• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.213-230
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• 2022

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to find out any potential factors for explanatory variables when calculating the virtual successful bid rate in case of no collusion. Design/methodology/approach - An empirical analysis was conducted in this study with a regression analysis that included 725 bid samples under the public construction technical type bidding. Findings - The result of the basic analysis showed that there are several factors affecting the successful bid rate. First, collusion variable; second, government variable; third, successful bidder design score variable and the number of bidder variable among bidding features; fourth, turnkey variable based on the alternative method; fifth, civil works variable and plant works variable based on building work; sixth, asset variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable. However, the technical proposal method variable among bidding features was found to be statistically insignificant in column(4). Research implications or Originality - The significance of this research is that new variable such as the government variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable were added in the regression model, which showed statistically significant research results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2004.11b
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• pp.97-100
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• 2004

As the circumstance of the traditional system is changed according to power system deregulation, the simulation tool which should reflect market code providing market operating mechanism is needed to analyze an electricity market. This paper presents the development of Electricity Market Price Simulator for short term(EMPS) that is designed to imitate the Korean electricity market. The EMPS is developed in VB.NET and is composed if three functions that consist of calculating SMP for CBP market, MCP for TWBF market and LMP for LMP-market. To evidence the features and the performance of EMPS, a small two way bidding market with 12-bus system, one way bidding market for generator competition and LMP market with 5-bus system will be presented for the electricity market simulations using EMPS.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2022.07a
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• pp.445-446
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• 2022

본 논문은 시세정보를 활용한 적정한 가격으로 경매를 할 수 있는 전자상거래를 연구하였다. 일반적인 전자상거래는 물건의 적정한 가격 정보 없이 등록 및 구매가 진행된다. 하지만 본 연구는 시세 조회를 이용한 가격 비교를 통해 거래가 적합한 금액에 이루어지는지 확인할 수 있도록 가격정보를 제공한다. 경매 시스템은 일반적인 경매방식인 최저가에서 시작해 점점 가격을 올려 최후의 구매자에게 판매하는 영국식 경매와 가장 높은 금액을 제시한 순서대로 구매자들의 순위가 정해지며 1순위가 2순위의 금액에 입찰 단위 금액을 포함해 구매하는 비딩 경매를 함께 사용한다. 또한, 시간이 부족하거나 경매가 어려운 사용자들을 위해 자신이 지불할 수 있는 최고가를 설정하면 시스템이 스스로 입찰을 해주는 예약 입찰을 추가해 사용자들에게 편리함을 제공한다.

• Architectural research
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.69-76
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• 2006

The purpose of this study is to suggest policies to improve the price escalation system in a construction contract through a Policy Delphi technique. The Delphi, including two times questionnaires and a group discussion, was conducted by joining 14 experts. Also, the escalation provisions of various countries were examined. Results of the Delphi showed that the minimum fluctuation rate for price escalation was desirable at a level of 3%. To compute the fluctuation rate, calculating the price fluctuation of overall articles was more desirable than using price indices. A bidding date was more reasonable as the initial date of change in price. Losses caused by price change should be shared between contractor and owner; therefore a deduction rate should be introduced in price escalation. Meanwhile, overhead and profit should be adjusted in proportion to the fluctuation rate; but advance payment or the delayed construction amount should be deducted from the adjusted amount.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.109-113
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• 2007

This paper introduces a system, Simulation based Stochastic Markup Estimation System (S2ME), for estimating optimum markup for a project. The system was designed and implemented to better represent the real world system involved in construction bidding. The findings obtained from the analysis of existing assumptions used in the previous quantitative markup estimation methods were incorporated to improve the accuracy and predictability of the S2ME. The existing methods has four categories of assumption as follows; (1) The number of competitors and who is the competitors are known, (2) A typical competitor, who is fictitious, is assumed for easy computation, (3) the ratio of bid price against cost estimate (B/C) is assumed to follow normal distribution, (4) The deterministic output obtained from the probabilistic equation of existing models is assumed to be acceptable. However, these assumptions compromise the accuracy of prediction. In practice, the bidding patterns of the bidders are randomized in competitive bidding. To complement the lack of accuracy contributed by these assumptions, bidding project was randomly selected from the pool of bidding database in the simulation experiment. The probability to win the bid in the competitive bidding was computed using the profile of the competitors appeared in the selected bidding project record. The expected profit and probability to win the bid was calculated by selecting a bidding record randomly in an iteration of the simulation experiment under the assumption that the bidding pattern retained in historical bidding DB manifest revival. The existing computation, which is handled by means of deterministic procedure, were converted into stochastic model using simulation modeling and analysis technique as follows; (1) estimating the probability distribution functions of competitors' B/C which were obtained from historical bidding DB, (2) analyzing the sensitivity against the increment of markup using normal distribution and actual probability distribution estimated by distribution fitting, (3) estimating the maximum expected profit and optimum markup range. In the case study, the best fitted probability distribution function was estimated using the historical bidding DB retaining the competitors' bidding behavior so that the reliability was improved by estimating the output obtained from simulation experiment.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.2
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• pp.199-203
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• 2005

This paper proposes the level of price cap in the TWBP(Two- Way Bidding Pool) market in Korea for which the draft of market design has been prepared by KPX. Max - GMCP(Maximum Generation Market Clearing Price) and APC(Administered Price Cap) would be separately applied as individual price caps for a normal period and a Price Capping period in TWBP. The level of price cap is determined for inducing optimal investment in the Korean Electricity Market considering the 'electricity resource baseline plan' published by the Korean government in 2002 for maintaining government-leading resource planning in Korea. In this regard, Max - GMCP is calculated from the equilibrium condition of investment based on reliability standard and fixed cost of the peaking plant. For verifying the propriety of the proposed price cap, this paper compares the proposed value with the estimated VoLL(Value of Lost Load) based on Korea's GDP(Gross Domestic Product).

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.19-21
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo. The conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle recent real-world situations. A systematic tool using game theory for the market participants is presented such that it determines the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies including the strategies for the bidding prices and bidding generations. We treat this power transaction game as incomplete information one, which means each market participants does not know other's cost function. And the demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.9
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• pp.1575-1580
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• 2010

Demand Response is a well-known means usually operated by the system operator(SO) or the electricity retailers in order to reduce the peak loads or cut the price in electricity market. KPX(Korea Power eXchange), the SO in Korea has been operating the demand bidding program(or the demand resource market) since it was firstly introduced as the pilot project in 2008. The results has proved to be effective to enhance demand response. This paper describes the basic concepts and the operation results of the program.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.2
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• pp.193-198
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• 2005

This paper proposes a new method to handle transmission line losses using loss distribution factors (LDF) rather than marginal loss factors (MLF) in electricity market operation. Under a competitive electricity market, the bidding data are adjusted to reflect transmission line losses. To date the most proposed approach is using MLFs. The MLFs are reflected to bidding prices and market clearing price during the trading and settlement of the electricity market. In the proposed algorithm, the LDFs are reflected to bidding quantities and actual generations/ loads. Computer simulations on a 9-bus sample system will verify the effectiveness of the algorithm proposed. Moreover, the proposed approach using LDFs does not make any payments residual while the approach using MLFs induces payments residual.