• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.127-133
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• 2014

North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to South Korea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK and emergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant in North Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility were estimated. $UF_6$ source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from the operation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersion models (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particle concentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependent upon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uranium concentration around the enrichment facility was about $1.0{\times}10^{-7}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$. The location of the maximum concentration was within about 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (${\mu}g$) could be obtained; and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, a uranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about $1.0{\times}10^{-13}{\sim}1.0{\times}10^{-15}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$, which is less than back-ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sample taken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Korea is carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundred kilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.275-279
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• 2001

In uranium enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, exact measurement of fissile isotope enrichment of uranium is required for material accounting in international safeguards inspection as well as process quality control. The purpose of this study was to develop a simple measurement system which can portably be used at nuclear fuel fabrication plants especially dealing with low enriched uranium. For this purpose, a small size CZT (CdZnTe) detector was used, and the detector performance in low uranium gamma/X -rays energy range was investigated by use of various enriched uranium oxide samples. New enrichment measurement technique and analysis method for low enriched uranium oxide, so-called, 'semi-peak ratio technique' was developed. The newly developed method was considered as an alternative technique for the low enrichment and would be useful to account nuclear material in safeguarding activity at nuclear fuel fabrication facility.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.261-293
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• 2017

Nuclear power is a way of attaining an enormous amount of energy with relatively small amount of resources and after it has been introduced to the submarine since 1954, there are approximately 150 of nuclear powered submarine currently on a mission around the world. This is due to the maneuverability, mountability and covertness of nuclear submarines. However, there are other tasks, not only the high level of nuclear technology that are needed to be dealt with in order to construct nuclear powered submarine. The biggest task of all is to secure the enriched uranium. Accordingly, this research is about the way of enriching and securing the nuclear fuel that are used in the nuclear submarine with the characteristics, merits and demerits of the nuclear submarine. Due to the fact that the pressurized water reactor in South Korea is the reactor that was originally built for the development of nuclear powered submarine, many parts is designed to be suitable for the submarine propulsion. However, in order to apply this to submarine it is needed to consider additional requests such as the position of reactor, accident-coping system, radioactive covering, reactor output adjustment and ship's pitch and roll in order to apply this to submarine. Nuclear submarines have much higher speed based on the powerful propulsion in comparison with diesel-electric submarine and also have bigger loading area. Besides, there is no need to snorkel and they also have advantages in covertness with the multi-noise proof system. The nuclear technology in South Korea has seen the dramatic development since 1962 and in 1998 reached to the level that we have succeeded in the localization of nuclear plant and exported the world-class one-piece small-sized reactor (SMART) to UAE. To operate these reactors, we import the whole quantity of low-enriched uranium and having our own uranium enrich facility is not probable because of the budget and international regulations. With the ROK/US nuclear agreement revised on 2015 November, the enrichment of uranium that are available without special permission has changed up to 20%. According to the assumption that we use the 20% enrichment of Uranium on U.S. virginia class submarine, it is necessary to change the fuel after 11 years and it will cause additional cost of 1 billion dollars. But the replace period by the uranium's enrichment rate is not fixed so that it is possible to change according to the design of reactor. Therefore, I would like to make a suggestion on two types of design concepts of nuclear submarine that can be operated for 30 years without nuclear fuel change by using the 20% enriched uranium from ONNp.First of all, it is possible by increasing the size of reactor by 3 times and it results in the 1,000t increase of the weight. And secondly, it is by designing the one piece reactor to insert devices such as steam turbine, condenser into the inside of nuclear core like the Rubis class submarines of France.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.3
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• pp.469-476
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• 2020

Research reactors in-core experimental facilities are designed to provide the highest steady state flux for user's irradiation requirements. However, fuel conversion from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) driven by the ongoing effort to diminish proliferation risk, will impact reactor physics parameters. Preserving the reactor capability to produce the needed flux to perform its intended research functions, determines the conversion feasibility. This study investigates the neutron flux in the central experimental facility of two material test reactors (MTR), the IAEA generic10 MW benchmark reactor and the 22 MW s Egyptian Test and Research Reactor (ETRR-2). A 3D full core model with three uranium enrichment of 93%, 45%, and 20% was constructed utilizing the OpenMC particle transport Monte Carlo code. Neutronics calculations were performed for fresh fuel, the beginning of life cycle (BOL) and end of life cycle (EOL) for each of the three enrichments for both the IAEA 10 MW generic reactor and core 1/98 of the ETRR-2 reactor. Criticality calculations of the effective multiplication factor (K_eff) were executed for each of the twelve cases; results show a reasonable agreement with published benchmark values for both reactors. The thermal, epithermal and fast neutron fluxes were tallied across the core, utilizing the mesh tally capability of the code and are presented here. The axial flux in the central experimental facility was tallied at 1 cm intervals, for each of the cases; results for IAEA 10 MW show a maximum reduction of 14.32% in the thermal flux of LEU to that of the HEU, at EOL. The reduction of the thermal flux for fresh fuel was between 5.81% and 9.62%, with an average drop of 8.1%. At the BOL the thermal flux showed a larger reduction range of 6.92%-13.58% with an average drop of 10.73%. Furthermore, the fission reaction rate was calculated, results showed an increase in the peak fission rate of the LEU case compared to the HEU case. Results for the ETRR-2 reactor show an average increase of 62.31% in the thermal flux of LEU to that of the HEU due to the effect of spectrum hardening. The fission rate density increased with enrichment, resulting in 34% maximum increase in the HEU case compared to the LEU case at the assemblies surrounding the flux trap.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.91-101
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• 2007

In this study, domestic regulatory requirement was investigated for self-disposal of concrete waste from nuclear fuel processing facility. And after self-disposal as landfill or recycling/reuse, the exposure dose was evaluated by RESRAD Ver. 6.3 and RESRAD BUILD Ver.3.3 computing code for radiological assessments of the general public. Derived clearance level by the result of assessments for the exposure dose of the general public is 0.1071Bq/g (3.5% enriched uranium) for landfill and $0.05515Bq/cm^2$ (5% enriched uranium) for recycling/reuse respectively. Also, residual radioactivity of concrete waste after decontamination was investigated in this study. The result of surface activity is $0.01Bq/cm^2\;for\;{\alpha}-emitter$ and the result of radionuclide analysis for taken concrete samples from surface of concrete waste is 0.0297Bq/g for concentration of $^{238}U$, below 2w/o for enrichment of $^{235}U$ and 0.0089Bq/g for artificial contamination of $^{238}U$ respectively. Therefore, radiological hazard of concrete waste by self-disposal as landfill and recycling/reuse is below clearance level to comply with clearance criterion provided for Notice No.2001-30 of the MOST and Korea Atomic Energy Act.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.37-43
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• 2021

Republic of Korea has many nuclear facilities in the country, and Democratic People's Republic of Korea(North Korea) locates in the surrounding country. Therefore, it is necessary to construct the target facility's nuclear forensic data in a preemptive response to the changing international situation. For this reason, this study suggests "signature" materials used to understand the origins and sources of nuclear and other radioactive materials, taking into account domestic nuclear facilities and the nuclear fuel cycle. In domestic, pressurized light water reactors and pressurized heavy water reactors are in operation, and enriched and natural uranium are used as fuels. In the front-end fuel cycle, the signature materials can be nature uranium and UF6 in the uranium enrichment process. The domestic back-end fuel cycle adopts a non-circulating cycle excluding the reprocessing process, and the primary signature material is spent nuclear fuel. According to IAEA recommendation, the importance of these materials as the signature and characteristic contents are suggested in this study. To prove the integrity of nuclear material and build a national nuclear forensics library, it is necessary to grasp the signature material and acquire the characteristic data considering the domestic nuclear facilities and the nuclear fuel cycle.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.5
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• pp.995-1001
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• 2020

With the development of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) devices, cyber security at nuclear power plants (NPPs) has become a hot issue. The Stuxnet, which destroyed Iran's uranium enrichment facility in 2010, suggests that NPPs could even lead to an accident involving the release of radioactive materials cyber-attacks. However, cyber security research on industrial control systems (ICSs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems is relatively inadequate compared to information technology (IT) and further it is difficult to study cyber-attack taxonomy for NPPs considering the characteristics of ICSs. The advanced research of cyber-attack taxonomy does not reflect the architectural and inherent characteristics of NPPs and lacks a systematic countermeasure strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to more systematically check the consistency of operators and regulators related to cyber security, as in regulatory guide 5.71 (RG.5.71) and regulatory standard 015 (RS.015). For this reason, this paper attempts to suggest a template for cyber-attack taxonomy based on the characteristics of NPPs and exemplifies a specific cyber-attack case in the template. In addition, this paper proposes a systematic countermeasure strategy by matching the countermeasure with critical digital assets (CDAs). The cyber-attack cases investigated using the proposed cyber-attack taxonomy can be used as data for evaluation and validation of cyber security conformance for digital devices to be applied, and as effective prevention and mitigation for cyber-attacks of NPPs.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.