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International Law on the Flight over the High Seas (공해의 상공비행에 관한 국제법)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.26 no.1
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    • pp.3-30
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    • 2011
  • According to the Article 86 of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) the provisions of high seas apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. Article 87 also stipulates the freedom of the high seas. International laws on the flight over the high seas are found as follows; Firstly, as far as the nationality of the aircraft is concerned, its legal status is quite different from the ship where the flags of convenience can be applied practically. There is no flags of convenience of the aircraft. Secondly, according to the Article 95 of UNCLOS warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military(or state) aircraft over the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. Thirdly, according to the Article 101 of UNCLOS piracy consists of any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft. We can conclude that piracy can de done by a pirate aircraft as well as a pirate ship. Fourthly, according to the Article 111 (5) of UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only military aircraft, or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. Fifthly, according to the Article 110 of UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an authorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. Sixthly, according to the Article 1 (5)(dumping), 212(pollution from or through the atmosphere), 222(enforcement with respect to pollution from or through the atmosphere) of UNCLOS aircraft as well as ship is very much related to marine pollution. Seventhly, as far as the crime on board aircraft over the high seas is concerned 1963 Convention on the Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(Tokyo Convention) will be applied, and as for the hijacking over the high seas 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(Hague Convention) and as for the sabotage over the high seas 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(Montreal Convention) will be applied respectively. These three conventions recognize the flag state jurisdiction over the crimes on board aircraft over the high seas. Eightly, as far as reconnaissance by foreign aircraft in the high seas toward the coastal States is concerned it is not illegal in terms of international law because its act is done in the high seas. Ninthly as for Air Defence Identification Zone(ADIZ) there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention. The legal status of the foreign aircraft over this sea zone might be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states whether this zone is legitimate or illegal. Lastly, the Arctic Sea is the frozen ocean. So the flight over that ocean is the same over the high seas. Because of the climate change the Arctic Sea is getting melted. If the coastal states of the Arctic Sea will proclaim the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) as the ocean is getting melted, the freedom of flight over that ocean will also be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states.

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The Meaning of Extraordinary Circumstances under the Regulation No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC 항공여객보상규칙상 특별한 사정의 의미와 판단기준 - 2008년 EU 사법재판소 C-549/07 (Friederike Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia) 사건을 중심으로 -)

  • Kim, Young-Ju
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.29 no.2
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    • pp.109-134
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    • 2014
  • Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation of assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (Regulation No 261/2004) provides extra protection to air passengers in circumstances of denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay. The Regulation intends to provide a high level of protection to air passengers by imposing obligations on air carriers and, at the same time, offering extensive rights to air passengers. If denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay are caused by reasons other than extraordinary circumstances, passengers are entitled for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004. In Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane SpA(Case C-549/07, [2008] ECR I-11061), the Court did, however, emphasize that this does not mean that it is never possible for technical problems to constitute extraordinary circumstances. It cited specific examples of where: an aircraft manufacturer or competent authority revealed that there was a hidden manufacturing defect on an aircraft which impacts on safety; or damage was caused to an aircraft as a result of an act of sabotage or terrorism. Such events are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and is beyond the actual control of that carrier on account of its nature or origin. One further point arising out of the court's decision is worth mentioning. It is not just necessary to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test for the airline to be excused from paying compensation. It must also show that the circumstances could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. It is clear from the language of the Court's decision that this is a tough test to meet: the airline will have to establish that, even if it had deployed all its resources in terms of staff or equipment and the financial means at its disposal, it would clearly not have been able - unless it had made intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time - to prevent the extraordinary circumstances with which it was confronted from leading to the cancellation of the flight.