• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• 융합경영연구
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.73-81
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• 2024

Purpose: South Korea is a close ally of the US and an important partner of China. Caught between the two most powerful countries, South Korea's strategic directions are critical. This article emphasizes that the deeper core of the US-China trade war is to improve the business environment to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost the economy, rather than engaging in the trade war. Research design, data, and methodology: Considering the complexity of this issue, this article applies a systematic analytical tool, the ABCD (Agility, Benchmarking, Convergence, and Dedication) model, to provide strategic guidance for inducing investments into South Korea in the context of the ongoing US-China trade war. Results: Specifically, South Korea needs to provide a more attractive business environment along the four points: expedite commercial activities through deregulation (Agility); adopt global standards of the flexible labor markets and technological developments (Benchmarking); integrate various industries and connect them to global value chains (Convergence); and create more economy-friendly policies rather than politics-oriented ones such as protectionism (Dedication). Conclusion: This study stands out not just by utilizing the ABCD model but, also by providing more systematic analysis and practical implications, particularly within the context of the escalating US-China competition. Unlike many existing studies that analyze the broader impacts of this geopolitical rivalry, this research delves into specific strategic guidelines for South Korea to attract FDI. The findings also provide implications for multinational corporations (MNCs) in choosing the locations for their overseas operations, particularly in South Korea.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.27-59
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• 2023

이 연구는 현재 논란이 되고 있는 '신냉전'에 대해 비판적으로 비교하기 위한 시론의 역할을 하는 것을 목적으로 한다. '신냉전' 담론이 미디어와 학계에 주요 이슈로 등장하여 현실 정치적 힘으로 작용하게 된 것은 세 번의 계기를 통해서였다. 중국의 '일대일로' 프로젝트가 출범하고 러시아의 크림병합으로 '우크라이나 위기'가 발생하면서 '신냉전' 담론이 형성되기 시작하여, 트럼프정부의 미중 무역분쟁을 통해 '신냉전' 관련 논쟁이 본격적으로 전면화 된 데 이어, 바이든 정부의 '민주주의 대 권위주의'의 프레임과 푸틴의 우크라이나 침공으로 인해 '신냉전' 논쟁은 현재 심화되고 있다. 현재 논란이 되고 있는 '신냉전'이 역사적으로 공인된 '20세기의 냉전(Cold War)과 동일하거나 연속선상에 있다는 합의'가 부재하다. '신냉전'이라는 용어는 이론적인 검증과 체계화는 물론이고 아직 분석적 개념의 지위를 획득하지 못한 시사적인 용어에 가깝고, 관련 논쟁 또한 주장이나 담론discourse 수준에 머물고 있다. '신냉전' 관련 담론들을 지지 및 동의하는 주장과 이에 대한 비판적 입장을 비교하여, 과거의 냉전과 어떠한 유사성과 차별성이 있는지 분석할 것이다. 이러한 비교 분석을 통해 현재 진행되는 '신냉전' 담론이 오늘날 세계질서의 전환적 현상을 설명하는 데 적실성 있는 개념이 아니라는 것을 논증하고자 한다.

• 수완나부미
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.205-228
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• 2024

The ASEAN and ROK have played a crucial role in fostering regional peace and economic development. Nevertheless, the recent strategic competition between the US and China has turned the region into a contested arena. The relationship faces challenges due to the ROK's growing alignment with the US, prompting a rising interest in minilateralism as an alternative collaboration model. This paper scrutinizes the impact of ROK's foreign policy behavior, with a focus on minilateralism as a preferred cooperation model with ASEAN. The study centers on BIMP-EAGA, investigating its effectiveness in sustaining collaboration amid geopolitical rivalry. The paper concludes that BIMP-EAGA, as a manifestation of minilateralism, serves as an alternative platform for ROK and ASEAN cooperation. However, the study reveals that the implementation of BIMP-EAGA falls short of expectations. This paper emphasizes the need for greater subregional focus and comprehensive coverage of BIMP-EAGA to truly reflect the shared interests of ASEAN member states.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• 한국수자원학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국수자원학회 2023년도 학술발표회
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• pp.245-245
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• 2023

This paper examines the extent to which the Mekong River Basin countries have achieved socioeconomic benefits based on regional cooperation through the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program, focusing on hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid. This study pays attention to the time period from 2012 to 2022. The benefit sharing approach is employed to evaluate the extent to which hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid have contributed to the regional energy trade in the GMS program. The GMS program was launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, and the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam have taken an active part in the program. The goals of the GMS program are to achieve poverty alleviation, economic development, and regional cooperation in various sectors, including energy, tourism, and transportation. The GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2030 (GMS-2030), in 2021, provides a new framework for prosperous and sustainable development in the river basin. In the energy sector, the GMS program has been instrumental in facilitating hydropower development and creating the Mekong Power Grid with the Regional Grid Code (RGC), contributing to economic benefits and promoting regional trade of hydroelectricity. It is argued that the GMS program has enhanced regional cooperation between the riparian countries. Despite such achievements, the GMS program has faced challenges, including the gap of economic development between the riparian countries, socioeconomic and environmental concerns regarding hydropower development between the Upper and Lower Mekong countries, and geopolitical tensions from the US-China rivalry. These challenges should adequately be addressed within the program, which can guarantee the sustainability of the program for the river basin.

• 동남아시아연구
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.83-120
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• 2018

2017년은 리콴유라는 구심점을 잃은 싱가포르의 여러 도전 과제들이 부각된 한 해였다. 첫 여성 대통령이 탄생하였지만 국민들은 새로 개정된 대통령 선출 방식에 대해 불만을 표출하였다. 리셴룽 총리의 권력 남용 논란은 온 국민을 충격에 빠트렸으며, 집권당은 차기 승계 구도에 대한 명확한 청사진을 제시하지 못했다. 경제적으로는 보호무역주의 극복과 증세 압박에 놓였으며, 중국의 외교 압박이 거세지면서 실용주의 외교의 실효성에 대한 의문이 제기되었다. 리셴룽 총리의 9월 방중으로 중국과의 관계는 다소 회복되었지만, 2018년 아세안 의장국으로서 미-중 사이에서 아세안의 중심성을 이끌어야 하는 난제를 안게 되었다. 한편 사회문화적인 측면에서 2017년은 싱가포르 사회가 좀 더 성숙한 다인종, 다문화 사회로 나아가고, 서로의 다양성과 다름을 추구하는 한 해였다. 특히 할리마 야콥 대통령의 당선은 말레이계이자 여성인 이중 약자가 대통령이 될 수 있다는 싱가포르의 통합적인 면모를 상징적으로 내보일 수 있는 좋은 기회가 되기도 했다. 하지만 동시에 싱가포르 정부가 정치적 의도와 목적으로 주창하는 '상징적'인 다양성이 아니라 실질적인 차원에서 소수 집단의 권익과 다양성이 인정되는 좀 더 통합적인 사회로 나아가야 함이 강조되는 계기도 되었다. 따라서 2018년 싱가포르 지도층은 후계구도를 명확히 함으로써 현재 직면한 여러 도전 과제들을 풀어나가려 할 것이며, 이를 통해 싱가포르 사회는 다인종, 다문화의 다양성을 포용할 수 있는 보다 통합적인 사회로 나아갈 것이라고 전망된다.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권1호
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

Для основных ведущих стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона США, Китая и России сложилась ситуация "новой нормальности". Причем для каждой из указанных стран эта "новая нормальность" имеет свои собственные особенности, характеристики и значение. Для США – это обострение военного противостояния с Китаем в Тайваньском проливе. Для Китая – обострение соперничества с Соединенными Штатами до нового уровня и, одновременно, замедление темпов экономического развития с очень высокой вероятностью их дальнейшего снижения. "Новая нормальность" для России – это почти полное свертывание отношений с США, ЕС и их партнёрами и союзниками на фоне специальной военной операции и введенных санкций. Эти нюансы, в дополнение к результатам 20-го съезда КПК, во многом и будут определять основные тенденции в китайско-американских и китайско-российских отношениях. С высокой вероятностью отношения Китая и России не претерпят серьезных изменений на фоне украинского кризиса. Пекин будет стараться сохранять позицию "доброжелательного нейтралитета" по отношению к Москве. В то же время баланс между "доброй волей" и "нейтралитетом" может варьироваться в зависимости от масштабов китайско-российского сотрудничества. Например, в экономической сфере китайские компании будут лимитировать сотрудничество с российскими партнерами, опасаясь западных вторичных санкций. Однако, в целом, Россия сохранит свое значение для Китая как сильнейший антиамериканский полюс. В отношениях с США Китай продолжит твердо отстаивать свои интересы, в то же время, не исключая нормализации отношений с Вашингтоном в определенных областях сотрудничества: стратегическая стабильность, нетрадиционные угрозы, экология и т.д. В целом решения 20-го съезда КПК не позволяют говорить ни за, ни против идеи о готовности Китая возобновить диалог с США в период после конгресса. Китайско-американские отношения, как отмечалось выше, имеют свою собственную логику и, вероятно, продолжат развиваться в ее рамках. Впрочем, как и китайско-российские отношения. В рамках этой логики Пекин, похоже, продолжает балансировать между двумя векторами своей внешней политики. С одной стороны – это развитие двустороннего сотрудничества с Россией с целью укрепления собственных переговорных позиций в противостоянии с Вашингтоном: военное сотрудничество с акцентом на совместные учения, политическое сотрудничество, основанное на антиамериканизме, экономическое сотрудничество с оглядкой на риски вторичных санкций. С другой стороны, для Китая неприемлемо, во-первых, нарушение территориальной целостности Украины, во-вторых, прямое военное столкновение с США и, в-третьих, дальнейшее обострение отношений с Вашингтоном по фактору китайской дружбы с Россией.