• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.373-399
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• 2014

This paper deals with the question whether the metaphysical dialetheism is a persuasive view or not. That is, the purpose of this paper is to criticize the metaphysical dialetheism by answering three questions, whether the dialetheism is compatible with the correspondence theory of truth, whether there is an observable contradiction, finally what the status of LNC is. In conclusion, it is argued that dialetheism is incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth, because it results in trivialism to suppose that two views are compatible. It is also claimed that LNC should be understood as the principle of exclusion which constrains the structure of the world and that the real world is consistent. Therefore, there is no observable contradiction in the world and the metaphysical dialetheism is not persuasive.

• Journal of Science of Art and Design
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• v.8
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• pp.95-127
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• 2005

It's a matter of ontology rather than that of cognition and methodology to discuss a work of art in Gadamer's philosophy. In addition, he emphasizes the cognitive aspect of a work of art instead of comparing forms and contents of them. For that reason, he excludes aesthetic consciousness derived from Kant first and then makes away with Schiller's theory of aesthetic education. For Gadamer, the concept of truth does not mean accord or correspondence. It would rather be an encounter. This encounter is not axed on a specific time, but a continuous and historical one. Basically. a work of art guarantees this kind of an encounter. This encounter is not based on mutual agreement through an objective standard but on recognition with mutual understanding. Therefore, prejudice or tradition should be acknowledged and respected instead of being excluded. We have only to minimize difference between them through conversation. Gadamer's ontology of a work of art is based on such a ground. The function of a work of art is not only simple satisfaction of aesthetic senses but an object of interpretation, that is, a text by presenting a ground of truth through an agreement of situation. This text reveals its meaning in the situation of author-text-reader. The appearance of this meaning is nothing but the birth of truth. Symbol-allegory and classicism show how to express this kind of truth in a work of art. It is true that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics cannot be easily applied to interpret a concrete work of art because it just lays emphasis on the process of 'understanding' instead of a detailed analysis on an individual work. For that reason, he was criticized by some people because of this subjectivity of understanding. However, it's meaning could be changed according to the viewpoint on a work of art. There appears various structural approaches on a work of art in contemporary theory of art. Gadamer just asks the basis of such approaches instead of criticizing a specific one Therefore, a practical approach on individual work should be made separately and hermeneutics enriches the meaning of open-ending of each work of art.

• Language and Information
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.163-182
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• 2004

Since metaphor was proposed to be a matter of thought instead of language over two decades ago, the research in this area has made most of its progress by the cognitivists. For the cognitivists represented by Lakoff, metaphor is not a mere poetic or rhetoric device, but is central to our everyday language. Furthermore, according to them, we categorize the world and break it into concepts mainly through metaphors, and truth conditions simply cannot account for metaphor. However, this cognitivists' view has been severely counterattacked by the truth-conditional semanticists. Their main criticism is that the cognitivists do not provide a way to go from our internal representations to the outside world. It is also criticized that the cognitive theory of metaphor as cross-conceptual domain mappings is too broad and general, and that they do not explain why a particular metaphorical expression should be subsumed under one mapping rather than another mapping, i.e., their schemes and structural relations are not predictive. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to propose a model for metaphor interpretation that combines the virtues of the two opposite views of metaphor. Truth-conditional semantics cannot ignore cognitive aspects of language, so-called states of affairs or mental representations, while cognitive theories cannot neglect vigorous representation of meaning with objective reality. This paper will try to present a preliminary outline of this combining model.

• English Language & Literature Teaching
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.131-150
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• 2003

The purpose of this paper is to provide two levels of conceptualization of a category such as an absolute category in semantic level and a relative category in pragmatic level on the basis of Aristotelian category theory and prototype category theory. I do not intend to criticize classical category theory and prototype category theory but to show that these two types of category are applied to the different world. Aristotelian categorization is an absolute category because it is based on the possible world called the meta-world and it has an absolute truth value. The members of an absolute category is presented as a set. There is a clear boundary between members and non-members because they are distinguished by the absolute criteria An absolute category is semantic conceptualization. This absolute category is changed into a relative category when it is applied in the real world. A relative category which corresponds to a prototype category is based on the real world called the object world and it has a relative truth value. Here individuals are categorized by the cognition and perception of human beings. A relative category is pragmatic conceptualization. In conclusion, while classical categories which are called absolute categories represent sentence meaning, prototype categories which are called relative categories represent utterance meaning.

• Proceedings of the Korean Geotechical Society Conference
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• 2007.09a
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• pp.396-398
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• 2007

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.3-32
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• 2005

Hilbert's rational ambition to establish consistency in Number theory and mathematics in general was frustrated by the fact that the statement itself claiming consistency is undecidable within its formal system by $G\ddot{o}del's$ second theorem. Hilbert's optimism that a mathematician should not say "Ignorabimus" ("We don't know") in any mathematical problem also collapses, due to the presence of a undecidable statement that is neither provable nor refutable. The failure of his program receives more shock, because his system excludes any ambiguity and is based on only mechanical operations concerning signs and strings of signs. Above all, $G\ddot{o}del's$ theorem demonstrates the limits of formalization. Now, the notion of provability in the dimension of syntax comes to have priority over that of semantic truth in mathematics. In spite of his failure, the notion of algorithm(mechanical processe) made a direct contribution to the emergence of programming languages. Consequently, we believe that his program is failure, but a great one.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.347-380
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• 2013

In this paper I will try to show how Wittgenstein criticized Frege's theory of meaning. Frege's theory of meaning can be compressed as sense-reference theory. Frege distinguishes between sense and reference on all the linguistic expressions. In particular, he regards that a sentence has sense and reference. This distinction was raised from, so to speak, the problem of identity sentences. Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the key of his direct criticism of Frege's sense-reference theory. That is, it is an attack on Frege's thought that the reference of a sentence is a truth value and truth values are "objects themselves" (in Frege's meaning). According to Wittgenstein, such an object does not exist and according to his picture theory, the function of a name and that of a proposition are fundamentally different. By the way, Frege can reply justly to this criticism that it is insufficient. In short, Frege's 'sense' and 'reference' etc, are the technical terms. Hence Wittgenstein's decisive criticism of Frege's theory consists in accusing his theory of logical flaws. There is an another route to the sense and reference of a sentence which Frege introduces. In discourses of judgement stroke and content stroke in his Begriffsshrift and in those of horizontal stroke since his "Function and Concept", Frege deals with the sense and reference of a sentence. Wittgenstein criticize that the sense of a complex sentence such as ~p would by no means be determined by Frege's determination.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.233-253
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• 2014

The Pinocchio paradox that Eldridge-Smith suggested is a version of the semantic paradox. But it is unique in the sense that this paradox does not contain a semantic predicate. Tarski's solution which appeals to the hierarchy of language and Kripke's para-completeness which accepts the third truth value cannot solve the Pinocchio paradox. This paper argues that Eldridge-Smith's trial to criticize semantical dialetheism is not successful and that the paradox implies the rule of the truth predicate is inconsistent. That is, the proper diagnosis to this paradox is that the Pinocchio principle should be considered to be potentially inconsistent, which suggests that semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise because the rule of the truth-predicate is inconsistent. The Pinocchio paradox teaches us that consistent view of truth cannot be successful to solve the semantic paradoxes and that we should accept the inconsistent view of truth.

• Journal of Information Science Theory and Practice
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.59-72
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• 2022

This text discusses elements and characteristics of contemporary informational reality, that is, the ways of producing, circulating, organizing, using, and appropriating information in the current context. Initially, seven terms and concepts used to describe this reality are discussed: fake news, false testimonials, hate speech, scientific negationism, disinformation, post-truth, and infodemic. Next, an attempt is made to present a framework for such phenomena as an object of study in information science. Therefore, this scenario is characterized based on the three main models of information science study: physical, cognitive, and social. The contribution of each of them to the study of contemporary informational reality is analyzed, identifying aspects such as the bubble effect, clickbaits, confirmation bias, cults of amateurism, and post-truth culture. Finally, it presents the discussion of a possible veritistic turn in the field, in order to think about elements not covered so far by information science in its task and challenge of producing adequate understanding and diagnoses of current phenomena. In conclusion, it is argued that only accurate and comprehensive diagnoses of such phenomena will allow information science to develop services and systems capable of combating their harmful effects.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.193-214
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• 2008

This paper is about to analyse Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh on textual evidences through the structure of perception and to apply this result to his theory of the others. In the first place, we study what he thinks of philosophical investigation and thus of the essence of philosophy. With this process, we find out that perception is more important than reflection in philosophical investigation. Differently from the objective or objectivistic viewpoint, the truth of perception is revealed to go beyond distinction between consciousness and object. This truth refers to reversibility which Merleau-Ponty thinks to be the ultimate truth. The reversibility of perception leads to chiasms which reveal and unreveal the beings. In the final analysis, the flesh as reversibility is the Being in the beings. When it comes to the problem of other minds, we are confirmed through the movement of flesh that self-presence is the presence to the differentiated world, namely the others.