• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.174-207
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• 2017

Human history shows diverse strategies for survival and prosperity. This study introduces the concept of the expansion of wealth as a key to explain choice and behavior of political entities. American scholar, -Bruce Bueno de Mesquita-, offers theoretical grounds for this concept in that the cores of selectorate theory is settled. The political entity consists of two groups, -the winning coalition that has power to replace leader and non-winning coalition that has not. Leaders implement policies serving for the welfare of winning coalition in return for their loyalty. Both internal problems caused by demographic changes and external ones of climate changes, epidemic disease, or invasion compel leader and winning coalition to adopt policies of expansion that they believe may lead to the acquisition of wealth needed to counter those problems. The process starts by occupying one spot where other entities reside and then connecting it to its own. The line between spots functions as a foothold to form a new line to other spots. By repeating this process, a space is created in which new laws and orders are instated. In the early stage of expansion, war is hardly avoidable. Once finished successfully, the political circumstance tilts to encourage economic activities in order to generate national revenues to strengthen political power of winning coalition. However, as scale of economic activities grows, so does political power of civic classes in production and trade. To gain financial support required to run the political entity, delegation of power or bestowing autonomy to non-winning coalition is inevitable. Thus, expansion is not the ultimate solution, only to prolong the political survival if succeed. Maritime power came to attractive option when overland expansion had become obstructed. It offered much greater advantages in terms of political risks and financial burdens in exploring new regions of precious commodities than overland expansion. Each political entity around world have been, for the first time in human history, connected by maritime means since 15th century. It is worthy of noting that land conditions propelled people out to sea. Political and economic situations created opportunities to exploit geographical position in pursuit of wealth. In the 21st century, we witness the operation of international winning coalition that presides over the rules of expansion. Competing for market is synonymous to the expansion in this era, the cause and aim of it has not been changed though. Energy and dollars are key factors of expansion since the end of the 2nd world war. No matter what the forms and conditions change, naval power is still the most relevant means for expansion as it retains unique characters of maneuver, flexibility, continuity, display and projection of power. The strategy for using naval power should be in line with two different approaches for expansion: Approaches to the international winning coalition by making contribution to world order, and approaches to the non-international winning coalition by enhancing military diplomatic activities. The former will serve our share of winning coalition while the latter will open chances to acquire further prosperity.

• 보건행정학회지
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• 제12권4호
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• pp.91-113
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• 2002

본 논문은 의약분업의 실시와 이에 따른 의료인의 대규모 파업을 연구 대상으로 하였다. 협상 (bargaining)에 관한 게임이론 (game-theory) 모형을 활용하여 의료인들과 정부의 협상과 정과 결과를 분석하고자 하였다. 특히 제도 변화의 과정에 있어 사회적 행위자들 사이의 분배적 갈등의 역할에 초점을 맞추고 있다 정부에 의한 의약분업의 시행은 의료인들로 하여금 심각한 분배적 결과를 초래할 수 있다는 것이며, 이는 다양한 배경의 의료인들로 하여금 정치적 연합의 가능성을 강화시켰다. 의료인들에 의한 분배적 결과의 인식은 파업과 같은 집합행동의 조직화로 나타나고 정부와의 협상 관계에 있어서도 줄곧 협상력의 우위를 견지하는 모습을 보여주었다. 결과적으로 의료인들은 그들이 원하는 결과를 확보하는데 성공한듯이 보인다. 협상은 제도의 형성과 변화에 있어 행위자들 간 상호작용의 중요한 형태라 할 수 있다. 이 경우 한 행위자의 목적은 그들에 유리하게 어떻게 제도적 규칙을 형성해 나가느냐 이다. 행위자들간 이해관계에 따른 갈등의 분석에 있어 주요한 변수는 당사자들 간 협상력의 차이라 할 수 있다. 힘의 비대칭 (asymmetry of power)현상은 제도 형성의 중요한 요소가 될 수 있다. 본 논문은 비협조 게임 모형 (the battle of sexes game)을 이용하여 협상력의 차이에 따른 균형해(equilibrium outcome)의 차이를 분석하고자 하였다. 특히 정부와 의료인의 협상에 있어 선호의 강도(intensity of preference)와 협상의 결렬시 지불해야 하는 비용 (breakdown cost) 의 차이는 협상력의 차이로 이어지고, 결과적으로 제도 변화의 결과를 가늠케 하는 척도로 작용하고 있음을 알 수 있다.