• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.21 no.12
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• pp.709-718
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• 2020

Even after Fukuyama declared "The End of History" in 1989, the challenge to liberal democracy continues. Controversy about totalitarianism is constantly being raised both internally and externally in democratic countries and leaders, as well as the US-China war of supremacy. In this paper, I explored a hypothesis about the totalitarian process, and to explain this hypothesis, I analyzed the case of Venezuela, which was once referred to as a welfare model state. This paper presupposes Fukuyama's insistence on the universality of liberal democracy but considers the last man Nietzsche argues for the last man he assumes. Accordingly, the process of totalitarianism was viewed as a process in which totalitarianism was institutionalized and spread internationally through the linkage and interaction of the last fallen humans, the masses, and totalitarians in the international and domestic environments. According to this hypothesis, the Bol?var Revolution and Chavez show the process of transformation into a typical quasi-totalism. Although the Venezuelan people preferred democracy, they remained the last man who had become a man of "rich consciousness." While investigating this hypothesis, it was confirmed that extensive and interdisciplinary studies such as digital t otalitarianism and the development of science and technology should be followed.

• Economic Analysis
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.1-32
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• 2021

This study empirically analyzes whether bank capital channel and risk-taking channel for monetary policy work for domestic banks in South Korea by analyzing the impact of the expansionary monetary policy on the rate spread between deposit and loan, capital ratio, and loan amount. For the empirical analysis, the Uhlig (2005)'s sign-restricted SVAR(Structural Vector Auto-Regression) model is used. The empirical results are as follows: the bank's interest rate margin increases, the capital ratio improves, risk-weighted asset ratio increases, and the amount of loans increases in response to expansionary monetary shock. This empirical results confirm that bank capital channel and risk-taking channel work in domestic banks, similar to the previous research results. The implications of this study are as follows. Although the expansionary monetary policy has the effect of improving the bank's financial soundness and profitability in the short term as bank capital channel works, it could negatively affect the soundness of banks by encouraging banks to pursue risk in the long run as risk-taking channel works. It is necessary to note that the capital ratio according to the BIS minimum capital requirement of individual banks may cause an illusion in supervising the soundness of the bank. So, the bank's aggressive lending expansion may lead to an inherent weakness in the event of a crisis. Since the financial authority may have an illusion about the bank's financial soundness if the low interest rate persists, the authority needs to be actively interested in stress tests and concentration risk management in the pillar 2 of the BIS capital accord. In addition, since system risk may increase, it is necessary to conduct regular stress tests or preemptive monitoring of assets concentration risk.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.147-165
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• 1992

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of elections on the Korean economy and their future ramifications. It measures the shocks to the Korean economy caused by elections by taking the average of sample forecast errors from four major elections held in the 1980s. The seven variables' Bayesian Vector Autoregression Model which includes the Monetary Base, Industrial Production, Consumption, Consumer Price, Exports, and Investment is based on the quarterly time series data starting from 1970 and is updated every quarter before forecasts are made for the next quarter. Because of this updating of coefficients, which reflects in part the rapid structural changes of the Korean economy, this study can capture the shock effect of elections, which is not possible when using election dummies with a fixed coefficient model. In past elections, especially the elections held in the 1980s, $M_2$ did not show any particular movement, but the currency and base money increased during the quarter of the election was held and the increment was partly recalled in the next quarter. The liquidity of interest rates as measured by corporate bond yields fell during the quarter the election and then rose in the following quarter, which is somewhat contrary to the general concern that interest rates will increase during election periods. Manufacturing employment fell in the quarter of the election because workers turned into campaigners. This decline in employment combined with voting holiday produce a sizeable decline in industrial production during the quarter in which elections are held, but production catches up in the next quarter and sometimes more than offsets the disruption caused during the election quarter. The major shocks to price occur in the previous quarter, reflecting the expectational effect and the relaxation of government price control before the election when we simulate the impulse responses of the VAR model, imposing the same shocks that was measured in the past elections for each election to be held in 1992 and assuming that the elections in 1992 will affect the economy in the same manner as in the 1980s elections, 1992 is expected to see a sizeable increase in monetary base due to election and prices increase pressure will be amplified substantially. On the other hand, the consumption increase due to election is expected to be relatively small and the production will not decrease. Despite increased liquidity, a large portion of liquidity in circulation being used as election funds will distort the flow of funds and aggravate the fund shortage causing investments in plant and equipment and construction activities to stagnate. These effects will be greatly amplified if elections for the head of local government are going to be held this year. If mayoral and gubernatorial elections are held after National Assembly elections, their effect on prices and investment will be approximately double what they normally will have been have only congressional and presidential elections been held. Even when mayoral and gubernatorial elections are held at the same time as congressional elections, the elections of local government heads are shown to add substantial effects to the economy for the year. The above results are based on the assumption that this year's elections will shock the economy in the same manner as in past elections. However, elections in consecutive quarters do not give the economy a chance to pause and recuperate from past elections. This year's elections may have greater effects on prices and production than shown in the model's simulations because campaigners' return to industry may be delayed. Therefore, we may not see a rapid recall of money after elections. In view of the surge in the monetary base and price escalation in the periods before and after elections, economic management in 1992 should place its first priority on controlling the monetary aggregate, in particular, stabilizing the growth of the monetary base.

• Proceedings of the Safety Management and Science Conference
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.355-380
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• 2004

I test the hypothesis that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability in Korea. Using thirty-six industry portfolios and the broad market index as our test assets, I establish several key results. First, a number of industries such as semiconductor, electronics, metal, and petroleum lead the stock market by up to one month. In contrast, the market, which is widely followed, only leads a few industries. Importantly, an industry's ability to lead the market is correlated with its propensity to forecast various indicators of economic activity such as industrial production growth. Consistent with our hypothesis, these findings indicate that the market reacts with a delay to information in industry returns about its fundamentals because information diffuses only gradually across asset markets. Traditional theories of asset pricing assume that investors have unlimited information-processing capacity. However, this assumption does not hold for many traders, even the most sophisticated ones. Many economists recognize that investors are better characterized as being only boundedly rational(see Shiller(2000), Sims(2201)). Even from casual observation, few traders can pay attention to all sources of information much less understand their impact on the prices of assets that they trade. Indeed, a large literature in psychology documents the extent to which even attention is a precious cognitive resource(see, eg., Kahneman(1973), Nisbett and Ross(1980), Fiske and Taylor(1991)). A number of papers have explored the implications of limited information- processing capacity for asset prices. I will review this literature in Section II. For instance, Merton(1987) develops a static model of multiple stocks in which investors only have information about a limited number of stocks and only trade those that they have information about. Related models of limited market participation include brennan(1975) and Allen and Gale(1994). As a result, stocks that are less recognized by investors have a smaller investor base(neglected stocks) and trade at a greater discount because of limited risk sharing. More recently, Hong and Stein(1999) develop a dynamic model of a single asset in which information gradually diffuses across the investment public and investors are unable to perform the rational expectations trick of extracting information from prices. Hong and Stein(1999). My hypothesis is that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability. This hypothesis relies on two key assumptions. The first is that valuable information that originates in one asset reaches investors in other markets only with a lag, i.e. news travels slowly across markets. The second assumption is that because of limited information-processing capacity, many (though not necessarily all) investors may not pay attention or be able to extract the information from the asset prices of markets that they do not participate in. These two assumptions taken together leads to cross-asset return predictability. My hypothesis would appear to be a very plausible one for a few reasons. To begin with, as pointed out by Merton(1987) and the subsequent literature on segmented markets and limited market participation, few investors trade all assets. Put another way, limited participation is a pervasive feature of financial markets. Indeed, even among equity money managers, there is specialization along industries such as sector or market timing funds. Some reasons for this limited market participation include tax, regulatory or liquidity constraints. More plausibly, investors have to specialize because they have their hands full trying to understand the markets that they do participate in