• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.40 no.9
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• pp.1802-1807
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• 2015

The cloud computing service provides physical IT resources to VM instances to users using virtual technique and the users pay cost of VM instances to service provider. The auction model based on cloud computing provides available resources of service provider to users through auction mechanism. The users bid spot instances to process their a job until its deadline time. If the bidding price of users is higher than the spot price, the user will be provided the spot instances by service provider. In this paper, we propose a new bidding strategy to minimize the total cost for job completion. Typically, the users propose bidding price as high as possible to get the spot instances and the spot price get high. we lower the spot price using proposed strategy and minimize the total cost for job completion. To evaluate the performance of our strategy, we compare the spot price and the total cost for job completion with real workload data.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38A no.11
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• pp.944-954
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• 2013

Cognitive radio technology gives secondary users chances that they can use specific spectrum of the primary user when the primary user doesn't use it. This paper proposes the algorithm that maximizes the benefit of the primary user considering spectrum price and auction period by using the auction game theory. According to the ratio of spectrum that secondary users bid, primary user allocates spectrum to secondary users. In the process of repeated auction, the primary user gets to find the optimal price of spectrum. Using the price and the proposed utility function of primary user, we derive the optimal auction period. At the same time, the primary user finally determines the price of spectrum appropriate for the optimal period.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.12 no.5
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• pp.159-170
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• 2011

In procurement auctions, auction frequency and transaction volume per auction have been analyzed as important factors in determining auction performance. However, there is no empirical study on the effect of auction frequency and transaction volume in procurement auction. Current studies mainly focus on bidder behavior analysis and new system design in procurement auction. In the study, we analyze the effect of two factors on relative winning price empirically by using real auction data from MRO procurement outsourcing company in Korea. From the results, we find the winning price is lower when the frequency of auction with same item category is lower. The low frequency of auctions means participating bidders have limited information of previous auctions and they bid their best price to win the current auction due to less opportunity of reopening the auction in near future. The larger purchase amounts of MRO items didn’t results in lower winning price, contrary to our hypothesis. The possible reason is that the price of MRO items already reflects the economy of scales and the increased volume per auction do not cause the further discount of MRO items from the auction.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 1998

Why are auctions so prevalent in fisheries fields\ulcorner One answer is, perhaps, that fisheries products have no standard value. The price of any catch of fish (at least of fish destined for the fresh fish market) depends on the demand and supply conditions at a specific moment of time, influenced by prospective market developments and prices must be remade for each transaction. There are various auction schemes including written-bid method in Korea. It is difficult to make decision the application of auction selling in market distribution. One reason is the absence of adequate data on which to base firm statements. There is very little precise information about the relative volume handled by auction scheme as compared with other sales schemes Because of the paucity reliable data, one must depend largely on qualitative in attempting to above this problem. This paper is designed to examine which auction scheme is more efficient as a economic tool by introducing the three auctions, as samples, utilized in Koheung peninsula. Koheung coast with abundant fisheries resource, locates on the Middle-South part in Korea and has three auction firm operating by fisheries cooperatives. fur selling of dry fish included sea weed, live fish and fresh fish respectively, As a result, 1 found that there are three interesting auction schemes as follow : 1. More than one winners are selected as buyers. The highest bidder can at first get fishes he wants to buy, second winner can get surplus fishes after the highest bidder employes one's privilege with the highest pay, and next winner would be a buyer if fishes would be left in sequence after being sold with higher price. Every fisherman can sell one' s fishes with equal unit price if he delivery it to the winner within one day. Therefore, all the vendors feel they are equal members of fisheries cooperation. 2. Written-bid pricing on the cover of handy book. It is easy to write and to erase the figure more than on the small black board, and is convenient also to keep in the pocket. 3. Auctioning on the fixed platform with fixed fish tank is a very fast auction scheme in spite of short displaying time. Auctioneer presides bidding at one place on the fixed platform, instead of moving, vendors should carry a container of live fishes in the fish tank into showing table in front of would-be buyers and auctioneer. Although the applicability of the auction system to a marketing problem depends in part on subjective considerations by those making decision, basically it is a matter of comparative economic efficiency. In general, if the scheme maximizes returns in relation to the effort expanded by both buyers and sellers, it will be utilized. If it does not, a more efficiency may take place over a period of time, but, even more important, those making decisions may become aware of the potentialities of new schemes. Therefore, in order to applicate the three interesting auction schemes introduced in this paper to other fisheries market, it is necessary not only to analyze many other auction schemes but also to compare the economic efficiency those schemes utilizing in other fisheries market.

• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.31-40
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• 2021

Blockchain technology is also actively studied in the real estate transaction field, and real estate transactions have various ways. In this paper, we propose a model that simplifies the authentication procedure of auction systems using Ethereum's Ether to solve the problem of offline court auctions. The proposed model is written in Ethereum's Solidity language, the court registers the sale date and the sale date with the DApp browser, and the bidder accesses the address of the individual's wallet created through Metamask's private key. The bidder then selects the desired sale and enters the bid price amount to participate in the auction. The bidder's record of the highest bid price for the sale he wants is written on the Ethereum test network as a smart contract. and creates a block. Finally, smart contracts written on the network are distributed by the court auction manager to all nodes in the blockchain network, and each node in the blockchain network can be viewed and contract verified. As a result of analyzing the smart contracts of the proposed model and the performance of the system, there are fees incurred due to the creation and use of Ether on platforms using Ethereum, and participation. Ether's changes in value affect the price of the sale, resulting in inconsistent fees in smart contracts each time. However, in future work, we issue our own tokens to solve the market volatility problem and commission problem with the value change of Ether, and refine complex court auction systems.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• Journal of the Korea Computer Industry Society
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• v.2 no.3
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• pp.321-328
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• 2001

Existing internet auction systems have adopted the form which gives a win to the auction bidder who proposes the top bid price for the goods posted on the auction board. But they haven't been satisfying the automatical one-step processing for user’s convenience because they must require continuous care of user for bidding and checking as well as neglecting the convenience of user interface while participating in the electronic bidding system. The agent push mail to a auctioneer information that able to get how much profit as calculate duration time and start price with bidding history stored database. So, this thesis propose a multi-agent system in internet auction that generate the highest margin for auctioneer’s goods.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2013.05a
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• pp.474-477
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• 2013

As the market-based spectrum policy is introduced, an interest in the economic value of the frequency is increasing. Research and practical applications concerning the methodology for the estimation of the economic value of the frequency and its determinants are actively engaged, which are used for setting a reserve price and bid price of spectrum auction and a spectrum clearance cost. In this study, by the analysis of the spectrum valuation methodology, we derive the changes in the factors affecting the valuation and propose to apply improved. In the model frequency value is consist of technical value, commercial value and strategic value, we find the dynamics of fluctuation factors and suggest how to apply them to spectrum policy.

• Current Photovoltaic Research
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.100-104
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• 2017

This paper analyzes the correlation between Net Benefit Test (NBT) and System marginal price (SMP), which has a significant impact on the allocation of demand response (DR) resources in resource scheduling and commitment (RSC) process, based on the performance data of the demand resource market which has been established in 2014. Demand resources compete with generation resources in the RSC process, and it is prescribed to use demand resources only when net benefit occurs. Analysis result shows that the larger the SMP than the Net Benefit Threshold Price (NBTP), the more the winning bid of demand response resource was. It is interpreted that the introduction of NBT in DR market is justified. The demand resource market has been steadily growing. It is required to expand the scope of resources up to the small-sized DR, and to expand the functionalities of demand resources not only in the current energy market but also in the reserve market in the future. In order for that, institutional improvements are required.