• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.73-81
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• 2024

Purpose: South Korea is a close ally of the US and an important partner of China. Caught between the two most powerful countries, South Korea's strategic directions are critical. This article emphasizes that the deeper core of the US-China trade war is to improve the business environment to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost the economy, rather than engaging in the trade war. Research design, data, and methodology: Considering the complexity of this issue, this article applies a systematic analytical tool, the ABCD (Agility, Benchmarking, Convergence, and Dedication) model, to provide strategic guidance for inducing investments into South Korea in the context of the ongoing US-China trade war. Results: Specifically, South Korea needs to provide a more attractive business environment along the four points: expedite commercial activities through deregulation (Agility); adopt global standards of the flexible labor markets and technological developments (Benchmarking); integrate various industries and connect them to global value chains (Convergence); and create more economy-friendly policies rather than politics-oriented ones such as protectionism (Dedication). Conclusion: This study stands out not just by utilizing the ABCD model but, also by providing more systematic analysis and practical implications, particularly within the context of the escalating US-China competition. Unlike many existing studies that analyze the broader impacts of this geopolitical rivalry, this research delves into specific strategic guidelines for South Korea to attract FDI. The findings also provide implications for multinational corporations (MNCs) in choosing the locations for their overseas operations, particularly in South Korea.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.27-59
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• 2023

This study aims to serve as a critical comparison of the currently controversial 'new cold war' discourse. It took three triggers for the 'new cold war' discourse to emerge as a major issue in the media and academia and to have real political impact. With the launch of China's 'Belt and Road' project and Russia's annexation of Crimea leading to the 'Ukraine crisis,' the 'new cold war' discourse has begun to take shape. Trump's U.S.-China trade spat has brought the 'new cold war' debate to the forefront. The 'new cold war' debate is currently being intensified by the Biden administration's framing of "democracy versus authoritarianism" and Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Currently, there is no consensus among scholars on whether the controversial 'new cold war' is a new version, or a continuation of the historically defined concept of the Cold War. The term 'New Cold War' is less of an analytical concept and more of a topical term that has yet to achieve analytical status, let alone a theoretical validation and systematization, and the related debate remains at the level of assertion or discourse. Through this comparative analysis, I will argue that the ongoing discourse of the 'New Cold War' does not have the instrumental explanatory power to analyze the transitional phenomena of the world order today.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.205-228
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• 2024

The ASEAN and ROK have played a crucial role in fostering regional peace and economic development. Nevertheless, the recent strategic competition between the US and China has turned the region into a contested arena. The relationship faces challenges due to the ROK's growing alignment with the US, prompting a rising interest in minilateralism as an alternative collaboration model. This paper scrutinizes the impact of ROK's foreign policy behavior, with a focus on minilateralism as a preferred cooperation model with ASEAN. The study centers on BIMP-EAGA, investigating its effectiveness in sustaining collaboration amid geopolitical rivalry. The paper concludes that BIMP-EAGA, as a manifestation of minilateralism, serves as an alternative platform for ROK and ASEAN cooperation. However, the study reveals that the implementation of BIMP-EAGA falls short of expectations. This paper emphasizes the need for greater subregional focus and comprehensive coverage of BIMP-EAGA to truly reflect the shared interests of ASEAN member states.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• Proceedings of the Korea Water Resources Association Conference
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• 2023.05a
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• pp.245-245
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• 2023

This paper examines the extent to which the Mekong River Basin countries have achieved socioeconomic benefits based on regional cooperation through the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program, focusing on hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid. This study pays attention to the time period from 2012 to 2022. The benefit sharing approach is employed to evaluate the extent to which hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid have contributed to the regional energy trade in the GMS program. The GMS program was launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, and the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam have taken an active part in the program. The goals of the GMS program are to achieve poverty alleviation, economic development, and regional cooperation in various sectors, including energy, tourism, and transportation. The GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2030 (GMS-2030), in 2021, provides a new framework for prosperous and sustainable development in the river basin. In the energy sector, the GMS program has been instrumental in facilitating hydropower development and creating the Mekong Power Grid with the Regional Grid Code (RGC), contributing to economic benefits and promoting regional trade of hydroelectricity. It is argued that the GMS program has enhanced regional cooperation between the riparian countries. Despite such achievements, the GMS program has faced challenges, including the gap of economic development between the riparian countries, socioeconomic and environmental concerns regarding hydropower development between the Upper and Lower Mekong countries, and geopolitical tensions from the US-China rivalry. These challenges should adequately be addressed within the program, which can guarantee the sustainability of the program for the river basin.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.83-120
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• 2018

For Singapore, 2017 was an uneasy year. The presidential election was fraught with controversy since the revised Presidential Election Act allowed only one candidate to be eligible for the election. The bitter feud between Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and his siblings shocked many Singaporeans. Succession planning for the next top leadership is still veiled in obscurity. The anti-globalization trend and the increasing pressure to raise the tax have become major challenges for Singapore's economy to overcome. China's continuous diplomatic pressure has called into the question Singapore's pragmatic foreign policy. Although its relations with China were back to normal, Singapore, the ASEAN chair in 2018, is still facing intractable problems in safeguarding ASEAN centrality in the growing US-China rivalry. In the meantime, Singapore has pursued its diversity and equality, heading toward a more matured multi-racial and multi-cultural society in 2017. The first female president, Halimah Yacob, served as a symbolic epitome of Singapore's emphasis on diversity and harmony among different ethnic groups and minorities. This great milestone, however, has largely been questioned by Singaporeans, as it seemed to be a political gesture that only utilized Halimah's double minority in the level of ideologies. The election of the Malay president has led Singaporeans to think about the real equity and equality among minorities, while strongly motivated to move toward a more inclusive society. In 2018, Singaporean leaders will try to resolve many challenging problems by reaffirming leadership succession planning, which is expected to lead Singapore to pursue a more integrated society.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.