• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.29 no.3
• /
• pp.75-97
• /
• 2019

The growing importance of biological resources as sovereign rights to healthcare, energy, and food has sparked international discussions on Genetic Resources (GRs) and Traditional Knowledge (TK). As the bio-industry continues to grow, research and development utilizing patented biological resources are advocated. Currently, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is actively discussing GRs and TK, and an effective response to national interest has been sought. Of late, there have been growing disputes over issues like ownership, control, and access and benefit-sharing between indigenous peoples and users of GRs and TK resources. Resolution of disputes concerning GRs and TK are thus becoming critical not only to stakeholders such as the indigenous peoples and corporations, but also to third-party users. Due to the weakness of the current IP and court system however, such disputes are not addressed adequately. This paper will address the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which is an out-of-court dispute resolution system, on conflicting issues regarding GRs and TK. It will consider the WIPO as a forum for ADR and ADR for GRs and TK disputes and it will seek both parties in the dispute to benefit from the use of the ADR process.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.9 no.2
• /
• pp.307-325
• /
• 2007

Examining the standards of review adopted by the dispute settlement body of the WTO in its decision on safeguard measures, the Appellate Body offers no coherent guidance or theory as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures adopted by the domestic authorities. It faults the lack of reasoned and adequate explanation in the national authorities' decision to impose safeguard measures, yet its own explanation of the permissible role for safeguard measure could hardly be less instructive. The Appellate Body has consistently emphasized fidelity to text in its decision but that approach can not work properly when the text is fundamentally deficient from the viewpoints that neither Article XIX nor the safeguard Agreement establish a coherent foundation for safeguard measures due to their vague and abstract provision. Without any coherent theory on guidance as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures, it would be absurd to expect WTO members to produce a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how their safeguard measures are in compliance with the WTO roles. In the absence of a thorough renegotiation for the proper operation of the WTO safeguard system, which seems quite unlikely for the foreseeable future, perhaps the unique method out of the current predicament is for the Appellate Body to lead a movement in establishing a sensible common law of safeguards, drawing on extra-textual guidance including the standards of review about their proper role in the WTO safeguard mechanism.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.17 no.1
• /
• pp.3-32
• /
• 2007

This age is called the age of global trade, and the World Trade Organization is a forerunner in promoting the global free trade through multilateral negotiations as the global level. On the other hand, regional economic cooperation such as North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) is appearing, saying that promotion by WTO takes too much time. As is known to everybody, Europe is on the way of integrating member states through EU not to mention economic cooperation. Even in Asia such tendency is shown through ASEAN, Korea, China and Japan in Northeast Asia share geographical proximity, many common historical experiences, and similar cultural norms and values although they have disparities in stages of development, trade and economic policies, and financial and legal frameworks. Under the situation, efforts have been made between three countries of Korea, China and Japan for the conclusion of investment agreements including FTA. If the conclusion of the FTA between the three countries would be realized, it would promote regional trade and investment, contributing to economic growth in the Northeast Asian region. The writer in this paper reviewed the settlement of private commercial dispute including investment dispute arising from the FTA and investment agreements. The investment dispute is quite different from an ordinary commercial dispute arising from commercial transactions in view of disputing parties, applicable laws and rules, etc. Therefore it is a problem of vital importance that the parties interested in investment under the FTA as well as the relevant investment agreement should understand and cope with the settlement mechanism of investment disputes arising therefrom. The ICSID Convention provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member countries and investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries. All contracting states of the ICSID Convention are required by the Convention to recognize and enforce the ICSID arbitral awards. The New York Convention(formally called "United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards") is also applicable for the enforcement of arbitral awards to be rendered under the FTA. As to applicable rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules may be required for the settlement of investment disputes under the FTA. This Rules has adopted by the internationally recognized arbitral organizations although it was developed primarily for use in ad hoc arbitration. The promotion of arbitral cooperation may be realized through agreements between arbitral institutions. Especially under the NAPTA system, a central common system was established to resolve jointly private commercial disputes arising from such free trades by the initiative of arbitral organizations among the member countries. It is called Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas(CAMCA), which may be a good example for the settlement promotion of the private commercial disputes between Korea and other relevant countries.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.44 no.1
• /
• pp.177-191
• /
• 2019

Global trade protectionism has increased further and U.S. priorities and protectionism have strengthened since Trump took office in 2017. Trump administration is actively implementing tariff measures based on U.S. domestic trade laws rather than the WTO rules and regulations. In particular, the American government has recently been imposing high tariffs due to national security and imposing economic sanctions on other countries' imports. According to the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232, the American government imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to WTO member countries such as China, India, and EU etc. on march 15, 2018. Thus, this study aims to investigate whether the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232 is consistent with GATT/WTO rules by comparing the legal basis of US / China / WTO regulations related to Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, and gives some suggestions for responding to the Section 232 measure. As the Section 232 measure exceeded the scope of GATT's Security Exceptions regulation and is very likely to be understood as a safeguard measure. If so, the American government is deemed to be in breach of WTO's regulations, such as the most-favored-nation treatment obligations and the duty reduction obligations. In addition, American government is deemed to be failed to meet the conditions of initiation of safeguard measure and violated the procedural requirements such as notification and consultation. In order to respond to these U.S. protection trade measures, all affected countries should actively use the WTO multilateral system to prevent unfair measures. Also, it is necessary to revise the standard jurisdiction of the dispute settlement body and to explore the balance of the WTO Exception clause so that it can be applied strictly. Finally, it would be necessary for Chinese exporters to take a counter-strategy under such trade pressure.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.48 no.4
• /
• pp.169-188
• /
• 2023

The increase in assertive and unilateral measures represents a key feature of the recent global trade environment. Against this backdrop, the EU is pushing to introduce the so-called "anti-coercion instrument(the instrument)," which aims to allow unilateral countermeasures in the event of economic coercion or threats from third countries. This paper examines the recent assertive trade environment and the legislative background of the instrument. It evaluated the necessity of and concerns arising from the instrument by comparing the existing EU trade policy, i.e., Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR). In addition, the paper aims to analyze the permissibility of the instrument under the WTO system, especially in the context of the principle of "strengthening of the multilateral system." Finally, the paper draws implications of the instrument in terms of our domestic policies that can effectively address economic threats or trade friction in the growing geopolitical crisis.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.16 no.1
• /
• pp.3-44
• /
• 2006

Arbitration, which involves a final determination of disputes, has elements of the judicial process. Although an alternative to formal court litigation, it does not replace it in all aspect, but rather coexists with court procedure as an adjunct and part of administering justice. As the international trade has the basic problems of business managed between the parties of other countries having different laws, customs, cultures, currencies and religions. It has been known that these defects caused the commercial disputes and suspended economic fluence in world economic development through the foreign business. The United Nations launched 'the United Nations Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of the Foreign Arbitral Awards' in 1958 to give effect to the international commercial arbitration. However, the convention has the limitation in excluding the legal obstacles originated from domestic arbitration systems of every states. As the result, the UN succeeded in making world wide arbitration law named 'The UN Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration' in 1983 and recommended all member countries to accept it to revise their domestic arbitration laws thereafter. Korea revised national arbitration law accepting 100% of the model law in 2000. In this respect korea became to have the international dispute settlement system. Korea will be able to settle more business disputes arisen from the international trade and enjoy the world credibility through the new arbitration system.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
• /
• v.38
• /
• pp.265-302
• /
• 2008

This paper intends to analyse some legal issues on "Zeroing" which is based on the article 2.4.2 under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. "Zeroing" stands for a specific methodology in calculating a general dumping margin for a product in question under which negative individual dumping margins are treated as zero (thus "zeroed") before aggregating all individual dumping margins. The article 2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement regulates three types of calculating methodology on dumping margin as first symmetrical method(average-to-average: A-A), second symmetrical method(individual-to-individual: I-I) and asymmetrical method(average-to-individual: A-I). However, this article does not have any provisions about the "Zeroing" practice. In their anti-dumping practices, the EC and the United-States calculated dumping margin based on the "Zeroing", but this methodology has been disputed in the Dispute Settlement Body(DSB) of the WTO. This paper analysed their legal problems with some WTO cases in particular concerning EC-Bed Linen, U.S.-Softwood Lumber Zeroing, U.S.-Zeroing(EC) and U.S.-Sunset Review(Japan) cases. On the basis of theses analysis, we can therefore ask some questions as follows; To begin with, although the article 2.4.2 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement does not clearly refer to the "Zeroing", how do some developing countries, as the U.S.A and the E.U. calculate dumping margin as the "Zeroing"? Secondly, what is the relationship between the symmetrical method and asymmetrical method to the dumping margin? And if we adopt the zeroing method, what is the different rate to anti-dumping margin? Thirdly, although the Panel decided that the zeroing methodology of dumping margin used by th U.S.A in administrative review between the U.S.A and the E.U, why does the Appellate Body made the decision that the american methodology is incompatible with the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement? Lastly, what will be affected the upper decision taken by the Appellate Body to the DDA negotiation of anti-dumping matters? Even though the WTO Appellate made a decision that the zeroing method is incompatible with the principles of the WTO law, this methodology contains a lot of problems. Some members of the WTO as the U.S.A and the E.U did not officially declare this methodology to abandon, and the debate concerned is arguing. Therefore this paper tried to present the adequate solution in order to promote the zeroing methodology in the international anti-dumping system and practices.

• Analyses & Alternatives
• /
• v.2 no.1
• /
• pp.31-69
• /
• 2018

This study examines the role of science in resolving trade disputes. After the Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011 that not only jeopardized the people of Japan, but also put the safety of an entire region at risk, the Republic of Korea (Korea) has imposed import bans as well as increased testing and certification requirements for radioactive material on Japanese food products. Japan has challenged these restrictions at the World Trade Organizations Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This study aims to explain how international trade agreements and previous DSB rulings have dealt with different scientific viewpoints provided by confronting parties. In doing so, it will contrast the viewpoints espoused by Korean and Japanese representatives, and then analyzes the most similar case studies previously ruled on by the DSB, including the case of beef hormones and the case of genetically modified crops including biotech corn, both between the United States and the European Communities (EC). This study finds that science is largely subordinate to national interests in the case of state decision-making within the dispute settlement processes, and science has largely been relegated to a supportive role. Due to the ambiguity and lack of truly decisive decisions in the Appellate Body in science-based trade disputes, this study concludes that the Appellate Body avoids taking a firm scientific position in cases where science is still inconclusive in any capacity. Due to the panel's unwillingness to establish expert review boards as it has the power to do, instead favoring an individual-based system so that all viewpoints can be heard, it has also developed a system with its own unique weaknesses. Similar to any court of law in which each opposing party defends its own interests, each side brings whatever scientific evidence it can to defend its position, incentivizing them to disregard scientific conclusions unfavorable to their position. With so many questions that can arise, combined with the problems of evolving science, questions of risk, and social concerns in democratic society, it is no wonder that the panel views scientific information provided by the experts as secondary to the legal and procedural issues. Despite being ruled against the EC on legal issues in two previous cases, the EC essentially won both times because the panel did not address whether its science was correct or not. This failure to conclusively resolve a debate over whose science is more scientific enabled the EC to simply fix the procedural issues, while continuing to enforce trade restrictions based on their scientific evidence. Based on the analysis of the two cases of disputes, Korea may also find itself guilty of imposing an unwarranted moratorium on Japan's fish exports, only to subsequently pass new restrictions on labelling and certification requirements because Japan may have much scientific evidence at its disposal. However, Korea might be able to create enough uncertainty in the panel to force them to rule exclusively on the legal issues of the case. This will then equip Korea, like the EC in the past, with a way of working around the ruling, by changing whatever legal procedure they need to while maintaining some, if not most, of its restrictions when the panel fails to address its case on scientific grounds.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.13 no.12
• /
• pp.702-714
• /
• 2013

South Korea, China and Japan is struggling for a new economic growth and facing new challenges and difficulties in foreign investment. In this paper, I Studied on the Legal System and Limits or Rules on the Investment Between Korea, China and Japan. First, FTA between Korea, Chin. The trade and economic relations and the investment flows between the three countries were examined. Based on the background of the three countries, it has been studied on the Legal System and Rules in the foreign investment Between Korea, China and Japan. Based on this, and the following were examined. What are the major limits in the foreign investment Between Korea, China and Japan? In the future, what should be included on the FTA investment chapter in FTA between Korea, China and Japan in order to facilitate more investment? FTA between Korea, China and Japan would be an effective means to strengthen the protection of investors and investment facilitation, and investment flows between the three countries will be activated. In the future, FTA between Korea, China and Japan is expected to further promote investment among the three countries. In this regard, in the future, the FTA investment chapter in FTA between Korea, China and Japan should include NT(National Treatment), MFN(Most-Favoured-Nation (Treatment)), Prohibition of the implementation of specific measures, the nationality requirements of management or the board of directors, movement of funds, safeguard measures, expropriation and compensation, compensation for loss, fair and equitable treatment, the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and investment promotion country(Investor-State Dispute Settlement), and other agreement between the three countries.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
• /
• v.7 no.4
• /
• pp.63-68
• /
• 2019

Recently, the United States and China have declared a 25% retaliatory tariff for the partner country products of 50 billion dollar scale. "Trade war" is getting full swing. Such conflicts between economic powers may spread to Japan like the domino phenomenon following the EU (European Union) and become bigger in the global trade war. As a result, Korea has an economic system with a high degree of external dependence, and there is an expert's analysis that it will become the largest victim of the global trade war. If the WTO Dispute Settlement Authority approves this US 301 retaliation measure in the same way as the past case (US-EU hormone-treated beef imports), the United States will not import any Chinese imported products Chinese products) can be imposed. If the US launches a special 301 or super 301, which is stronger than the regular 301, then China is very likely to enforce US retaliation against it, and the trade war between the two countries could become a reality. This phenomenon is likely to have a negative impact on Korean companies. In particular, Korea, which is highly reliant on intermediate goods exports to China, is expected to suffer a great deal of damage. Therefore, Korea needs flexible response at home and abroad, it is necessary to enhance the autonomy of companies and protect export industries. Adjusting corporate tax rate as well as domestic industry height will be one way. The long-term (21 months) trade war between the United States and China has resulted in economic uncertainty. The resulting damage must be compensated. It is necessary to prepare the compensation through the economic council between countries. In the future, the punitive damage compensation system should be introduced.