• 수산경영론집
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• 제25권2호
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.41-53
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• 2016

According to the price-decline effect, the art auction prices are known to decrease with the order of auction sale. Our empirical study investigates the presence for the price-decline effect using the data for Korean antique art hosted by the Seoul Auction in September, 2015. We apply the Hedonic price model to the data and examine the relation between the sale order and auction price. Our empirical evidences show that the well-known price decline effect is not present for the case of Korean antique auction in 2015. We confirm our results by estimating the ordered probit model. From the view of the price-decline effect, our results suggest that the Korean antique auction data exhibits different characteristics from most of the foreign art auction data.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제20권3호
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• pp.33-49
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• 2010

We empirically examine the impact of online auction knowledge and category-specific knowledge on the final price of online auctions. Specifically, we question how the relationship between buying and selling experiences affects the final prices of online auctions. Related to the trust between buyers and sellers, we examine the multiple interactions between a buyer-seller pairand aim to identify how these repeated transactions influence the final price. To contrast these effects with other product related factors, we focus on so called 'common value' auctions of vintage stamps on eBay, in which the ex-post value of the product is the same among participating agents’ perceived value. Online auction of stamps provides a representative setting to examine the relationship between market experience and the auction participation behavior in the common value auction, as it provides the book value of stamp as well as price variation across individual buyers with different expertise levels. Our analysis of over 3000 stamps auctions on eBay indicates a significantly high frequency of buyer-seller (pair) interactions, thus suggesting a 'relationship view' of auctions. The work validates five hypotheses derived from the existing theory in economics, marketing, and information systems. Through the common-value auction data, we find that seller's online auction experience and category-specific experience favor sellers by increasing the final price. However, buyer's online auction experience does not affect the final price, but buyer's category-specific experience favors buyers by decreasing the final price. We find that the trust between two trading parties increases the final price.

• 인터넷정보학회논문지
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• 제12권5호
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• pp.159-170
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• 2011

구매 물량이 많고 구매 시점이 분산되어 있는 기업간 구매경매에서 경매빈도와 한번 경매 시 거래되는 거래규모에 대한 결정은 구매경매 성과에 중요한 영향을 미치는 것으로 조사되었다. 하지만 이제까지 구매경매 연구에서는 새로운 시스템을 만들거나, 참여자들의 행위 분석 위주의 연구가 이루어지고, 경매빈도와 거래규모의 영향에 대한 실증적 연구는 없었다. 본 연구에서는 MRO 구매대행 업체의 실제 경매 데이터를 이용하여 경매빈도와 거래규모가 경매의 성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석결과 같은 대하여 경매빈도가 낮을수록 입찰자들이 경매시장에 대한 사전 정보가 부족하고, 상대적으로 적은 판매기회를 잡기 위해 낮은 가격으로 입찰하여 낙찰가격이 낮아지는 것으로 분석되었다. 거래규모는 가설과 달리 거래규모가 증가하여도 낙찰가격이 낮아지지 않았다. 대상 제품인 MRO 제품이 표준화되어 대량 생산되는 제품이므로 규모의 경제에 의한 가격 할인이 이미 반영된 것으로 파악되고, 특정 경매에서 거래규모의 크기가 추가적인 가격인하에 미치는 영향이 없고 오히려 거래규모가 적을 때, 상대적 낙찰가격이 더 낮아지는 것으로 분석되었다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제32권1호
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• pp.27-51
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• 2007

We analyze the effects of the sellers' strateiges on the final bid prices in internet auctions. We focus on the following three strategies of the seller adoption of the buy-price, setting the starting bid price, and adoption of 'the effective fixed price' which means that the starting bid price is set near the buy-price. In addition, the number of units sold single-unit or multi-unit, and item characteristics, such as whether the food is a search product (functional product) or an experience product (non-functional product), are also considered. We use real data on bids for 4 items from an online auction site. We find that in an auction for experience products when sold as single units, adopting the buy-price strategy raises the final bid price. We also find that in multi-unit auctions, starting the auction at 'the effective fixed price' raises the final bid price.

• 한국융합학회논문지
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.205-214
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• 2019

우리나라 정부 당국은 주로 최저가낙찰제도를 이용하여 조달을 시행해왔으나, 과거 일정 시기 동안은 제한적 평균가 낙찰제 경매방식(일명 부찰제)을 이용하여 시설공사부문 조달을 실시했다. 부찰제란 각 입찰자들이 서로 모르게 공급가격을 적어 내면 그 가격을 평균하여 그 평균값에 가장 가까우면서 평균값보다는 낮은 공급가격을 부른 사람이 승자가 되며, 그가 부른 가격에서 낙찰가가 결정되는 제도이다. 본 논문은 제한적 평균가낙찰제 경매방식을 자원배분기구설계(mechanism design)의 관점에서 정형화하고, 고려할 문제를 제시한다. 나아가 ?명의 일반적 상황 하에서 사적 정보를 가지고 있는 입찰자들의 전략을 일양 분포 가정과 선형전략의 가정을 도입하여 구하고, 이를 통해 부찰제 경매방식의 균형을 제시한다. 또한 이러한 균형전략을 최저가낙찰제도와 비교함으로써 우리나라에서 자주 사용되는 두 제도의 효율성과 기대수입의 측면을 살펴본다. 끝으로 부찰제를 실시하는 경매인(정부)의 현실적 목적성이 어느 정도 달성되고 있는가를 비판적으로 고찰한다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제43권3호
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• pp.55-77
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• 2021

In Korea, local governments and local agencies had to apply a version of the first price auction augmented by an ex-post screening process when they procure construction contracts. However, this first price auction had been criticized because it was felt that too much price competition could lead to poor ex-post performance in construction. In response, the existing auction method was recently replaced by a version of the average price auction with a similar screening process. This paper empirically examines the effectiveness of this reform and finds that the replacement only increases the fiscal burden of local governmental bodies without making any improvement in the ex-post performance.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.141-155
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• 2005

It is very important that sellers provide reasonable reserve prices for auction items in internet auction systems. Recently, an agent has been proposed to generate reserve prices automatically based on the case similarity of information retrieval theory and the moving average of time series analysis. However, one problem of the previous approaches is that the recent trend of auction prices is not well reflected on the generated reserve prices, because it simply provides the bid price of the most similar item or an average price of some similar items using the past auction data. In this paper. in order to overcome the problem. we propose a method that generates reserve prices based on the moving average. the exponential smoothing, and the least square of time series analysis. Through performance experiments. we show that the successful bid rate of the new method can be increased by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices compared with the previous methods.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.201-212
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• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.