• Journal of Sasang Constitutional Medicine
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.128-135
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• 2017

Objectives The purpose of this study is to investigate economic decision-making in accordance with Sasang Constitution through Ultimatum Game. Methods 84 subjects classified as Sasang Constitution played Ultimatum Game in two session which are firstly not facing their opponents(responders) and secondly facing ones. And they were also proposed unfair offers(9:1) in the same two session. Amount of proposal and whether they accept or reject to unfair offers were observed. Results and Conclusions Taeeumin tended to offer more to his/her responder in Ultimatum Game when facing the responder then not. Taeeumin seemed to feel more burnden when he/she was facing the responder while Soyangin or Soeumin didn't.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.1-12
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• 2008

In the ultimatum game two players have to divide a certain amount of money between them. One player is the allocator and proposes a division of the money. The other is the recipient and can either accept or reject the proposed division. If the recipient accepts, the money is divided as proposed. If the recipient rejects, however, both players receive nothing. Purchase decisions could be classified on two basic factors (or dimensions) : involvement and think/feel in the FCB grid model. In this study we studied the influences of the two factors in purchase decisions on the choice of strategy (or propensity to fairness) in the ultimatum game. The empirical study showed that a decision maker chooses rational strategy more frequently when he (or she) is thinkful (or cognitive) in high involvement level.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.479-490
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• 2021

Background: Conflict in the medical world in 2020 led to the rejection of the national examination for doctors. This study explained the process until the end of the national test refusal situation triggered in 2020 through the signaling game theory. The government has succeeded in requiring medical students to take the national exam. Methods: To explain the rejection of the national examination, we first compose and show an example of two small non-signaling games where medical students know which type the government is of, then combine them to play a signaling game. Results: The behavior of the government and medical students was examined through the signaling game model. In the context of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the government makes an ultimatum, whatever the type. And the medical students accept it. They judged that the government could not be expected to abolish the policy. If COVID-19 had not occurred, medical students would have been able to continue the confrontation. Conclusion: The government instilled in the other party the perception that the government would not bend its policies because it was the surly type and would not be afraid of a strong confrontation. Through the image created in this way, the government was forced to accept the ultimatum by medical students. Academically, this study is to deal with the policy-making process through the signaling game theory. In the area of health care policy, this study suggests that various situations such as the type of government or the spread of COVID-19 can become important in addition to the rationality of the policy itself.

• Journal of Gifted/Talented Education
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.59-80
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• 2017

In this study, we investigate social preference of gifted students by analyzing their behaviors in social dilemma situations. We conducted an experimental study using ultimatum games and public goods games with 132 academically gifted middle school students who attended the Ewha-Seodaemun Center for gifted education from 2012 to 2016. We also experimented the same games with 87 regular students for comparative analysis. The result of ultimatum game experiment shows that there is no statistical difference in the proposed share of both groups. Their proposed share ranges from 37% to 38% as expected in other similar studies. However, the rejection rate of the respondents to the proposals with small share are significantly higher among gifted students than among their regular counterparts. This result implies that the gifted students show stronger negative reciprocity, meaning that they tend to punish selfish behaviors even when it takes some costs. In finitely repeated public goods game experiments, the results show that both groups' contribution rates decrease toward the end of the experiments. However, the gifted students show strategic cooperation by attempting to increase the other members' contribution rate within an experimental group. This implies that gifted students tend to care more about how to increase their own expected rewards by reciprocating other students' behaviors.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.407-420
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• 2016

We live under the consequences of countless decisions, among which significant number of decisions is made by representatives acting on behalf of us. However, individuals often make disparate decisions depending on which identity they are assigned as an agent or with which opponent they are interplaying. In the current research, behavioral discontinuity depending upon actor identity and social relationship was investigated using the ultimatum game. Participants behaved in a more economically rational way when they acted as a group representative compared with when they made decisions as a private individual. However, the direction of the individual-representative discontinuity was reversed when rivalry came into play. Furthermore, more fairness was requested to accept the offers in the interaction with the rival compared with the neutral countergroup. Especially when interacting with the rival group, participants showed contrasting level of decision bias - measured by rejection rate toward unfair offers - according to the degree of mind attribution to the opponent. Specifically, the greater participants attributed a mind to the rival group, the more they rejected the unfair offers from it. The present research is important in that it provides insight into individuals' decision-making in a group context, which sometimes forgoes the financial gain of the entire group and ultimately leads to the sub-optimization of social welfare.

• 한국노년학
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• v.39 no.4
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• pp.921-939
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• 2019

According to the social selectivity theory (SST), despite the disadvantages of life conditions, older adults experience less negative emotions because they regulate their emotions by avoiding negative stimuli or situations. Based on the SST, this study attempted to find out whether older adults are better able to regulate negative emotions than young adults in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In an UG, if the proposer proposes to distribute a portion of the money to the responder, the responder must decide whether to accept or reject it. If the responder accepts the offer, the proposer and the responder can each have their own share as proposed, but if s/he reject the offer, both get nothing. Thus, if the responder considers own economic benefits, it is a more reasonable decision to accept the unfair offer no matter how low, than to reject it. To accept an unfair offer, the responder must regulate the anger felt at the proposer. If older adults could regulate anger better than young adults, they would be less likely to reject the unfair offer than young adults. Fifty-seven olders and 60 university students participated in this study. Both the older and young adults accepted most of the fair offers. In contrast, older adults accepted unfair offers at a significantly higher rate than young adults. In addition, compared to young adults, older adults reported anger less frequently at the unfair offers. Accepting unfair offers was negatively correlated with anger report, but positively correlated with the emotion regulation measured by ERQ. The ERQ score was negatively correlated with anger report. Emotion regulation partially mediated the relationship between the age groups and acceptance of unfair offers. The present results showed that older adults accepted the unfair offers at a higher rate than young adults because they could regulate the negative emotions felt at the unfair offer better than young adults. This study provided new evidence for the claim that improving emotional regulation is a major developmental change in adulthood.