• The KIPS Transactions:PartB
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• v.8B no.6
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• pp.601-608
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• 2001

The automated assignment of multiple tasks to executing agents is a key problem in the area of multi-agent systems. In many domains, significant savings can be achieved by reallocating tasks among agents with different costs for handling tasks. The automation of task reallocation among self-interested agents requires that the individual agents use a common negotiation protocol that prescribes how they have to interact in order to come to an agreement on "who does what". In this paper, we introduce the multi-agent Traveling Salesman Problem(TSP) as an example of task reallocation problem, and suggest the Vickery auction as an interagent negotiation protocol for solving this problem. In general, auction-based protocols show several advantageous features: they are easily implementable, they enforce an efficient assignment process, and they guarantce an agreement even in scenarios in which the agents possess only very little domain-specific Knowledge. Furthermore Vickrey auctions have the additional advantage that each interested agent bids only once and that the dominant strategy is to bid one′s true valuation. In order to apply this market-based protocol into task reallocation among self-interested agents, we define the profit of each agent, the goal of negotiation, tasks to be traded out through auctions, the bidding strategy, and the sequence of auctions. Through several experiments with sample multi-agent TSPs, we show that the task allocation can improve monotonically at each step and then finally an optimal task allocation can be found with this protocol.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2005.07b
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• pp.733-735
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• 2005

인터넷 경매는 객관적 정보획득이 쉽고 신분노출이 적어 크게 각광받고 있으나 불특정 다수의 참여로 이루어지기 때문에 안정성과 효율성을 전제로 해야 한다. 본 논문에서는 인터넷과 같은 불안전한 통신채널과 호스트를 신뢰할 수 없는 상황에서 확률론적 암호화 기법을 이용하여 자신들의 입찰정보는 최대한 숨기면서 효율적으로 낙찰자와 낙찰가를 계산할 수 있는 Vickrey 경매 모델을 제안한다 제안된 모델은 Auctioneer라 Auction Issuer가 담합하지 않는다는 가정하에서 그 효율성이 입증된 Naor-Pinkas-Sumner의 시스템보다 훨씬 적은 계산량을 요구한다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.6
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• pp.2811-2830
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• 2017

In this paper, we study the problem of mobile data offloading for a network that contains multiple mobile network operators (MNOs), multiple WiFi or femtocell access points (APs) and multiple mobile users (MUs). MNOs offload their subscribed MUs' data traffic by leasing the unused Internet connection bandwidth of third party APs. We propose a combinatorial auction-based two-stage matching mechanism comprised of MU-AP matching and AP-MNO matching. The MU-AP matching is designed to match the MUs to APs in order to maximize the total offloading data traffic and achieve better MU satisfaction. Conversely, for AP-MNO matching, MNOs compete for APs' service using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and the Vickrey auction theories and, in turn, APs will receive monetary compensation. We demonstrated that the proposed mechanism converges to a distributed stable matching result. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm well capture the tradeoff among the total data traffic, social welfare and the QoS of MUs compared to other schemes. Moreover, the proposed mechanism can considerably offload the total data traffic and improve the network social welfare with less computation complexity and communication overhead.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2001.10b
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• pp.76-78
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• 2001

인터넷 사용이 급증하고 전자상거래의 발달과 동시에 전자 경매들이 인터넷 상에서 활발히 이루어지고 있다. 그 중에서 아웃크라이(Out-Cry) 스타일의 경매들은 봉인입찰(Sealed Bid) 경매에 비해서 많이 행해지고 있다. 봉인입찰 경매들을 인터넷 상에서 수행되었을 때에 보안상의 문제점을 가지고 있다. 가장 치명적인 단점은 경매자(Auctioneer)에 대한 신뢰문제로 입찰자(Bidder)들은 경매자가 자신의 입찰정보를 알아내어 다른 입찰자를 도와주거나 더 많은 이익을 얻기 위해서 입찰 정보를 조작하지 않을까 걱정한다. 이런 문제를 해결하기 위해서 몇몇의 보안 프로토콜이 등장하였는데, 그것들은 신뢰할 수 있는 제삼자(Trusted Third Party)와 다수의 입찰 매니져(Bidding Manager)를 둠으로써 해결하고 있다. 첫 번째 방법에서는 경매자에 대한 절대적 신뢰를 전제로 하고 두 번째 방법에서는 경매자와는 별도의 다른 기관들이 요구되어 진다. 이 논문에서는 다른 기관 없이 인터넷 상에서 안전하게 행해질 수 있는 봉인입찰 경매방법을 제시한다. 이 프로토콜은 Vickrey 경매와 FPSB 경매에서 모두 사용될 수 있고 다른 신뢰할 수 있는 제삼자의 도움 없이 입찰자와 경매자의 통신만으로 가능하기 때문에 비용이 절감된다.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.114-121
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• 2010

In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes' dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.135-166
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• 2008

This paper reports the empirical results of comparing the willingness to pay(WTP) for health risk reductions and the willingness to accept(WTA) for risk increases using experimental market methods in the first time in Korea. Health risks were defined as probabilities of premature death from exposure to one of As, Pb, and THM in tap water. A total of six experimental markets with 15 participants in each experiments were held using 20 repetitive Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auctions. To compare the effects of market experiences, trading a marketed good, candy bar, was introduced before the trading the non-marketed good, drinking water risks. Moreover, an objective risk information was provided after the first 10 trials to incorporate learning processes. Regardless of marketed or non-marketed goods, the mean of WTA exceeded the mean of WTP at the first auction trial. As experimental trials proceeded, the disparity between WTA and WTP for marketed goods disappeared. However results for non-marketed goods were rather mixed to the extent that WTA for health risks from As (relatively high risk leves) were significantly larger than WTP, while there were no significant difference between WTA and WTP for health risks fro Pb and THM (relatively low risk levels). On the other hand, participants seemed to respond in a 'rational' manner to the objective risk information provided, with positive learning effects of market-like experience(especially in the WTA experiments).