• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.1
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• pp.47-85
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• 1989

The Fundamental purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to establish uniform rules applicable to international air transportation. The emphasis on the benefits of uniformity was considered important in the beginning and continues to be important to the present. If the desire for uniformity is indeed the mortar which holds the Warsaw system together then it should be possible to agree on a worldwide liability limit. This liability limit would not be so unreasonable, that it would be impossible for nations to adhere to it. It would preclude any national supplemental compensation plan or Montreal Agreement type of requirement in any jurisdiction. The differentiation of liability limits by national requirement seems to be what is occurring. There is a plethora of mandated limits and Montreal Agreement type 'voluntary' limits. It is becoming difficult to find more than a few major States where an unmodified Warsaw Convention or Hague Protocol limitation is still in effect. If this is the real world in the 1980's, then let the treaty so reflect it. Upon reviewing the Warsaw Convention, its history and the several attempts to amend it, strengths become apparent. Hijackings of international flights have given rise to a number of lawsuits by passengers to recover damages for injuries suffered. This comment is concerned with the liability of an airline for injuries to its passengers resulting from aviation terrorism. In addition, analysis is focused on current airline security measures, particularly the pre-boarding screening system, and the duty of air carriers to prevent weapons from penetrating that system. An airline has a duty to exercise a high degree of care to protect its passengers from the threat of aviation terrorism. This duty would seemingly require the airline to exercise a high degree of care to prevent any passenger from smuggling a weapon or explosive device aboard its aircraft. In the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescene to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. A finding of willful misconduct on the part of an air carrier, which is a prerequisite to imposing unlimited liability, remains a question to be determined by a jury using the definition or standard of willful misconduct prevailing in the jurisdiction of the forum court. Through the willful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention, air carrier face the possibility of unlimited liability for failure to implement proper preventive precautions against terrorist. Courts, therefore, should broadly construe the willful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention in order to find unlimited liability for passenger injuries whenever air carrier security precautions are lacking. In this way, the courts can help ensure air carrier safety and prevention against terrorist attack. Air carriers, therefore, would have an incentive to increase, impose and maintain security precautions designed to thwart such potential terrorist attacks as in the case of Korean Air Lines Flight No.858 incident having a tremendous impact on the civil aviation community. The crash of a commercial airliner, with the attending tragic loss of life and massive destruction of property, always gives rise to shock and indignation. The general opinion is that the legal system could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. I would like to remind all passengers that every discovery of the human spirit may be used for opposite ends; thus, aircraft can be used for air travel but also as targets of terrorism. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the soverign rights of the states, and the human rights of the individuals. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co-ordinated measures. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.41-53
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• 2015

In Paracomon Inc. v. Telus Communication, Realice's anchor became entangled with a working fiber-optic submarine cable during its voyage and are presentative of the shipowner(the captain) cut the cable. The owner of the cable brought a claim for the repair cost against the shipowner. The shipowner then advanced a third party claim against a liability insurance underwriter. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that the shipowner was entitled to limit its liability under the 1976 Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims. The SCC also ruled that even though the misdeed of the shipowner was insufficient to break its right to limitation of liability, its wrongdoing constituted willful misconduct under the 1993 Canada Marine Insurance Act, allowing the underwriter to deny coverage for the incident. Thecasewasthefirsttoaddresstheinterrelationship between the shipowner's right to limit liability under the international convention regime and the availability of liability insurance with respect to such limited liability. This study analyzes the reasoning behind the SCC's judgment and evaluates the appropriateness of this court's decision based on the current maritime industry as well as prevailing maritime law. It concludes that the SCC's decision to declare that the shipowner retained the right to limit its liability is appropriate under the Limitation Convention (1976). However, its declaration that the liability insurer was discharged from liability is not correct in due consideration of the common recognition in the maritime industry, the intended purpose of a third party's right against the liability insurer, and the adoption process of the conduct barring limitation. Based on the SCC's decision, this study finally reviews the issue of the shipowner's right to limit and the coverage of the liability insurer in the Sewol case (2014).

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.109-133
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• 2007

The legal labyrinth through which we have just walked is one in which even a highly proficient lawyer could easily become lost. Warsaw Convention's original objective of uniformity of private international aviation liability law has been eroded as the world community ha attempted again to address perceived problems. Efforts to create simplicity and certainty of recovery actually may have created less of both. In any particular case, the issue of which international convention, intercarrier agreement or national law to apply will likely be inconsistent with other decisions. The law has evolved faster for some nations, and slower for others. Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, strict liability is imposed on the air carrier for damage, loss, or destruction of cargo, luggage, or goods sustained either: (1) during carriage in air, which is comprised of the period during which cargo is 'in charge of the carrier (a) within an aerodrome, (b) on board the aircraft, or (c) in any place if the aircraft lands outside an aerodrome; or (2) as a result of delay. By 2007, 151 nations had ratified the original Warsaw Convention, 136 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, 84 had ratified the Guadalajara Protocol, and 53 nations had ratified Montreal Protocol No.4, all of which have entered into force. In November 2003, the Montreal Convention of 1999 entered into force. Several airlines have embraced the Montreal Agreement or the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Only seven nations had ratified the moribund Guatemala City Protocol. Meanwhile, the highly influential U.S. Second Circuit has rendered an opinion that no treaty on the subject was in force at all unless both affected nations had ratified the identical convention, leaving some cases to fall between the cracks into the arena of common law. Moreover, in the United States, a surface transportation movement prior or subsequent to the air movement may, depending upon the facts, be subject to Warsaw, or to common law. At present, International private air law regime can be described as a "situation of utter chaos" in which "even legal advisers and judges are confused." The net result of this barnacle-like layering of international and domestic rules, standards, agreements, and criteria in the elimination of legal simplicity and the substitution in its stead of complexity and commercial uncertainty, which manifestly can not inure to the efficient and economical flow of world trade. All this makes a strong case for universal ratification of the Montreal Convention, which will supersede the Warsaw Convention and its various reformulations. Now that the Montreal Convention has entered into force, the insurance community may press the airlines to embrace it, which in turn may encourage the world's governments to ratify it. Under the Montreal Convention, the common law defence is available to the carrier even when it was not the sole cause of the loss or damage, again making way for the application of comparative fault principle. Hopefully, the recent entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999 will re-establish the international legal uniformity the Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought to achieve, though far a transitional period at least, the courts of different nations will be applying different legal regimes.