experts. Nonetheless, it does not intend to freeze the international coordination and cooperation of banking regulation. Given the understanding of the politics behind the creation of the Basel Accord, this paper evaluates the Basel Accord of 1988 and the new capital adequacy framework(Basel II), and then moves beyond the assessment of the capital adequacy standards In doing so, this study draws lessons from Basel in search of a just world order in the global finance.