• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.35-51
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• 1991

The primary purpose of this study is to point out the rising problem from which the insured value is remarkably different from the sound value of the ship in the Institute Time Clauses-Hulls(1. 10. 83.) and that of the ship in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906. Its secondary purpose is to suggest remedial methods for these problems and to contribute to the reduction of premium for shipowners.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.152-177
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• 2021

Purpose - This study analyses the excepted requirement and burden of proof of the carrier due to unseaworthiness through comparison between the marine transport contract and marine insurance contract. Design/methodology - This study uses the legal analytical normative approach. The juridical approach involves reviewing and examining theories, concepts, legal doctrines and legislation that are related to the problems. In this study a literature analysis using academic literature and internet data is conducted. Findings - The burden of proof in case of seaworthiness should be based on presumed fault, not proved fault. The burden of proving unseaworthiness/seaworthiness should shift to the carrier, and should be exercised before seeking the protections of the law or carriage contract. In other words, the insurer cannot escape coverage for unfitness of a vessel which arises while the vessel is at sea, which the assured could not have prevented in the exercise of due diligence. The insurer bears the burden of proving unseaworthiness. The warranty of seaworthiness is implied in hull, but not protection and indemnity policies. The 2015 Act repeals ss. 33(3) and 34 of MIA 1906. Otherwise the provisions of the MIA 1906 remain in force, including the definition of a promissory warranty and the recognition of implied warranties. There is less clarity about the position when the source of the loss occurs before the breach of warranty but the actual loss is suffered after the breach. Nonetheless, by s.10(2) of the 2015 Act the insurer appears not to be liable for any loss occurring after the breach of warranty and before there has been a remedy. Originality/value - When unseaworthiness is identified after the sailing of the vessel, mere acceptance of the ship does not mean the party waives any claims for damages or the right to terminate the contract, provided that failure to comply with the contractual obligations is of critical importance. The burden of proof with regards to loss of damage to a cargo caused by unseaworthiness is regulated by the applicable law. For instance, under the common law, if the cargo claimant alleges that the loss or damage has been caused by unseaworthiness, then he has the burden of proof to establish the followings: (i) that the vessel was unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage; and that, (ii) that the loss or damage has been caused by such unseaworthiness. In other words, if the warranty of seaworthiness at the inception of the voyage is breached, the breach voids the policy if the ship owner had prior knowledge of the unseaworthy condition. By contrast, knowingly permitting the vessel to break ground in an unseaworthy condition denies liability only for loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthiness. Such a breach does not, therefore, void the entire policy, but only serves to exonerate the insurer for loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.307-316
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• 2014

In view of the increased threat arising terrorism, the International Maritime Organization(IMO) adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) which attached to the SOLAS Convention. The ISPS Code requires a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. For example, a shipowner must obtain the International Ship Security Certificate(ISSC). If the carrying vessel has not ISSC, the ship may be detained by the contracting governments. The Joint Cargo Committee(JCC) in London adopted the Cargo ISPS Endorsement, in which the assured who knowingly ships the cargoes on a non-ISPS Code compliant vessel will have no cover. However, where there is no the Cargo ISPS Endorsement in a Marine Cargo Insurance Policy and the cargo is carried by a non-ISPS Code certified vessel, the legal problem is whether or not it would constitute a breach of an implied warranty of seaworthiness and/or an implied warranty of legality. The purpose of this article is to analyze the potential legal issue on the relations between non-ISPS Code compliant vessel and two implied warranties under Marine Insurance Act(1906) in U.K.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.26
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• pp.173-199
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• 2005

The MIA 1906, s.78(4) provides that it is the duty of the assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss. In many cases the statutory duty will be unimportant, since rights, duties and liabilities declared by the Act or implied into marine insurance contracts by law may be modified by agreement, and many contracts contains a sue and labour clause which effectively reproduces and/or to modifies the statutory duty. The effect of such contractual provisions will, of course, be a matter of construction, though modern sue and labour clauses tend to reflect the principles contains in section 78. However, it must not be assumed that the terms of all contractual sue and labour clauses are, or will remain, identical, either with each other or with the statutory duty. The purpose of this study is to clarify the ambit of sue and labour.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.33
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• pp.191-219
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• 2007

Section 39(5) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 concerns the case where with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state. The underwriters argue that the assured had"blind-eye knowledge" of the particular respect in which the ship was unseaworthy. Blind-eye knowledge requires a conscious reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion of a truth about which one do not want to know and which one refuse to investigate. What has caused greater difficulty is the broad provision in s.17 which appears to be unlimited in its scope. The expression "utmost good faith" appears to derive from the idea of uberrimae fidei, words which indeed appear in the sidenote. The concept of uberrima fides does not appear to have derived from civil law and it has been regarded as unnecessary in civilian systems. S.17 raises many questions. But only two of them are critical to the decision of the present appeal-the fraudulent claim question and the litigation question. It is however necessary to discuss them in the context of a consideration of the problematic character of s.17. In the Star Sea Case, for the defendants to succeed in their defence under this part of the case the defendants have to show that claim was made fraudulently. They have failed to obtain a finding of fraud. It is not enough that until part of the way through the trial the owners failed to disclose to the defendants would have wished to see in order to provide them with some, albeit inadequate, evidential support for their alleged defence under s.39(5). The defence under s.17 fails. The Purpose of this work is to analyze the Star Sea Case, and to explore problems of the MIA relating to the judgement of this case.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.51-79
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• 1994

Section 55 (1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that the insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against but is not liable for any loss not proximately caused by a peril insured against. It is, therefore, essential to determine whether it is to be recoverable under the Marine Insurance Policy attaching the Institute Cargo or Hull Clauses. But a number of important losses are excluded from the policy by subsection 2 of the same section, unless the policy otherwise provides, although these losses are proximate causes of them. The purpose of this study is to investigate the meaning of proximate cause and excluded losses in the Act. The method of this study is a literature survey. In summary, (1) if the loss is considered to have been proximately caused by a certain peril, and the peril is insured against, the claim is recoverable, (2) if there are different causes resulting in separate losses, the claims recoverable will be those due to insured perils, (3) when the effective cause of the loss is established, remote causes can be ignored, (4) when causes of loss are combined, the claim is recovera-ble if the cause which is proximate in efficiency is an insured peril, (5) if there are two causes, equal in efficiency, the loss is recoverable if one of the causes is an insured peril, but always providing the other cause is merely an uninsured peril rather than a specific exclusion, (6) although certain losses are exclu-ded by section 55 (2) of the Act, with the exception of wilful misconduct of the insured, it is permitted for provision to be made in the policy to widen the terms to include such losses.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.365-387
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• 2000

One of the central and primary doctrine of the law of marine insurance is that the contract of indemnity entered into by assured and insurer is a contract of the utmost good faith. The notion of utmost good faith is a well established doctrine derived from the celebrated case of Carter v. Boehm(1766), decided long before the inception of the Marine Insurance Act(MIA). With the codification of the law, the principle found expression in sections $17{\sim}20$ of the MIA 1906. In section 17 is presented the general duty to observe the utmost good faith, with the following sections introducing particular aspects of the doctrine, namely, the duty of the assured and brokers to disclose material circumstances, and to avoid making misrepresentations. It is somewhat surprising that section 17, being a long founded doctrine, has not attracted the attention of the courts until very recently. Given that the most significant manifestations of uberrimae fidei are non-disclosure and misrepresentations, fulfillment of the obligation of utmost good faith was, not unreasonably, for a long time perceived in terms of the duty to disclose and not to misrepresent. However, Black King Shipping Corporation v. Massie, 'Litsion Pride'(1985) has clarified that the duty of disclosure stems from the duty of utmost good faith, and not vice versa. The duty of utmost good faith is an independent and overriding duty, with the ensuring sections on disclosure and representations providing mere illustrations of that duty. It is now clear that there are important questions with regard to the general doctrine and as to the nature and scope of any duty of good faith continuing after the contract of insurance is made which require separate and fuller discussion. The purpose of this paper is to review the nature and scope of the duty of utmost good faith.