• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.417-423
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• 2005

Contractor's opportunistic bidding behavior refers to contractor's deliberate low-bid, which cannot accord with the cost, and expectation for beyond-contractual reward (BCR), the compensation earned through cutting corners or claims after undertaking the construction project. This research applies System Dynamics to develop a model of contractor's pricing with consideration for dimensions of "cost", "market competition", and "BCR". Iterative computer simulations were performed to analyze the effects of contractor's pricing on the market price. The results were then examined by statistical analysis on data collected from 44 highway projects in Taiwan. It is found that the critical force driving the contractors to bid opportunistically is their excessive expectations in BCR under the current environment. Within the price competition mechanism, if the problem of BCR exists, even if the bidding system is further improved, contractors would still prefer opportunistic bidding behavior, and eventually make the whole construction industry operate ineffectively. Therefore, it is crucial to remedy the aforementioned BCR problem by more effective management policy.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.108-114
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• 2012

Escalation method examining the changes in price index has been widely utilized in public construction projects. The previous escalation method determined estimated changes in price based on the average unit price of contract items over a period of time. In relation to this method, the issue has been raised that the fluctuation rates of previous method show different trends compared with other related price indices, as the influence of the small group of contract items with large unit prices overwhelms the others. This research suggested an improved escalation method which estimates the fluctuation rate by examining the changes in CCI (construction cost index) and applies it to the total amount or the partial amount deducted for labor cost in price escalation for previous bid price method. To verify the improvement, a case study is conducted on an educational facility, and the fluctuation rate was estimated in two different base periods (short term, long term). The results over the long term showed similar tendencies to those of related price indices, as well as significant differences in fluctuation rates compared to those of the previous method.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.26 no.5D
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• pp.849-859
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• 2006

Earnings of domestic enterprises are expected a serious damage because the lowest cost bid system and the current cost estimate system. In 2005 average successful bid rate for the lowest cost bid project is below 60%, this is not reach at the operating budget of enterprise. Many problems such as illegal construction, low price subcontract, chain enterprise loss com in to practice because of low successful bid rate. In addition earnings of the enterprises expected to be the minimum, because of enlarge execution of the current cost estimate system. This study tries to lend assistance by giving alternative for the construction enterprise by presenting the bid system, investigate and compare foreign system with domestic and analyze correlation of the lowest cost bid and the current cost estimate system.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.3
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• pp.455-461
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• 2009

This paper proposes Direct Load Control(DLC) operation scheme using a bidding system and the methodology to value proper quantity decided by the DLC program, which is a kind of resources for stabilization of electricity market price during peak times by managing consumer electricity demand. Since DLC program in Korea is based on the contract with the customers participating in this program, it is difficult to anticipate voluntary participation. That is, incentive for participants in DLC program is insufficient. To cope with this point, it is necessary to develop a new market mechanism and market compatible operation scheme for DLC programs. DLC market mechanism is deemed to be equipped with iterative bidding system, independent operation from energy market, and interactive with bidding information on energy market. With this market mechanism, it is important to find the optimal operation point of DLC allowing for the factors of stabilizing the electricity market price and compensating DLC implementation. This paper focuses on the mathematical approaches for the bid-based DLC operation scheme and examines several scenarios for the following technical justifications: 1) stabilization of electricity market price during peak times, 2) elasticity of demand.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

Auction is widely used in allocation and procurement of resources due to its desirable properties: efficiency and revenue maximization. It is well-known, however, that auction may fail to achieve efficiency when allocative externalities exist. Such a result may happen in the auction of the resources that are very scarce, for example, radio spectrum. This is because allocation of the resources has effects on competition of the firms in the aftermarket, and thus a firm that utilizes the resources less efficiently may make a higher bid to lessen competition. This paper shows first that efficient allocation may not be achieved by auction even when the number of bidders is 2, while it is shown in the literature that auction may result in inefficient allocation when the number of bidders is greater than or equal to 3. There exist 2 firms, who make a bid to win the scarce resources that increase the value or decrease the production cost of their own product. After the auction ends, the firms engage in Bertrand competition on the Hotelling line. Inefficient allocation may happen even under the second-price auction rule, and it happens only when the firms are different in the initial value or the initial cost of their products as well as in the value of the auctioned resources. The firm who has been the leader loses a large portion of the market if it fails to win the auction, and thus makes a high bid even when the other firm can use the resources more efficiently. Allocative efficiency Pareto improves when the smaller firm's bid counts more than the leader's bid. This paper suggests a modified rule that the smaller firm wins the auction when its bid multiplied by some constant is greater than the leader's bid. The multiplier can be calculated from the market shares. It is equal to 1 when the two firms are the same, and is increasing in the leader's market share. Allocation is efficient in a strictly larger set of parameters under the modified rule than under the standard second-price auction rule.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.159-166
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• 2006

It was found that Korean Standard of Estimate which has been used as the only basis of cost estimate of public construction projects had some side effects such as jerry-build construction and over-estimation because it failed to reflect the current price and the state-of-the-art construction methods in a changing construction environment. Therefore, the government decided to gradually introduce historical construction cost into cost estimate of public construction projects from 2004. This paper presents analytic criteria and a process model for deducing more current and reasonable historical construction cost for contract items from not only previous contract prices but also all of the other bid prices that were not contracted. The procedure of estimating actual unit cost proposed in this paper focuses on the removal of abnormal values including strategically too low or high prices and the time correction. In addition, basic research is conducted for the correction of actual unit cost through the analysis of fluctuation of bid price depending on bidding types and rates of successful bid. It is anticipated that the effective use of the proposed process model for estimating actual unit cost would make the cost estimation more current and reasonable.

• Journal of the Korean housing association
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.89-98
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• 2012

As the construction of multi-family housings, especially apartments, has been increased since 1970s, the multi-family housing becomes one of the main housing types in Korea. With the increase of multi-family housings, managing them becomes an important issue. Since 2010, the government has made a lowest price award system by a competitive bid compulsory to promote the development of housing management systems. Although competitive bids were implemented, the maintenance company was finally selected by the price without any other consideration. Consequently, the quality of management service was not enhanced. The purpose of this study is to suggest the improvement scheme of multi-family housing management system. In this study, the bidding data of "K-apt", the bidding method and the successful tendered price are analyzed. The results of analyzing bidding materials, the proportion of applying a lowest price system was 67.7%. Also many diverse ways to select the best management company were used, but most of these ways were violate the law and guidelines of Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs. It meant that the lowest price award system was not implemented by strict standards and didn't correspond with the needs of residents of apartment. This condition made the housing maintenance quality low and deteriorated the management industry development. To enhance this condition, a new standard to select the management company, which are included contents of quality of managing quality, management expenses and companies' soundness, is necessary.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.135-158
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• 2000

In recent years, many retail businesses jumped on the Internet auction bandwagon and paid substantially high fees to learn and develop proper business strategies for this new environment. Unlike what most businesses in the real world presume, this research shows that discriminatory-price ascending-bid auctions in a digital economy might be not very beneficial for the sellers on the Internet, if sellers sell the identical digital products through both a typical posted-price market and an auction. Using an extensive technology infrastructure along with suitable incentives and rules for market agents, we found that a discriminatory-price ascending-bid auction, which is the most popular auction mechanism on the Internet, serves consumers better than it does the sellers or producers in the digital economy. That is, the average prices for digital goods in these auctions are substantially lower than the prices in a posted-price market. This shows that it is not so wise for sellers to jump on the bandwagon of Internet auctions, if there is a market place with posted-price mechanisms which sells comparable items, or if a seller does not have special advantages or strategies in this new market institution. Electronic market mechanisms provide powerful means of understanding and measuring consumer characteristics including willingness-to-pay and other demographics for sellers or producers. Many concern that sellers may extract the entire surplus from the market by using customization on the Internet, thus consumers will be worse off in this digital economy. We found that these sellers who can customize their products and prices fail to capture the whole consumers surplus and cannot exercise a monopoly. One major explanation for this phenomenon is that the competition among the sellers prohibits them from charging prices according to customers demand for each product, where switching from one seller to another is not so difficult for the customers, and reselling products among the buyers are prohibited.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.10
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• pp.610-615
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• 2003

With the growing competitive pressure from market participants, utilities, consumer and government, analyses of existing competitive electricity market become more important. The presence of congestion in the transmission system can significantly increase the potential of exercising market power. Since the congestion in the network depends on the several factors, the market power cannot be simply analyzed through the existing indices. This paper presents a systematic analysis on local market power under uniform pricing scheme and provides determining approach of the level of price cap as mitigation measure of the strategic market power.

• Proceeding of Spring/Autumn Annual Conference of KHA
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• 2009.04a
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• pp.211-216
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• 2009

Bidding systems in the domestic public construction work have been amended many times since the lowest-bidding system was implemented in 1951. However, this hasn't had much success. Competition in technical development among companies has declined as the contracts for buildings are given to company which submits the lowest price without considering traits of projects. In addition, as the construction market turns to the limitless competition system due to FTA(Free Trade Agreement), advanced techniques are needed to promote the national competitive power. Considering the needs of the times, Korean government announced that "Best Value Contract (Design-Bid-Build)" and "Bridging Contracts (Design-Build)" are included to 4 existing bidding systems in October 2007. Thus this study aims to suggest devised the evaluation criteria including major items for evaluating bidders, in order to establish and revitalize the best-value bid system successfully.