• 국제학술발표논문집
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• The 2th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• pp.106-118
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• 2007

Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and also help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제3A권1호
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• pp.47-52
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• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• 국제학술발표논문집
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• The 3th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• pp.1433-1439
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• 2009

Best value is the ultimate goal of the owner and can thus have diverse meanings according to the project characteristic, owner's purpose, user groups' payment capability, etc.. Recently, resettlement problems of the marginalized members in the urban regeneration area have been issued in Korea because they have no capability to purchase (or lease) redeveloped housing (or apartment). It means that a minimized production cost for reducing supply price of housing is a key factor in establishing the best value of the marginalized members. The lowest-price bidding system serves the purpose of ensuring a minimized production cost, but due to the low-cost investments, it creates various problems, such as sloppy construction, lowered quality, an increased LCC, and worsening profitability for builders. Thus, to help them resettle, it is necessary to supply affordable housing geared towards a certain appropriate quality and minimum construction costs. Towards this end, this study aimed to propose a cost reduction bidding system based on a technical proposal. The proposed technical-proposal-based cost reduction bidding system consists of the following components: work-unit-based, project-unit-based, and construction-period-reducing technical proposals. These components are evaluated to select the best bidder for a given project. The technical proposal based cost reduction bidding system proposed herein is expected to provide facilities with appropriate supply prices and appropriate quality levels, to bolster the technological competitiveness of builders.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제57권7호
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• pp.1157-1166
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• 2008

This paper presents a new approach for the evaluation of location marginal prices (LMPs) considering demand-side bidding (DSB) in a competitive electricity market. The stabilization of the electric power supply and demand balance is one of the major important activities in electric power industry. In this paper, we present an analytical method for calculation of LMPs considering DSB, which has opportunity to compete with generating units, as England & Wales Pool's DSB scheme[1]. Also, we propose a new approach that LMP considering DSB is divided into three components. The proposed approach can be used for the evaluation of demand-side bidding into the electricity market and the assessment of the influence of DSB on total production costs and LMPs as well as three components.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제33권3호
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• pp.322-328
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• 2007

Highly standardized products are suitable for automated purchasing using electronic commerce technology, where the price becomes the most important factor. Suppliers can change the prices dynamically based on the inventory level and market situation in order to maximize the sales and profit. In the virtual marketplace where multiple customers purchase multiple standardized products from multiple suppliers repetitively, customers can purchase the required amount of each item as a dynamic bidding by allocating purchase orders to the suppliers based on the current price. Customers need a method to quickly determine the optimal allocation of orders to the suppliers using the dynamically changing data to minimize the total cost. We present a LP model which minimizes the sum of the total price plus transportation cost for this problem. Simulation results using random data show meaningful reduction of the total cost.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 1995년도 하계학술대회 논문집 B
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• pp.535-539
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• 1995

In recent years, electric industries in many countries confront with a structural change in business and socio-economic environments. Since 1984, PUC and utilities in U.S.A. have adopted or developing competitive bidding systems, and this new procurement programs prevailing and restructuring the power markets. In Korea, government and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) invited the private sector to build and operate two 500 MW coal plants and two 400 MW LNG plants during 2001 - 2004. The plan also specifies basic concepts and conditions for the IPP projects such that new IPPs are selected through competitive bidding system with the purchased power price based on the avoided cost. In this study, the direction, guideline and scoring methods to Korean IPP bidding system are presented. Also, as a benchmark price and rates for purchased power, the avoided cost calculation models are developed, this study may contribute for the development of private power in Korea, and improve overall economic efficiencies of whole electric power sector.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.201-212
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• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.

• 에너지공학
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.59-66
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• 2002

수직 통합된 체제의 전력회사가 6개의 발전회사와 1개의 판매회사로 분리되고 전력거래소를 통한 전력거래가 본격화되면서 발전회사는 자체 소유 발전설비의 공급가능용량을 어떻게 활용하느냐에 따라 영업상 수익의 영향을 받게 된다. 특히, 하루 전 발표되는 한계가격(System Marginal Price, Base Load Marginal Price)에 맞도록 전력생산을 위한 발전 비용함수를 적용한다면 익일의 공급가능용량이 최적 배분됨으로써, 변동비 반영 시장(Cost based Generation Pool)과 입찰가격 반영 발전시장(Price Bidding Generation Pool)에 적용될 계통운영보조서비스의 계약 물량 산출 및 익일 생산비용의 최적화를위한 입찰전략(Bidding Strategies) 수립이 가능해 지므로 보유 설비에 대한 최적이용이 가능하게 된다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 수요예측 오차와 과거 시장운영 실적을 기초로 년 간 유지보수 계획을 수립하고, 계통운영보조서비스에 대한 계약물량 산출과 개개 발전기의 비용함수 산출, 적용을 통한 발전설비의 효율적인 입찰 방안에 대해 논하고자 한다.

• 한국건설관리학회논문집
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.35-44
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• 2010

현재 턴키 대안입찰공사에서의 도급내역서 단가가 적정하게 책정되지 않고 있다. 그 사유는 각 입찰제도의 성격 및 그에 따른 단가책정 프로세스가 다르기 때문이며, 이러한 사유로 인하여 턴키 입찰에서는 총액을 맞추기 위한 단가가, 그리고 내역 입찰에서는 저가심의제를 통과하기 위한 단가가 도급내역서에 사용되고 있으면 그 단가는 각 공종별 적정단가라 할 수 없다. 그러나, 도급계약후에는 이러한 단가들이 각 입찰제도의 성격 및 그에 따른 단가책정 프로세스의 고려없이, 모두 도급기성, 설계변경, 물가변동 등 법적 기준단가로 사용되고 있으며, 또한, 저가하도급 판정 기준 및 실적공사단가로도 사용되고 있어 다른 제도에까지 영향을 주고 있는 실정이다. 이러한 시스템은 검증되지 않은 단가를 책정한 입찰자와 발주자에게 모두 리스크 상승요인으로 작용하고 있어, 본 연구에서 그 리스크인자를 규명하고 그 리스크의 정도를 파악하여 향후 그 리스크를 대비하고 관리할 수 있도록 하였다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.